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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Common law is a term used to designate English unwritten law as 
distinguished from English civil law, international law, and the laws 
of courts of equity. The statutes of England modified common law to 
a considerable extent. Changes were brought about to favor commercial 
enterprise, improve the state of society, and void feudal principles. 
Chapter 29, Section 8, Laws of Iowa, effective July 30, 1840, says, 
"None of the statutes of Great Britain shall be considered as law in 
this territory" (1, p. 401). This caused the state to become depend­
ent upon federal and state ruling cases. 
American ruling case laws are the result of final decisions of 
the courts—state, federal, or both. 
The difference between common law and ruling case law is that 
common law is a result of usage and custom within the jurisdiction of 
the statutes: American ruling case law is a direct product of court 
decisions, which in most instances were advanced from the lower to 
the high court system. 
The common law of a state, found in the decisions of its highest 
court of record, forms a body of precedent which gives added signif­
icance to the statute law enacted by the legislature and helps fill in 
gaps that may exist. A study of the numerous decisions which have been 
rendered by the Supreme Court of Iowa in the field of school law is 
therefore useful for a better understanding of school law. 
The purpose of this study is to present a survey of Iowa Supreme 
Court decisions which have been rendered throughout the history of the 
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State. It is hoped that specific guidelines can be suggested for more 
efficient school administration based on an understanding and an aware­
ness of principles as established by the courts. 
This chapter relates the merit of a historical study of Iowa 
Supreme Court decisions relative to education. A historical review of 
governmental authority, a statement of the problem, and a need for the 
study is described. The remainder of the chapter includes terminology 
and delimitations. 
Historical Review of Governmental Authority 
The school districts of Iowa are territorial divisions of the state 
and are held to be creatures of statute with only those powers expressly 
conferred by law or reasonably and necessarily implied as incidental to 
exercise of an expressly conferred power. They are governed by district 
directors who are political officers of the state and appointed by 
statutory provision. 
Iowa public school districts are quasi-corporations and are governed 
within the framework of the law which is derived from federal and state 
influences. These sources of law, at both levels, are the constitutions, 
statutes, court precedents, administrative policies and regulations, and 
attorney generals opinions. 
There was no mention of education in the Constitution of the United 
States. The tenth amendment of that document left the subject entirely 
to each of the respective states. Article X reads: "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
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to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people" 
(2, p. 24). 
The Federal Government influenced education in the various states 
even though the Constitution failed to mention it. While the Constitution 
was being framed, the Congress of the Old Confederation was enacting the 
Ordinance of 1787, also known as the "Northwest Ordinance." That document 
shaped the course of public education in the states thereafter admitted 
to the union. This is clearly explained in the words of Whiting 
(3, p. 25). 
In addition to a bill of rights to insure democracy, the North­
west Ordinance went further than the Constitution drawn up in 
that same year. It affirmed the principle that a democracy 
cannot function adequately unless supported by educated citizens. 
Therefore, each township was to have one section of land re­
served for the maintenance of public schools so that 'schools 
and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.' The 
Northwest Ordinance laid the foundation for the system of public 
schools and that is one of the finest aspects of American 
civilization. 
The Iowa Constitution deals with the subject of education in 
Article IX. Such areas as finance, organization, and administration 
have been carefully included. 
Both federal and state laws have an immeasurable influence upon edu­
cation. Most of the laws are based upon court decisions which are civil 
in nature. Another source of school law lies in judicial opinions. Both 
Federal and State Courts interpret the Constitutions and statutory laws 
and make application of common law principles. When given circumstances 
or conditions have not been legislated upon, the rights must be described 
by the courts on the basis of general principles handed down traditionally 
over many years. 
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The various state agencies may draft administrative policies and 
regulations. These agencies must operate within the framework of the 
state and federal statutes, and administrative rules and policies pro­
mulgated pursuant to law. 
For the reason that the General Assembly cannot foresee every 
operational detail, it has granted rule-making power to the State Super­
intendent, Department, or Board of Public Instruction, with respect to 
various areas of subject matter within the field of school law. 
Examples of such areas are approval standards, safety standards for school 
buses, special education, certification of teachers, and area schools. 
A valid departmental rule has the force and effect of law and is a 
part of the growing field of regulation known as Administrative law. 
In 1951 the General Assembly of Iowa enacted uniform requirements for the 
adoption, approval and publication of administrative rules by state 
agencies. For purposes of this discussion, the terms "rule," "regu­
lation," and "standard," may be considered as synonymous. The require­
ments for the adoption of rules appear in Chapter 17A of the Code of Iowa. 
In order for a proposed rule to become effective as a rule, it must 
first be adopted by the State Board of Public Instruction and signed by 
the President of the Board and the State Superintendent. The signed 
rules, in the form of two originals and two first carbons, typed on 
special rule paper, are then submitted to the Attorney General for 
approval as to form and legality. At the same time duplicated copies, 
made by any legible process, are mailed to the six members of the Depart­
mental Rules Review Committee and to the Code Editor. These copies must 
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be in the hands of the committee members at least ten days before the 
committee meeting at which they will be considered. The committee meets 
on the second Tuesday of every month. A departmental representative is 
required to be present and explain the authority and reason for the pro­
posed rule when it is taken up by the committee. 
The Attorney General has 30 days and the Rules Review Committee has 
45 days in which to act upon the proposed rule. Action may be approval 
or disapproval. 
Rules which have been approved by the Departmental Rules Review 
Committee must be filed with the Secretary of State. The rules are re­
ferred to the president of the senate and speaker of the house of the 
forthcoming General Assembly. Objections to a rule may be enforced by 
the enactment of a statute to provide alterations or declare it void. 
A bipartisan Departmental Rules Review Committee is appointed by 
the president of the senate and speaker of the house. Each appoints 
three members from the legislative body which he represents. The Com­
mittee serves for a two year term, which commences on May 1 following 
the convening of the legislature in regular session. 
Lastly, the Federal and State Attorney Generals who issue opinions 
exert considerable influence upon the operation of school districts. 
They interpret legislative questions which arise at their respective 
levels. Of the various judicial and administrative forces that influence 
and implement the statutes, the Supreme Court of Iowa furnishes the most 
important precedents. 
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Statement of Problem 
The school law, insofar as the legislative process is concerned, is 
the product of the General Assembly (4, p. 1). School laws are con­
tinuously available to school administrators, boards, and other interested 
consumers in the form of a bound book and supplements (5, p. 75). 
However, the legislative process invariably involves a series of com­
promises embodied in amendments. The final production may be cloaked in 
ambiguities. The bare bones of the statutes need to be fleshed out in 
order to have a viable function. To a degree this can be accomplished 
by executive construction of doubtful provisions. However, the Supreme 
Court of Iowa has said that executive construction, whether arrived at by 
a department head or the attorney general, though it be entitled to con­
sideration by the court, is not binding upon the courts (6, p. 201; 
7, p. 391; 8, p. 277). The problem is, therefore, to obtain a complete 
picture of school law, not only the words and phrases as enacted by the 
General Assembly, but their significant meaning as declared by the Court 
in the course of resolving actual controversies. 
Need for the Study 
There are few areas in the field of school administration that are 
more important than school law; however, this area is sometimes neg­
lected. Board members, superintendents, principals, teachers, non-
certified employees, and students are directly concerned. These persons 
are not expected to have a technical understanding of legal procedures 
7 
resulting from court action; however, they should possess general knowl­
edge of the subject. 
A review of doctoral dissertation abstracts, periodicals, and texts 
indicates there is no comprehensive study of Iowa Supreme Court cases in 
the field of school law. 
It is hoped this study will not only aid those directly involved in 
our public schools but also serve as resource material for those in­
directly involved. By reason of organization and arrangement, it may be 
useful to various attorneys and state legislators, even though they are 
not included in the group for whom it is primarily designed. 
Delimitations of the Study 
Supreme Court decisions vary from state to state in accordance to 
statutes and legal interpretations. This study is limited to the follow­
ing: 
1. Iowa Supreme Court decisions from the time of the Court's 
first education decision in 1848 through the year 1970. 
2. Iowa Supreme Court decisions which only influence the 
operation of public schools. The history of these cases 
at the lower court level was not included in this study. 
3. Iowa Supreme Court decisions which currently influence the 
operation of public schools. Obsolete cases were excluded 
from the study except when used for historical significance. 
4. Decisions most recently rendered by the Iowa Supreme Court 
were utilized in this study wherever possible. Court rul­
ings of an earlier date were used only to indicate consist­
encies, contrasts, or when considered important. 
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CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This chapter consists of a review of statutory related materials 
acquired from dissertations, theses, and publications. In no instance 
was any publication devoted totally to Supreme Court decisions of the 
various states; however, the materials may be considered directly or in­
directly related. The State University of Iowa and Iowa State University 
have not had any doctoral research confined to Iowa Supreme Court 
decisions. 
The researcher has investigated other studies and publications which 
were similar to Iowa Supreme Court case decisions. Parallel findings 
were evident even though the authors had conducted their studies in other 
states, or on a national basis. The likeness of reporting indicated the 
similarity of Iowa statutes and court decisions to those of other states. 
Case summaries revealed that court judges review the decisions of other 
State Supreme Courts prior to final action relative to a given case. 
The review of literature was limited to (1) tort liability, (2) students, 
and (3) personnel. 
Tort Liability 
In 1965 Fred John Rhode of Iowa State University wrote a disser­
tation titled "Tort Immunity and Iowa School Districts." At that time 
Iowa school districts were immune to tort liability. All school district 
employees were liable for their own torts because governmental immunity 
did not extend to them if they were sued as individuals. Tort liability 
was, however, extended to school district administrative personnel. 
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School districts were not legally permitted to expend school funds 
for liability insurance. The Iowa Attorney General ruled the expendi­
ture illegal because liability did not exist. 
The author stated that sovereign immunity of the lesser governmental 
subdivisions was being criticized by the courts. He wrote (9, p. 180): 
The Courts, in attempting to lessen the harshness of the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, have developed the so-called 
governmental proprietary distinction, which attaches tort 
liability to a proprietary function, but not to a function 
deemed governmental. The rationale given for the distinction 
was that many governmental units act in both a corporate 
capacity, similar to private corporations with local interests 
not shared by the state as a whole, and in a governmental 
capacity endowed with governmental powers and responsibilities. 
The Iowa Supreme Court generally sustained tort immunity; however, 
recovery was permitted by legislative claim. This Court also ruled that 
municipal corporations were liable for their torts and the torts of their 
employees. 
Rhode found that school districts were immune from tort liability 
as early as 1876 in the case of Wood v. Independent School District of 
Mitchell when a child was injured on unguarded well-drilling equipment 
located on the school ground. 
In 1912 the Attorney General ruled that a school district was not 
held liable for a personal injury sustained from a boiler explosion, and 
in 1928 he rendered a decision resulting in district immunity for an in­
jury sustained by a student engaged in athletics. A 1930 opinion ex­
tended immunity to schools for injuries sustained by visitors on school 
premises. 
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The Hjobs case of 1933 held that officers, agents, and servants of 
a municipal corporation were immune to liability. In the 1964 case of 
Beyer v. lova Hish School Athletic Association, the Court again absolved 
a school district from tort liability when a bleacher collapsed and 
caused personal injury during a basketball tournament sponsored by the 
Iowa High School Athletic Association in the Mason City High School gym­
nasium. The Iowa High School Athletic Association, however, was not im­
mune because it was not a governmental agency. 
The results of the Rhode dissertation were made available to the 
Iowa Legislature prior to the passage of the tort liability law in 1967. 
Tort immunity had been severely criticized by the courts because as 
quasi-corporations the schools were receiving complete immunity. The 
doctrine of immunity was weakening due to the fact that courts believed 
school districts were responsible for their employees. 
Leonard Abels, administrative consultant, Iowa Department of Public 
Instruction, wrote an article "School Districts are now Subject to Tort 
Liability." It was published in the Educational Bulletin of the Iowa 
Department of Public Instruction in November 1967. The author explained 
the newly created statute which was advocated in the Rhode dissertation. 
Abels referred to the enactment of Senate File 710 by the 62nd General 
Assembly which imposed tort liability upon the school districts of the 
State. 
Abels discussed the historical aspect of tort liability with refer­
ence to the Boyer case, which was heard three times by the Iowa Supreme 
Court. 
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Abels quoted the passage of the Act which became effective on 
January 1, 1968. He said (10, p. 1): 
With certain exceptions. Senate File 710 subjects school 
districts to liability for the torts of their officers and 
employees while acting within the scope of their employment. 
It defines a tort as 'every civil wrong which results in 
wrongful death or injury to person or injury to property and 
includes but is not restricted to actions based upon negli­
gence, breach of duty, and nuisance.' Examples where such 
liability might be imposed on a school district would include 
injuries in shop classes, laboratories, on the playground, 
while riding the school bus, and in about every imaginable 
situation, including those inflicted by pupils upon each 
other through lack of proper supervision. 
Abels spoke of exceptions which were provided in the bill. Prior 
knowledge by the plaintiff of defect, disrepair, obstruction, accumu­
lation, or nuisance is a defense when a different but safe route was 
available. These circumstances prevent cases to be brought before the 
lower courts. 
Abels was aware of the Rhode study and had discussed the findings 
with him in 1964. A tort liability bill was drafted by Abels upon the 
request of Iowa legislators. It was patterned after the Minnesota tort 
statute; however, it was modified somewhat from its original form by 
legislative influences. These men must be given due credit for their 
contributions relative to the passage of the Tort Liability Act. 
The contributions of Rhode and Abels were included in this review 
of literature to summarize their findings and contributions in one source 
of information. Their reports present a history of tort liability in 
Iowa and relate to the findings of the researcher's dissertation. All 
Iowa Supreme Court cases dealing with tort liability reported to date were 
decided during and prior to 1964, or before the enactment of the law. 
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The researcher trusts that the information will be more accessible to 
all interested persons. 
Students 
A thesis titled "The Constitutional Rights of Students in Public 
Universities," written in 1969 by Charles William Dobra, Jr., a student 
at Iowa State University, is included in this chapter. The study related 
to historical change at the higher education level, but occasionally re­
ferred to students at elementary and secondary levels. Many of the 
illustrations at the university level are also applicable to the school 
districts of Iowa. 
The researcher's dissertation includes a chapter devoted to student 
Court cases. The Dobra study is summarized in this chapter to make the 
results more accessible to school officials and those having an interest 
in court decisions. 
Cases reviewed by Dobra indicated that institutions of higher learn­
ing can regulate student demonstrations relative to place and time. A 
seizure of buildings by students is not a permissive form of expression 
guaranteed by the Constitution. The wearing of armbands cannot be denied 
students unless the university can prove the action is detrimental to 
the educational process. 
Dobra found that schools at the secondary level have limited reg­
ulations of personal dress of students. This cannot however be ac­
complished at the university level. 
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Freedom of the press at the higher level of education is not abso­
lute. It is subject to given minimum restrictions imposed upon it by 
statute. Student editors can be removed from their editorial positions 
even though expulsion from college is not proper. The student press is 
liable in both civil and criminal actions for its printing. 
Dobra found that fraternal organizations are subject to the regu­
lations of institutions of higher learning when given permission to 
function upon their campuses. Racial or religious discrimination by the 
fraternal organization is not permitted. 
Some persons are not eligible to enroll in public institutions due 
to their inability to meet the standards of institutions and state legis­
lative requirements. These standards cannot be discriminatory due to 
race. A student's grades must be assessed in a non-arbitrary manner by 
institutions of higher learning. 
Institutions of higher learning have been forced to evaluate and 
apply restrictive standards relative as to who should be permitted to 
view student records. This change in practice was based on a re-emphasis 
on constitutional rights rather than on new statutes. 
The author stressed change when he said (11, p. 395): 
This study has dealt with an area of legal transaction. The 
courts since 1954 have made tremendous inroads in applying 
those rights contained in the Bill of Rights to students who 
attend public universities and colleges through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For the first time in 
history students have been recognized to have rights, and 
better yet, the courts have held that students have a right to 
exercise those rights provided that they do not disrupt school 
activities. 
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The courts have been changeable institutions which have not devised 
concise and clear rules for student behavior. However, they have devised 
a general framework for the adoption of higher educational policies and 
a system for student behavior. Education is not considered a privilege, 
but a recognized right. 
Dobra's study was chiefly limited to a discussion of statutes and 
judicial decisions relating to higher education. However, there are a 
number of parallels applicable to public school education at the elemen­
tary and secondary levels. Examples of these include; (1) wearing of 
armbands, (2) fraternal organizations, (3) enrollment standards, and (4) 
viewing of student records. 
The Dobra study excluded all areas of Iowa Supreme Court research 
included in the researcher's dissertation, except the subject of students. 
As published by Bolmeier (12), a study of the legal status of 
married students in North Carolina public high schools was completed by 
L. Gilbert Carroll in 1960 as a requirement for an Ed.D. degree at Duke 
University. This study revealed that a greater percentage of rural high 
school students marry than do city secondary students; also, a greater 
percentage of girls marry while in high school. 
Carroll found that a very limited number of married students take 
part in college preparatory courses. He also found that a high per­
centage of married students fail to complete the twelfth grade and that 
scholarship, conduct, and attitude toward education are improved or 
approximately the same. The acceptance of students by classmates after 
marriage is about the same or somewhat less than their acceptance before 
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marriage. Finally, student participation in extra-curricular activities 
declines after marriage. 
Carroll's study of married students did not correlate with any of 
the Court cases in this study. The Iowa Supreme Court has ruled on only 
one married student case throughout history. It is possible that the 
Court will experience similar cases in the future. 
As cited by Bolmeier (13), a dissertation was written by Harold L. 
Tyler, a graduate student at Duke University, relating to the legal status 
of pupil placement in public schools. Tyler found that legislative, ex­
ecutive, and judicial branches of the United States Government had be­
come united in their efforts to end racial discrimination and had estab­
lished the principle of enrollment by freedom of choice. Boards have 
been charged with the responsibility of providing education which 
eliminated discrimination. The courts did not specify the means of 
accomplishment but permitted district freedom in this task. 
The Tyler study was designed to report on racial discrimination in 
the United States. His findings were highly applicable to the re­
searcher's study inasmuch as Iowa ruled on the subject of discrimination 
as early as 1839. The Court decided the Ralph case and ruled that the 
law extends equal protection to men of all colors. Discrimination was 
also the subject of two school cases in 1868 and 1875. The Court ruled 
in both instances that students cannot be compelled to attend separate 
schools, or be refused admission because of color. 
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Personnel 
In a publication by Mort and Hamilton (14), titled "The Law and 
Public Education," it was found that a teacher's certificate relates only 
to classification and qualification. Certification serves as a license 
to teach but does not guarantee employment. The issuing agency cannot 
arbitrarily refuse the awarding of a certificate unless there is due 
cause. 
Mort and Hamilton stated that a teacher must possess a valid cer­
tificate at the commencement of a teaching period, unless state statute 
requires that the teacher possess a valid certificate at the time of 
entering into a contract with a school district. In most instances a 
teacher cannot be legally compensated by a district if he does not possess 
a valid certificate and contract. 
Teacher contracts must meet all the requirements of contracts in 
general. It must be an instrument of agreement between competent parties; 
illegal matters cannot be negotiated; an offer and acceptance must exist; 
and compensation must be awarded for services rendered. Contracts must 
be in writing when required by statute. 
The authors also found that the courts have decided that selection 
of teachers on a discriminatory basis is illegal. Employment standards 
may be devised but must be justly applied to all applicants. 
Teachers may be legally dismissed for incompetence, negligence, in­
subordination, and immorality. Many of the states which possess con­
tinuing contract laws also provide for staff dismissal. 
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The authors related that boards of education have the authority to 
establish reasonable rules and regulations relative to the operation of 
their respective schools. This applies to both employees and students. 
Some states consider the rules of the board of education as a part of 
the teacher's contract. 
Teachers occupy a position in loco parentis so as to maintain dis­
cipline in the school. They may administer corporal punishment, unless 
prohibited by their respective boards or state statute. The punishment 
must be reasonable, without malice, and cannot cause permanent damage. 
Courts generally ruled on the manner in which punishment was administered, 
because it must be appropriate to the size and sex of the student. 
Mort and Hamilton also found that several states enacted statutes 
to provide a retirement system for their employees. This was accom­
plished to attract and retain competent personnel. Funding is mandated 
and contributions are made by state governments and employees. Mandatory 
or voluntary participation is dependent upon individual state laws. 
The constitutionality of retirement laws has been upheld by the 
courts in the past. Favorable consideration has been sustained because 
of the attraction and retention of competent employees. 
Mort and Hamilton related to several teacher personnel areas which 
are found in the researcher's dissertation. They are (1) dismissal, 
(2) contracts, and (3) retirement. 
The text of Mort and Hamilton related to national trends, whereas 
this dissertation is devoted to Iowa Supreme Court decisions. 
18 
CHAPTER III: PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES 
USED IN THIS INVESTIGATION 
The research described in this dissertation was both historical and 
topical in approach and was almost exclusively limited to the primary 
source data. This source was the library of Iowa Reports, published by 
the State of Iowa, consisting of 261 volumes. The time considered was 
1848 through 1971. These volumes contain all decisions rendered by the 
Supreme Court of Iowa; those relating to education were considered in 
this study. 
Secondary sources of information included various commentaries 
regarding court decisions contained in dissertations, theses, and other 
publications pertinent to school law. All of this research was com­
pleted during the past 13 years. 
Case Briefing 
A system for briefing primary source cases was devised after inter­
views were concluded with two attorneys. Leonard Abels, administrative 
consultant. Department of Public Instruction, Des Moines, Iowa, and G. W. 
Templeton, attorney at law. Garner, Iowa, were most helpful. A decision 
was reached by the researcher to obtain four major sources of information 
from each case: (1) facts, (2) issue, (3) decision, and (4) reasons. 
An example of a brief obtained from the case of Lewis Consolidated School 
District v. Johnston is presented. 
Facts: 1. The Legislature enacted a statute authorizing and 
directing the State Superintendent and State Board 
to make rules for the approval of schools. 
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2. The State Board and State Superintendent made rules 
for the approval of schools as directed by statute. 
3. The plaintiff school was disapproved for noncom­
pliance with the rules and as a result lost its 
state aid. 
4. The plaintiff sued to keep its state aid. 
Was the statute, pursuant to which the rules were adopted, 
cons t i tut iona1? 
Court decided for the plaintiff. 
1. Article III, Section 1, Constitution of Iowa, gives 
exclusive legislative power to the Legislature 
(General Assembly). 
2. A delegation of rule-making power without qualifica­
tions or standards amounts to a delegation of 
legislative power. 
3. The General Assembly cannot delegate its exclusive 
power to make law. 
In addition to the four major sources of information obtained by 
briefing Supreme Court cases, the researcher attempted to supply the 
following: 
1. Date of case. 
2. Name of plaintiff and defendant. 
3. Number of judges voting in favor of sustaining or 
overruling decisions (this does not always appear 
in the Iowa Reports). The Constitution of 1857 pro­
vided for three Supreme Court judges. Article V, 
Section 10 of the Constitution provided for an 
increase in the number of judges. The General Assembly 
has currently provided for nine. 
Issue; 
Decision: 
Reasons: 
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Organization of the Study 
Supreme Court cases used for the purpose of this study were cate­
gorized into a historical sequence. 
1. The Northwest Ordinance provided land for educational purposes 
from which school districts were established. 
2. School boards were needed to conduct the affairs of the dis­
tricts. 
3. The districts became involved in school building construction, 
employment of teachers, and education of children. 
4. Transportation of children began at a later date, which con­
tributed in part to necessary district reorganization. 
5. Elections were necessary in the administration of school dis­
tricts. 
6. Conflicts resulting from disagreements in all phases of edu­
cation resulted in many court appeals. 
The study was organized into 13 chapters related to the following 
topics: 
Chapter I Introduction 
Chapter II Review of Literature 
Chapter III Procedures and Techniques Used in the Study 
Chapter IV School Districts 
Chapter V School Boards 
Chapter VI Building and Grounds 
Chapter VII Teachers 
Chapter VIII Students 
Chapter IX Transporta tion 
Chapter X Reorganization of Districts 
Chapter XI Elections 
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Chapter XII Court of Appeals 
Chapter XIII Summary and Conclusions 
Each chapter was divided into sub-topics with the appropriate case 
decisions properly categorized. A summary of each case was presented, 
followed by one or more headnotes as presented in the Iowa Reports. The 
headnotes were approved by the judges who wrote the Supreme Court deci­
sions . 
Definition of Terms 
A study of Iowa Supreme Court decisions required that terminology 
be adequately defined. The following definitions were used in conjunc­
tion with the summarization and case quotations. This list will facili­
tate a greater understanding of the Court cases. 
Adjudicated: To hear or try and determine judicially 
Affirmed: To establish, ratify, or confirm 
Aggrieved : One in distress, or having suffered injury or loss 
Appeal: A procedure by which a case is brought from a lower to a 
higher court 
Certiorari: To be informed. Writ from a superior court to call 
for review of the proceedings and records of an inferior court 
or a body acting in a quasi-judicial capacity 
Collaterally Assailed: Accompanying one another, or at the side 
Common Law: Unwritten laws for universal reception 
Concurrent Action; Joint and equal in authority 
Contiguous: In actual contact or touching 
Court of Equity: Court of equality 
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Declaratory Judgment: One which declares the rights of the parties 
and expresses the opinion of the court on a question of law, 
without ordering anything to be done 
De Facto: In fact or actual 
Defendant; One required to make answer in an action or suit 
De Jure: By right; by lawful title 
Demurrer: Plea for the dismissal of a lawsuit 
Discretionary: The power of free decision. The power of the court 
to act unhampered by legal rule 
Electorate: Persons entitled to vote 
Enjoin: To require or command. To require a person by writ of 
injunction to perform or to abstain from some act 
Equity: Formal system of legal and procedural rules and doctrines 
according to which justice is administered 
Estop; To impede or bar 
Immunity: Freedom from any charge 
Injunction: A writ requiring a person to do or to forbear cer­
tain acts 
Interlocutory: Intermediate and not final 
Jurisdiction: Sphere of authority 
Loco Parentis: To act in place of the parent 
Mandamus: The writ issued to enforce the performance of some 
public duty 
Mandate: A demand from a superior court or official to an inferior 
one 
Pari Materia: On the same subject or of the same matter. Equal 
Plaintiff: One who brings a suit into court 
Plenary: Complete or full 
Prima Facia: Evidence which is adequate to establish a fact 
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Qtiash; To suppress or quell 
Quasi-corporation: As if it were. In a certain sense 
Quasi-Judicial: Having critical powers of inquiry, like those of 
a judge or judiciary 
Quit Claim Deed: A deed which warrants nothing and proposes to con­
vey only that interest in the property which is held 
Quo Warranto: A proceeding for a like purpose begun by an informa­
tion; also, the information, or the proceeding itself 
Ratify: To approve or sanction 
Repugnant: That which is contrary to what is stated before, or 
insensible 
Sacrosanct: Most sacred 
Statutory: A law enacted by the legislative branch 
Stay Order: To stop or halt 
Tort: A wrongful act, injury, or damage for which a civil action 
can be brought against the wrongdoer 
Tortious Act: Implying or involving tort 
Vitiate: To make legally ineffective 
Writ: An order or mandatory process 
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CHAPTER IV: SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
School districts are the basic units of school government in the 
State of Iowa. The legislature provided for their creation as corpora­
tions with limited powers. Several classifications of districts were 
established during the history of the State. 
The township district was the first to become implemented as a re­
sult of the Northwest Ordinance in 1787. This type of district was physi­
cally superimposed upon the geographic township plan which served as the 
original framework for land survey. Each township was comprised of 36 
sections of land, divided into sub-districts of four sections each. A 
schoolhouse was usually constructed at the midpoint of each sub-district. 
The creation of cities and towns resulted in the development of in­
dependent city or town school districts. The district boundaries were 
in most instances the same as the boundaries of the political subdivi­
sions of cities and towns. 
Consolidated school districts were created at a later date in an 
attempt to obtain a larger tax base. This system resulted in centrally-
located schools which were frequently situated in rural areas. Effort to 
stay with some semblance of the government land survey was evidenced by 
a provision that school district boundaries conform to no smaller dimen­
sion than quarter-quarter sections of land. 
Finally, because there was need for an even larger tax base than 
that found in the consolidated district, the community school district 
was conceived for the purpose of supporting an expanding educational pro­
gram. The consolidated and community districts differ in that the latter 
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is not limited to a single centrally-located building per district and 
conformance of boundaries to quarter-quarter section lines is not re­
quired . 
Various problems relating to the nature, power, duties, and responsi­
bilities of school districts have occurred throughout the history of the 
State. It was necessary to resolve many of them in the Supreme Court of 
Iowa. Those which specifically relate to general government of school 
districts are presented in this chapter. 
Quasi-corporations of State 
School districts in Iowa are classified as quasi-corporations cre­
ated by the legislature to administer the educational policies of the 
State. A quasi-corporation is defined as something less than a true muni­
cipal corporation (a city or town) but resembling it in corporate nature. 
The affairs of each district must be directed by a board of education 
within the powers conferred upon it by statute or implied therefrom. 
These powers may be altered, added to, or taken away at the pleasure of 
the legislature, whose authority is plenary. The researcher has set forth 
below summaries of three case decisions which have been rendered relating 
to quasi-corporations. 
Bloomfield v. Davis County Community School — In 1963 the Davis County 
Community School District sought a permit from the City of Bloomfield for 
permission to install a gasoline pump and storage tank in a residential 
district, but on its own property. The City Council passed an ordinance 
after the request was submitted and forbade such installation. The issue 
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involved the authority of a city ordinance to prevent a school district, 
as an agency of the state, from making an installation on its own prop­
erty. The Court unanimously ruled in favor of the Davis County Community 
School District. It reasoned that a school district has jurisdiction 
over student transportation; consequently, it must conduct its own trans­
portation business affairs. There is no statute which prohibits a state 
agency from utilizing its property in a manner which permits it to com­
ply with the law.(15, p. 900). 
District agencies of state—transportation of pupils govern­
mental function. A school district is an arm or agency of 
the state, and maintenance of public schools, including pro­
viding transportation to the pupils entitled to it as required 
by statute, is a governmental function, not a proprietary one. 
Dean v. Armstrong — The Board of Education of the North Superior School 
District closed its.school and designated the children to Spirit Lake on 
a tuition basis for the 1954-55 school year. Dean brought suit against 
Armstrong, the Board President, to prevent the directors from closing the 
school. The issue: Does the Board have statutory authority to close an 
educational facility and contract with other districts, and more specifi­
cally, with consolidated districts? The Court held in favor of Armstrong 
and reasoned that a board of education does possess the authority to dis­
continue its educational facilities and contract with other districts. 
The ruling also applies to consolidated districts because they are valid 
organizations with school district authority (16, p. 412). 
Application of constitutional guaranties--status of school 
districts. A school district is not a 'person' within the 
meaning of any bill of rights or constitutional limitation, 
but is a political organization with no rights, functions, 
or capacity except such as are conferred upon it by the 
legislature, whose power is plenary. 
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Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Association — Boyer brought suit 
against the Iowa High School Athletic Association for an injury sustained 
at a state basketball tournament held in the Mason City High School gym­
nasium. He claimed the defendant did not assume normal precaution, 
thereby causing the bleachers to collapse. The issue was to determine 
whether or not the doctrine of local government tort immunity was harsh, 
outmoded, and obsolete, relative to trends of the law. In 1964 the Court 
ruled that the Iowa High School Athletic Association was liable because 
it was not a quasi-corporation of the state. The Mason City School 
District was absolved from liability because it is an agency of the state 
and serves a state function. The Court, after pointing out that in Iowa 
governmental immunity is based on statute rather than court rule, sus­
tained previous decisions in absolving school districts of tort liability 
(17, p. 337). 
Quasi-corporation—agency of state. The school district is 
a quasi-corporation, an arm or agency of the state, created 
by legislature to carry out the governmental function of 
maintaining public schools. 
Tuition 
Tuition may be defined as financial reimbursement for educational 
services. The responsibility for payment of tuition was an issue in 
some instances which resulted in Supreme Court cases. 
District Township of Horton v. The District Township of Ocheyedan — A 
tuition case was brought to the attention of the Iowa Supreme Court in 
1878. The District Township of Horton brought charges against the District 
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Township of Ocheyedan. A number of students residing in the Horton 
District attended school in the Ocheyedan District because the Horton 
District conducted school for only three months of a school year. The 
defendant attempted to collect tuition by filing a claim with the County 
Auditor, requiring him to deduct said amounic from the tax receipts of the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff attempted to void the claim of the defendant. 
The issue given consideration by the Court: Was the plaintiff school 
district liable for tuition payments when school was conducted for only 
three months in its district? Twenty-four weeks of school was required 
by law. A decision was rendered by the Court which held in favor of the 
defendant, and the plaintiff was required to pay tuition. The Court rea­
soned that children were entitled to attend 24 weeks of school and a 
school year of only three months, scheduled by the plaintiff, did not re­
move the responsibility (18, p. 231). 
Attendance in another district. Children residing in one 
school district may attend school in another with the consent 
of the directors of the latter, provided their own school is 
not in session, and also provided they have not had the privi­
lege of attending school twenty-four weeks in the year in their 
own district, and for such attendance their own district is 
liable to the district where they may attend. 
Filing of account. Where the directors of the district in 
which the children reside upon being notified of their attend­
ance elsewhere, determine they will not pay their tuition, no 
further demand upon them is necessary and the account may then 
be filed with the auditor. 
Nishna Valley Community School District v. Malvern Community School 
District — Declaratory judgment was brought by the plaintiff to collect 
tuition from fragmented districts annexed to the Malvern District by 
the County Board. Following the reorganization of school boundary lines. 
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students residing in unassigned areas attended the Nishna Valley School. 
The territory of the children's residence was assigned to the Malvern 
Community School District by Court action on November 9, 1960. The 
Malvern Board protested payment of tuition prior to the date of Court 
assignment, claiming that the territory was not a portion of its district. 
The issue: What portion of tuition should be paid to the Nishna Valley 
School District? A decision was rendered in 1963 by the judges that 
tuition be paid to the plaintiff in an amount of one-third of the total 
charge. The Court reasoned that generally children must attend school 
in the district where they reside (19, p. 132). 
Tuition and transportation—obligation of pupils to attend in 
their own districts. Generally, where adequate school facil­
ities are available in a school district pupils residing 
therein must avail themselves of the facilities so furnished 
and they have no absolute right to attend school in another 
district at the expense of their local board. 
Property Tax 
Property tax has been a source of support for the public schools 
since the time of their conception. Complaints and controversies rel­
ative to this tax go back many years, as evidenced in the Court. 
Stevenson and Rice v. The District Township of Summit — Stevenson and 
Rice initiated a writ of mandamus to recover a balance due them for the 
construction of a schoolhouse. Approval for payment was given by the 
Board, and the District Treasurer was ordered to make payment; however, 
no funds were available. The issue: Must a board of education levy a 
tax to meet an obligation when no funds are available? An 1878 decision • 
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was reached in favor of the plaintiff. The Court reasoned that a tax 
must be levied when a treasurer is instructed to pay an obligation for 
which there are insufficient funds. Mandamus refers to many issues, but 
in this case refers to property tax (20, p. 462). 
Mandamus. Where orders on the treasurer have been issued by 
the board to a creditor for the amount of his claim, and there 
are no funds in the treasurer's hands to meet the same, it be­
comes the duty of the board to levy a tax to provide the 
necessary funds, and on its refusal to so act, it may be com­
pelled thereto by mandamus. 
Fort Dodge Independent School District v. The District Township of 
Summit — The Fort Dodge District brought suit against the Board of Super­
visors of the District of Summit. The plaintiff owned real property in 
trust and used the profit to finance college education for needy students. 
The School District attempted to recover previously paid taxes from the 
County and stop further collection. The Court was faced with the issue 
of deciding whether or not the profits from real property held in trust 
were used to reduce taxes. A decision was rendered in 1940 in favor of 
the defendant because the judges reasoned that the income received by 
the school did not reduce taxes (21, p. 544). 
School district as trustee—individuals as cestuis—property 
not exempt. A school district which held real property in 
trust to use the income for college scholarships could not, 
in a mandamus action against the county supervisors, recover 
taxes paid on the property and prevent further collection of 
taxes on the ground that the property was exempt from taxation 
under a public purpose, the beneficiaries of the trust being 
the recipients of the scholarships, with the trust standing 
in the same position as if vested in any other qualified 
trustee. 
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District Township of Honey Creek v. Floete -- In 1882 the District Town­
ship of Honey Creek filed suit against Floete, who, as Treasurer of 
Delaware County, improperly distributed tax money. Taxes were paid for 
school support to the County in which the area was located, but the 
receipts should have been paid to the Treasurer of an adjoining County 
because of territorial assignment. The issue: Was a portion of the tax 
money improperly paid? The judges of the Court held in favor of the 
plaintiff. Mandamus proceedings compelled the correction; the error 
was a mistake and statutory limitations had not expired. Mandamus in 
this case also refers to property tax (22, p. 109). 
Territory in another township: Right to taxes arising from. 
Where one of the subdistricts of a district township embraced 
territory in another township and county, and taxes for the 
contingent and teachers' fund had been levied upon such 
territory and paid into the treasury of the county in which 
it lay, and the treasury belonged to the district township to 
which the territory was attached, and for the support of whose 
school the taxes were levied and paid and the money apportioned, 
and that the treasurer, refusing to pay said district township 
upon the proper warrants therefor, could be compelled by man­
damus to do so. 
Grout V. Illingworth — In 1906 Grout initiated proceedings against 
Illingworth, who was County Treasurer of Black Hawk County. The plain­
tiff brought action to restrain the defendant from imposing a tax on 
his property. He claimed that said property was not included in the East 
Waterloo School District until April 15, 1904, and that he was not a 
resident of the District at the time of election, which prevented him 
from voting. The issue involved a taxpayer who was absent at the time 
of election and who was assessed property tax at a later date. The 
Court ruled in favor of the defendant inasmuch as the plaintiff would 
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receive benefits from the school. The certification of taxes was com­
pleted after the plaintiff purchased property within the district (23, 
p. 281). 
Extension of a district: Taxation of property. Property 
which is brought into a school district by an extension of 
its limits, prior to the levy of a schoolhouse tax by the 
board of supervisors, is subject to the payment of the tax 
even though the owner was not a resident of the district, 
could not participate in voting the tax and his property was 
not included therein until after the amount of the tax had 
been certified to the county board. 
Smith V. Powell — The Township of Brighton Board instructed the Dis­
trict Secretary not to certify a $3,000 tax for the construction of a 
building which had been mandated by the voters. Smith had initiated 
a writ of certiorari to force the certification of the tax. Powell 
was named defendant for the school district. The 1880 issue involved 
the legality of the instructions given to the District Secretary. A 
decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the reason that 
a tax voted by the people must be levied and mandamus is the proper 
procedure (24, p. 215). 
School directors: Illegal act of. Certiorari is a pro­
per remedy where the board of directors in a district 
township direct their secretary not to certify for col­
lection a tax voted by the electors of the district. 
Chappell V. Keokuk Board of Directors — In 1950 the voters of the 
Keokuk School District approved a schoolhouse tax (2.5 mills) for a 
period of ten years. Chappell brought court action to stop the certif­
ication of the tax after a two year period. The district court granted 
an injunction and the Keokuk Board of Directors appealed to the Iowa 
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Supreme Court. The issue: Does a continuing tax levy violate the law? 
The Court ruled in favor of the defendant for the reason that the law 
does not place restrictions on this levy, and it speaks of the element 
of time as "plural." Chapter 278, Code of Iowa, also relates to the 
authority of the voters (25, p. 230). 
Authorization for levy of tax for term of years may be 
terminated or modified at another election. Where voters 
have authorized levy of schoolhouse tax for a number of 
years, they may at any regular election or special election 
called for that purpose order the tax terminated or modi­
fied . 
Voters empowered to vote schoolhouse tax for term of years 
under Section 278.1, C., '46. Code Section 278.1, C., '46, 
authorizing a schoolhouse tax of two and one-half mills in 
any one year, having no express or implied limitation in 
the number of years, empowers the voters to vote a school-
house tax for more than one year. 
Keefner v. Porter — A suit in equity was initiated in 1940 by Keefner 
to prohibit the State Treasurer and State Comptroller from carrying out 
their mandated duties in making agricultural land tax payments. This 
money was paid to relieve the agricultural tax burden when the tax ex­
ceeded a given millage. The case was presented to the Court on the 
grounds that appropriations were used for private interests of tax­
payers and not for public purposes. The issue: Was the Iowa 
Constitution violated? The Court held for Porter since payments were 
made to the taxpayers of all school districts. Legislative authority in 
the matter of appropriations was sustained (26, p. 844). 
Equal protection of laws—agricultural land credit act— 
arbitrary classification. The Agricultural Land Credit Act 
granting tax benefits only to agricultural land located in 
independent school districts are not to agricultural lands 
lying within consolidated districts held violative of the 
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equal protection clause of the constitution since the 
classification adopted in that act is based solely upon 
the location of the property, and the basis for such 
classification has no reasonable relation to the purpose 
of the act, namely, 'equalizing the burden of taxation 
to be borne by agricultural real estate.' 
RePille v. Polk County — ReDille owned five blocks of land which was 
used by the Highland Park College in Des Moines. He brought suit claim­
ing the property should not be taxed inasmuch as it was used by a private 
school. The issue: Shall property which is used by a private college be 
exempt from property tax? The Court held in 1903 for the defense; the 
reason being the land was not owned by the college. It was also held by 
the owner to earn a profit at a later time (27, p. 575). 
Exemption from taxation. Property devoted by the owner to 
private school, with a view to individual pecuniary prof­
its, is not exempt from taxation under Code Section 1304. 
Tort Liability 
Tort liability is a wrongful act, injury, or damage for which civil 
action can be brought against the wrongdoer. For many years the Iowa 
public schools were immune to this liability because they were considered 
to be agencies of the state. The Court cases present a history of tort 
liability. 
Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Association — This case was presented 
in Chapter III, Page 27, inasmuch as it pertained to quasi-corporations, 
as well as tort liability. The information will not be repeated; how­
ever, three case issues pertaining to tort liabilities are presented 
(28, p. 285). 
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Immunity of high school athletic association. A high school 
athletic association is not entitled to governmental immunity 
for torts, where it does not appear the association is rec­
ognized by statute as an arm or agency of the state created 
by legislative enactment. 
Governmental immunity. Governmental immunity doctrine is 
applicable to schools and school districts because they are 
quasi-corporations—an agency or arm of the state created by 
legislative enactment. 
High school basketball tournament a governmental function. 
Holding a high school basketball tournament was a govern­
mental function, not a proprietary one. 
Monta nick v. McMillin — An Ottumwa truck driver was charged with neg­
ligence, resulting from a truck-bicycle accident in which a student was 
injured. McMillin allowed his truck to leave its normal course of 
travel, striking Montanick. The defendant was working for Wapello 
County and the truck was the property of that governmental agency. 
The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant 
was ordered to pay Montanick $5,000. McMillin appealed the case to the 
Supreme Court of Iowa in 1938. The issue: Can a person working for 
the county be more negligent than the county? The defendant lost his 
case; the Court reasoned that an employee is liable for a wrong to an­
other person (29, p. 442). 
Governmental employees—personally liable for torts— 
governmental immunity denied. A governmental employee 
committing a tortious act which causes injury to another 
in violation of a duty owed to the injured person, be­
comes, as an individual, personally liable in damages 
therefor. 
Castee1 v. Town of Afton -- An athletic field owned by the Town of Afton 
lay adjacent to the property of Casteel. He charged that his garden. 
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fences, and fruit trees were destroyed by those using the athletic field. 
An injunction was initiated to stop the recreational activities on this 
particular site. The issue: Is it reasonable to issue an injunction in 
this case? In 1939 the Court held that it was not proper to issue an 
injunction to restrain all activities. An athletic field is conducive 
to good health and the general welfare of a community; however, its 
operation can result in a nuisance for which the town is responsible. 
The Town of Afton was told that it must pay the plaintiff for actual 
damages to his property (30, p. 61). 
Playgrounds--athletic fields—not per se nuisances. Play­
grounds and athletic fields are of advantage to the health 
and well-being of a community and are not per se nuisances, 
though they can be so conducted as to become nuisances. 
Ness V. Independent School District of Sioux City — The Sioux City Board 
of Education constructed a junior high building adjacent to the property 
of Ness. In 1941 Ness brought charges, stating that the manner in which 
playground activities were conducted resulted in children trespassing on 
his property, causing damage to his flowers, garden, and trees. The 
issue: Is a municipal corporation responsible for nuisances? The Court 
held for Ness and the Sioux City Board was directed to pay a $300 judg­
ment. The case of Casteel v. Town of Afton was cited by the Court in 
its decision (31, p. 771). 
Governmental agency—liability for private nuisance. Where 
a school district conducts a playground in such a manner as 
to constitute a private nuisance to an adjoining property 
owner, it is liable for damages since the majority rule is 
that the immunity of a governmental agency for liability 
for negligence in the exercise of governmental functions 
does not exempt it from liability for a nuisance created 
and maintained by it. 
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Religion 
The separation of church and state has long been recognized as 
established by the United States and Iowa Constitutions. These docu­
ments did not convince some people regarding the issue because cases 
were brought to the attention of the Supreme Court of Iowa. 
Knowlton v. Baumhover — Knowlton brought charges against Baumhover 
relative to the use of public funds to finance sectarian teachers. 
A two story building was located next to a Catholic church which was 
only partially used by that order for the purpose of educating children. 
The public school district rented some rooms from the church and the 
Board of Education employed a Catholic sister and paid her salary from 
public tax funds. The issue: Can a sectarian teacher be paid from a 
public fund? The Court held in 1918 that public money could not be used 
to pay the salary of a Catholic nun. Reasons for the decision included 
constitutional separation of church and state and statutory provision 
(32, p. 691). 
Public school funds—appropriation for sectarian purposes. 
The carrying on with public school funds of a public school, 
in conjunction with, and as a part of, a parochial school, 
devoted in part to sectarian teaching, is wholly illegal, 
and no lapse of time, and no acquiscence of the people 
therein, will give it validity. 
McLang v. Harper — An effort was made by McLang to enjoin the Sioux City 
School District from renting a vacant building to a Jewish federation as 
a community center. He charged that Hebrew language and history were 
taught in the building. The issue reviewed by the Court included the 
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teaching of Hebrew and the history of religion. The Court ruled in 
1945 in favor of the Sioux City School District. All judges concurred. 
The Court reasoned that benefits were made available to both children 
and adults. The federation permitted all groups, lodges, societies, and 
all other organizations to use the building as a meeting place. There 
were no restrictions relative to color, race, or creed, and no religious 
training was incorporated in the teaching of Hebrew and history (33, 
p. 1006). 
Authority to use schoolhouse as community center— 
Section 4371, C., '39, as amended. The facts are reviewed 
and it held that a certain schoolhouse was used for com­
munity and not sectarian religious purposes and that under 
Section 4371, C., '39, as amended by Chapter 166, 49 G.A., 
such use was proper. 
Approval of Schools 
The approval of schools for state aid payments was mandated by law. 
The decision in this case resulted in the creation of current school 
standards through legislative enactment. 
Lewis Consolidated School District v. Johnston — This case related to 
standards and state aid. The legislature had created a statute which 
required the State Board of Public Instruction and State Superintendent 
to establish rules for the approval of schools. This was accomplished 
and the Lewis Consolidated School District was disapproved for noncom­
pliance of the rules, which resulted in the loss of state aid. In 1964 
the plaintiff sued to keep its financial aid. The issue: Was Iowa law 
constitutional in mandating the establishment of rules for governing 
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schools? The Court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff for 
the reason that the power of making rules is a form of legislative power. 
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make law. Article III, 
Section 1, Constitution of Iowa, gives legislative power to the legis­
lature. Declaratory judgment was proper (34, p. 236). 
Declaratory—judgment action--justifiable controversy and in­
jury shown. Where plaintiffs are citizens and taxpayers in a 
school district that has been compelled to reduce the number 
of its grades by threat of withholding state funds, causing 
the district and its taxpayers to expend funds in tuition to 
other schools, there was a sufficient showing of a justifiable 
controversy and present interest and injury to permit them to 
maintain a declaratory-judgment action for a determination of 
the validity of the statute they challenge. 
Statutes—standards in other school laws not applicable to 
statute pertaining to authority of state board. Statutes deal­
ing with government of schools not maintaining high schools, 
with state aid to transportation, requirements which schools 
must meet as basis for allocating aid from state funds, giving 
boards of directors the right to prescribe courses of studies, 
inspection of schools, and setting up standards to be met are 
not in pari materia with the statute pertaining to responsi­
bilities of the superintendent of public instruction and the 
formulation of standards, regulations and rules for all schools, 
or indicate a legislative intent to make the standards set up 
applicable to the statute under consideration. 
Statute conferring powers on state board without setting up 
standards—unconstitutional. Statute authorizing the super­
intendent of public instruction to formulate standards, 
regulations and rules for the approval of all schools and re­
move schools from the approved list for state aid and funds, 
leaving the officials to their own interpretation of what is 
needed and proper and giving them authority to inflict severe 
penalties without providing sufficient guides, is unconsti­
tutional. 
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CHAPTER V: BOARDS OF EDUCATION 
Historically, school boards are an offspring of the committees 
which were established by New England town meetings to deal with school 
problems. Their creation was due to the complexity of school manage­
ment and the inability of the committees to cope with the educational 
problems which had grown in volume and scope. 
The courts, state legislatures, and state constitutions have de­
fined education as a state function. The Federal Constitution passed 
this responsibility on to the states in an indirect manner. Conse­
quently, education is under the management of the legislatures. Each 
local board of education has been identified as a state and local agency. 
Its membership is subject to the electorate. 
In Iowa, citizens nominated for a board position shall possess the 
same qualifications as an eligible voter. These qualifications are: 
1. A citizen of the United States 
2. At least 21 years of age 
3. A resident of the state at least six months, of the county 
sixty days, and of the local district ten days. 
Section 275.35(2), Code of Iowa (35), requires a seven-man board in 
all or part of a city of fifteen thousand. The electorate may authorize 
a seven-member board in any other district if they so desire. All other 
districts have five-member boards. These provisions are found in 
Sections 277.25 and 277.30, Code of Iowa (36). 
The terms of board members rotate and are so scheduled that an en­
tire board is not elected at one time. Members usually serve three year 
terms. 
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The Supreme Court of Iowa stated that the courts only act on un­
reasonable and arbitrary issues and not on the expediency of board reg­
ulations (37). Discretionary acts were not the concern of the courts 
relative to board action in adopting regulatory rules of conduct and 
management of a school (38). Many Iowa Supreme Court cases somewhat 
govern the actions of school district directors. The Court ruled that 
a board of education has the authority to adopt rules governing the ac­
tion of pupils and for its own government (39). 
Authority and Compliance 
School board members are considered officers of the state and are 
provided with authority to conduct the business affairs of school dis­
tricts. Their jurisdiction is also somewhat limited by the Federal and 
State Constitutions and by law. The extent of their authority has been 
constantly challenged in the Court. 
Waterloo Board of Directors v. Green — The Waterloo Board of Education 
had established a rule which prohibited married students from taking part 
in extra-curricular activities. Green was denied the privilege of parti­
cipating in basketball due to his marriage. He brought suit against the 
District and was awarded a lower court decision. The Board of Education 
appealed the case to the Iowa Supreme Court. The issue: Does the 
Waterloo Board of Education have the statutory authority to make a rule 
which prevents married students from participating in extra-curricular 
activities? The Court, in a 1967 decision, held for the school district. 
The state vests authority in a board to operate its own school. A board 
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also has the authority to adopt rules governing the action of students. 
Finally, the activities which affect the government of the school come 
under the direction of these officials (40, p. 1260). 
Directors vested with authority to adopt rules governing it­
self and pupils. Operation of public schools under and in 
accord with the statutes is clearly vested in the directors, 
the governing body, having authority to adopt rules for its 
own government as well as all its pupils. 
Board's power to govern activities outside schoolrooms or 
playgrounds. School boards can exercise only that authority 
conferred by law or implied therefrom, and it is not within 
their power to govern or control the individual conduct of 
students wholly outside the schoolroom or playgrounds, how­
ever, conduct of pupils which directly relates to and affects 
management of the schools and its efficiency is a matter 
within the sphere of regulations by school authorities. 
Herrington v. District Township of Liston — Transaction of business 
by boards of education has long been challenged in the courts. As 
early as 1877 the Court decided that valid board action required a ma­
jority vote of a board duly in session (41). 
Furnace Company v. District of Seymour -- In 1896 the Supreme Court of 
Iowa concurred with the previous decision of 1877 when it said that the 
president and secretary of a board of education could not bind the dis­
trict by issuing contracts. Authorization for a transaction was required 
from a board officially in session (42). 
Looney v. Consolidated Independent School District of Cromwell --
Boards of education may authorize board officials to act for them. In 
1920 given territories of Adams and Union Counties were reorganized into 
a consolidated district, known as Consolidated Independent School District 
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of Cromwell. Subsequently, a bond issue was passed to build and furnish 
a schoolhouse. The Board of Education purchased a site for the con­
struction of the schoolhouse from Looney, and the President and Secre­
tary were instructed to make payment and obtain a warranty deed. At 
this point the citizens had second thoughts about consolidation and 
construction and proceeded to elect board members who were for the aban­
donment of the bond issue. The newly elected Board contended that the 
bond issue and purchase of site were illegal and void, and instructed 
the Treasurer not to accept the proceeds from the sale of bonds. The 
Board President tendered the deed to Looney. Looney then brought suit 
against the District claiming that the site transaction was legal and 
proper and demanded payment. The issue: Can ministerial power be 
given to a board president and secretary? The Court ruled for the plain­
tiff inasmuch as a board of education is empowered to delegate its 
president and secretary to act in a ministerial capacity. The Board as 
a whole had selected the site upon payment for same (43, p. 436). 
Officers--delegation of authority. A school board may very 
properly delegate to its president the authority to receive 
a deed to property purchased by the board and to deliver the 
warrant in payment for such property. 
Independent School District of Cedar Township v. Wirtner — In 1892 
Wirtner visited with two sub-directors and the President of the Board 
of Cedar Township, and upon verbal agreement commenced teaching school. 
At the conclusion of the first teaching day she went to the President's 
home to pick up her contract which was to have been placed in writing. 
The President refused to issue a written contract and proceeded to seek 
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counsel in Iowa City without the consent of the directors. The Presi­
dent was determined to terminate the services of the teacher and in be­
half of the Board brought the case to Court. The Court ruled in favor 
of Wirtner and in so doing stated that the President had no right to 
bring this case to the attention of the Court without first receiving 
consent from the Board. The Court reasoned that a board president shall 
appear in behalf of his district in all suits brought by or against the 
district; however, this does not permit him to begin court action without 
official approval of the board. Responsibility for payment of court 
costs rests with the president if board approval is not obtained prior, 
to court action (44). 
Gallagher v. Holley Springs School Township — In 1916 a required re­
organization petition was presented to the County Superintendent and 
approved. An election was held and the issue carried. Gallagher 
claimed the proceedings were not valid. His reason was that the Presi­
dent of the Board directed one of his members to notify the remaining 
members of a special meeting held for reorganization. The appointed 
member made all but one contact by telephone and in ample time. One 
member was in California and could not be contacted. The issue; Is 
oral notification of a board meeting official? The Court miled in favor 
of the School District due to the fact that even though notice must be 
delivered, notification is not void when given by telephone. An oral 
notice is as good as a written one, and the meeting was legally con­
ducted. The term "delivered," which appears in the statute, does not 
imply that the notice must be written (45, p. 610). 
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Notice required—statute—construction. Oral notice of the 
time and place of a special meeting of the board of directors 
of a school corporation, under Section 2757, Code Supplement, 
1913, is sufficient. The fact that the statute requires the 
notice to be "delivered" to each member does not imply that 
the notice shall be written notice. 
Kesselring v. Mooreland — An injunction was issued in Guthrie County to 
prevent the opening of two rural schools. The schools were closed be­
cause of an insufficient number of students. The School District ap­
pealed the case to the Supreme Court in 1948 for a decree allowing the 
injunction. The issue: Shall an injunction be filed to prevent the 
operation of a school and the employment of teachers? The Court ruled 
for the plaintiff. The contracting of a teacher and the opening of 
school are business matters of a district. Routine business affairs are 
not to be curtailed by a temporary injunction (46, p. 1156). 
Opening of school—injunction—notice required. The opening 
of a school or the contracting with a teacher would seem to 
be a part of the general and ordinary business of a school 
corporation and should not be stopped by a temporary in­
junction without notice as required by Rule 326, RCP. 
Herbst v. Held — Official business of a de facto board was considered 
by the Iowa Supreme Court in 1922. The Hinton School Corporation had 
reorganized the school boundaries and voted a bond issue to construct a 
new schoolhouse. The old Board continued to serve without an election 
of new school officers. The President of the Board certified taxes to 
the County Auditor in the absence of the District Secretary. Herbst 
challenged the action and sought to restrain tax collection. The issue: 
Can a de facto officer conduct the business of a school district? 
The Court decided in favor of Held, who was President of the Board of 
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Education. It reasoned that the defendant was a de facto officer. The 
County Treasurer and Auditor were not de facto officers. Their business 
transaction of tax collection could not be subject to collateral attack 
(47, p. 679). 
Officers—officers de facto without election or appoint­
ment. The board of directors of an independent school cor­
poration which has been supplanted by the official organ­
ization of a new and larger district, became de facto 
officers of the new corporation by openly, notoriously, in 
good faith, and with the apparent acquiescence of the people, 
acting for and on behalf of such new corporation. The acts 
of such de facto officers may not be collaterally assailed. 
Menlo Board of Directors v. Blakesley — The Iowa Supreme Court ruled on 
a resignation, issue of the Menlo Board of Education in 1949. Four 
members of the Board filed their written resignations with Blakesley, 
Secretary of the Board, after failure to re-elect the former Superin­
tendent, and after electing a new Superintendent. Two days prior to 
this a fifth member had resigned to become a member of the County Board. 
Blakesley conferred with the County Superintendent and posted notices of 
election to fill the vacancies. Shortly thereafter the Board members 
approached the Secretary and withdrew their resignations. The notices 
of election were removed. The resigned Board Members brought suit 
against Blakesley, contending their resignations were not accepted by a 
board or school official and therefore they were entitled to retain their 
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positions. The issue: Does the filing of a resignation with the Secre­
tary of a board constitute an immediate vacancy and must the vacancy be 
accepted by school officials? The Court ruled in favor of Blakesley. 
According to Section 277.29, Code of Iowa, a written resignation, when 
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filed, creates an immediate vacancy (48, p. 910). 
School board—vacancies created by resignation—effective 
immediately. The written resignation of members of the 
board of directors of a consolidated school district 
created vacancies on the school board immediately upon the 
filing thereof with the secretary of the board without the 
necessity of an acceptance by the board or an official, 
and the resigning members had no authority to act in the 
filling of any vacancies on the board. 
Bellmeyer v. The Independent District of Marsha11town — Boards of 
education have had the authority to prescribe curriculum throughout 
the history of this Country. As early as 1876 the Supreme Court ruled 
on a case which gave boards of education the authority to demand that 
music be included in the curriculum. The Board was permitted to pur­
chase an instrument from unappropriated funds (49). 
Neilan v. Sioux City Board of Directors -- Neilan initiated mandamus 
against the Sioux City Board of Education. He sought to have book­
keeping taught in the junior high. The proposition had been submitted 
to the voters of the District and carried by a majority vote. The plain­
tiff claimed that the only way to teach bookkeeping was by using a day­
book, ledger, and journal, and demanded their utilization. This was 
being done in all grades except seven and eight. The issue: Was the 
Board of Education carrying out the mandate of the people? The Court 
ruled in favor of the Board of Education and reasoned that the District 
was teaching bookkeeping. Text selection is a matter for the board, 
according to statute, as is the manner of instruction. Mandamus covers 
a broad area; however, in this case it relates to curriculum (50, 
p. 860). 
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Court of study—discretion—mandamus. The directors of 
a school district have a fair discretion as to the method 
to be employed in teaching a subject which the electors 
have directed to be taught-r-a discretion not controllable 
by mandamus. 
Johnson v. School Corporation of Cedar — Johnson, a salesman, solicited 
a number of Calhoun County board members to sign contracts for supplies. 
The board members represented their sub-districts and signed individ­
ually. All supplies were delivered and used; Johnson sought to collect. 
The School Corporation of Cedar refused to pay because of irregularities, 
or because individual members signed contracts with the salesman when a 
master contract was claimed to be proper. The President and Secretary 
attempted to make payment by issuing a warrant but remaining members 
of the Board failed to agree. The issue; Is it permissible for the 
President and Secretary to pay for the supplies when the remainder of 
the Board will not take formal action? A decision was rendered in 1902 
which held with the defendant. Official action of a board of education 
is necessary to make payment (51, p. 319). 
Warrants--legality. A warrant executed by the president 
and secretary of a school board without the authority of 
the rest of the school board, in payment for school sup­
plies, contracted for by a majority of the board is void. 
Moore v. Independent District of Toledo City — The question of whether 
or not a board of education may legally employ one of its members to 
supervise a construction project was decided by the Court in 1881. 
A contract was awarded to Billings for the construction of a schoolhouse. 
The contractor posted bond and started construction, but abandoned the 
project prior to completion. The Board of Education proceeded to make 
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arrangements to complete the building and employed one of its members, 
Moore, to supervise the construction and purchase the necessary mate­
rials. At the completion of the project Moore brought suit against the 
District for nonpayment of services rendered. The issue: Does a board 
of education have the authority to contract with one of its members to 
supervise the construction of a building and make payment for said serv­
ices? The Court ruled in favor of the School District, stating that 
the law cannot be evaded and one member of a board selected to make 
decisions, which must by statute be performed by a board.(52, p. 654). 
Powers of directors—right to compensation. The board 
of directors of an independent district have no power to 
employ one of their number to oversee the completion of 
a schoolhouse abandoned by the contractor, and bind the 
district for his payment, nor can he recover from the 
district for services so rendered. 
State of Iowa v. Wiek — A New Hartford board member by the name of 
Wiek acted as a salesman of textbooks and supplies to students of the 
district. It was brought to the attention of the State of Iowa, which 
brought suit against him, charging that this was an illegal practice. 
Wiek claimed that he was conducting this business upon appointment by 
the Board as its agent or representative. The issue: Is it legal for 
a board of education to select one of its members to represent it and 
sell books and supplies to the students of the district? A decision 
was reached by the judges in favor of the State. This 1906 decision was 
based on statutory interpretation (53, p. 31). 
Sale of books by director—criminal offense. Code, 
Section 2834, applies to and prohibits a school director 
from engaging on his own account in the sale of school 
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books and supplies to the pupils, and is not limited to 
directors acting as agents of the board under Code, 
Section 2824. 
Kennedy v. The Independent School District of Derby Granger — The 
official capacity of a school district treasurer was determined in 
1887. Kennedy furnished materials and labor in the construction of 
a schoolhouse in the District Township of Julien. The District owed 
him an amount exceeding $350. During the building process the Dis­
trict reorganized and no division of assets and liabilities was taken 
into account. Mandamus was initiated by the plaintiff to force the 
directors of the original sub-districts of Derby Granger to schedule 
a meeting and determine a fair and equitable amount to be paid him by 
each sub-district. A meeting was held and apportionments made, which 
were favorably supported by all except the District of Asbury. The 
District of Asbury claimed that notices pertaining to the matter were 
delivered to its District Treasurer rather than to the Board and there­
fore this notice was inadequate. The Asbury District therefore felt it 
was not obligated to pay its pro rata share to the contractor. The 
issue; Is the treasurer of a school district a school officer? The 
Court decided in favor of the plaintiff- A treasurer is not merely an 
employee but an officer. He is an officer of a municipal corporation as 
established by law. Notice served upon him is served upon the district 
(54, p. 189). 
Officer. The treasurer of a school district is an officer 
thereof, and service of an original notice upon him in an 
action against the district constitutes service upon the 
district. 
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The Consolidated School District of Glidden v. Griffin -- The absence 
of a board member at a meeting where a superintendent was hired has 
been challenged in our Court. The Glidden Board met and elected Griffin 
as superintendent for a two year period. Two replacements were elected 
to the Board at a later date and duly sworn in. A month later the re­
organized Board passed a resolution declaring the contract of the 
Superintendent null and void. One member of the Board was in California 
at the time the Superintendent was contracted. He claimed the employ­
ment of the Superintendent was void due to his absence. The issue: Is 
it proper to delay the business of a school district due to the absence 
of a board member? In 1925 the Court ruled in favor of Griffin and 
reasoned that employment of teachers is a normal business function and 
should not be delayed because of the absence of a board member. The 
decision was unanimous (55, p. 63). 
Meetings--failure to notify director. The action of a 
school board at an annual meeting will not be invali­
dated because a member was not notified of the meeting 
because he was absent from the state and his where­
abouts were not definitely known. 
Finance 
Several problems concerning finance which would have resulted in 
the levy of an additional tax were brought to the attention of the 
Supreme Court. Other cases dealt with the management of public funds. 
Nelson v. Sioux City Board of Directors — A teachers' retirement system 
was established in the Sioux City school system in accordance with the 
statutes. Teachers contributed one per cent of their salaries and the 
52 
balance was supplemented by the District. In 1950 the Congress of the 
United States provided social security for teachers and the State of 
Iowa entered into this agreement. The Board of Education went on record 
to liquidate the fund by investing the amounts collected into the social 
security program. It was necessary to increase the voluntary retire­
ment age to 65. A portion of the program would be continued to care for 
those who had already retired. Nelson attempted to prevent the termi­
nation of the retirement program by bringing the case to Court. The 
issue: Does a board of education possess the authority to alter the 
retirement program? A decision was rendered in 1955 in favor of the 
defendant. Authority rests with a board to alter the retirement pro­
gram. It acquired a better program for its employees, and there was no 
evidence that the Board handled the situation improperly (56, p. 1079). 
Teachers' pension—rights acquired are not vested. 
Teachers who have been members of a pension annuity and 
retirement system established by a city independent 
school district but who have not retired, and no such 
vested or contract rights in the local system or in 
pensions thereunder as to make invalid the liquidation 
plan adopted by the board which abolished the system, 
repaid the amounts they had paid in and substituted the 
social security system. 
Rural Independent School District of Eagle v. Independent School District 
of Bankston — School district reorganization was approved by the voters 
in an area of Dubuque County in 1926. The Independent District of Bankston 
was formed from portions of several districts; however, at the same time 
an area of that original district was extracted to become a part of the 
Rural Independent School District of Eagle. Bankston school officials 
employed legal counsel to assist in the proceedings. Iowa statutes pro­
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vide for the division of assets and liabilities following school dis­
trict reorganization and it was during these proceedings that the 
citizens of the District of Eagle challenged the legality of a school 
district to employ legal counsel. The District wished to recover a por­
tion of the expenditure as its assets. Refusal of the Bankston Board to 
make settlement resulted in Court action for recovery of funds. The 
issue: Is it legal to expend money to employ legal counsel? A decision 
was rendered in favor of the defendant. The Court reasoned that a 
school district is a corporation and may sue and be sued. Consequently, 
legal counsel may be employed (57, p. 286). 
Powers of board--employment of counsel. The board of 
directors of a school corporation has implied power in good 
faith to employ attorneys to defend against the proceeding 
for the dissolution of the district and to contract for a 
reasonable compensation for such services. 
Directors--powers--employment of county attorney. School 
boards are under no mandatory duty to secure the services 
of the county attorney in litigation affecting the cor­
porate affairs of the school districts, even though the 
statute (Sec. 5180, Code of 1924) does require such of­
ficers to give legal advice to such boards. 
American Insurance Company v. Stratton — A rural board of education pur­
chased school building insurance at a time when the law did not provide 
for payment of insurance. The company was given a promissory note; how­
ever, the Board failed to meet its financial obligation. The American 
Insurance Company brought suit to collect. The issue: Are board members 
personally liable when they exceed their purchasing authority? In 1882 
a decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The Court reasoned 
that board members are liable when they exceed their purchasing authority 
(58, p. 696), 
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Statutes construed. Chapter III, Acts of 1882, which 
legalizes all contracts made by school officials for 
insurance of school buildings, as well as all orders, 
warrants, and other evidence of indebtedness issued 
therefor, was not intended to render a district liable 
for the personal obligation of its officers, such as 
the note sued on in this case. 
Austin V. District Township of Colony — The voters of the District of 
Colony approved an issue to construct a schoolhouse not to exceed $2,000. 
Unanticipated expenditures caused the Directors to borrow $495 from 
Austin, who charged interest ai a rate exceeding the statutory maximum 
of six per cent. The Board did not compensate Austin because the build­
ing cost had exceeded the amount approved by the people. Austin ini­
tiated court proceedings to recover the amount due him. The issues: 
Is it legal to borrow money to meet the financial obligations of a 
district? May interest rates in excess of the statutory maximum be 
charged? A decision was rendered in 1879 in favor of the plaintiff who 
was paid $495 at six per cent interest. The Court said that the Board 
had established an illegal debt; however, money can be borrowed to meet 
a financial obligation. Interest rates may not exceed the statutory-
limit (59, p. 102). 
School district: Power to borrow money: Liability upon 
this order. The directors of a school district have power 
to borrow money to discharge a debt which has been legiti­
mately created and are authorized to pledge the credit of 
the district for that purpose. 
Interest. They cannot, however, make the obligations 
evidencing such a debt bearing a higher rate of interest 
than 6 per cent. 
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Boynton v. District Township of Newton — The District Township of Newton 
owed Boynton for the construction of a building, which was to be paid 
from the schoolhouse fund. Boynton brought action to force the Board to 
levy a tax to pay for the construction. The issue: Must a tax be 
levied to meet a financial obligation? The Court ruled in favor of the 
plaintiff and contended that construction was reasonable, legal, and 
justifiable. Mandamus is the proper procedure (60, p. 510). 
Against school district officers. The directors of a 
school district township on their refusal to levy a tax 
for the payment of a judgment recovered against it, may 
be compelled thereto by mandamus, the electors of the 
district having failed and refused to provide therefor, 
by voting the necessary tax. Section 3275 of the Revi­
sion applies as well to school districts as to other 
civil corporations. 
Drew V. School Township of Madison — This 1901 case pertained to an 
issue involving an expenditure to construct a schoolhouse pursuant to 
the vote of the people. The School Township of Madison, located in 
Winneshiek County, owned five buildings, but three were old and not re­
pairable. A bond issue was favorably voted upon in the Winneshiek County 
School District. Following the election there was much discussion among 
the patrons of the District about further reorganization. The Board then 
proposed dividing the district into eight sub-districts. Drew appealed 
this proposed reorganization to the County Superintendent, who ruled that 
the electors had authority to create the proposed sub-districts. After 
his decision the Board proposed to raise added funds to construct three 
additional schoolhouses. This proposal was defeated by the electorate 
of the District. The Board felt the bond issue was defeated due to the 
56 
location of sites and therefore selected a committee to recommend sites 
for the construction of buildings. The recommendation of the committee 
resulted in an election in which the sites were rejected. The Board then 
met in special session to consider new sites but failed to succeed. Drew 
then brought suit to force the Board to construct buildings on the sites 
originally voted by the people. The issue: Can a board expend funds in 
a manner other than voted by the people? A decision was reached by the 
Court which stated that the defendants could not expend funds differently 
than voted upon for the reason that the voters of the district did not 
grant this permission at the polls (61, p. 721). 
Division of funds—injunction. School officers cannot 
divert funds to some other purpose than that for which 
they are voted by the electors, and an injunction will 
lie to restrain such a threatened diversion of funds. 
Hansen v. Independent School District of Holstein — Hansen served as 
treasurer of the Holstein District. He deposited the District's money in 
a bank which became insolvent. Upon termination of his tenure and as a 
part of his conditional settlement, he paid the District $732, with the 
understanding that he would be reimbursed after the District was paid by 
the bank. Failure of the Board to comply caused Hansen to bring suit for 
recovery of the money. The Board accused him of incompetently handling 
District funds. The issue: Did the plaintiff exercise due care in han­
dling the school funds? The Court ruled in favor of Hansen because he 
was found to be competent in the management of funds (62, p. 265). 
Deposit of district funds—liability of treasurer. A school 
treasurer, obligated by his bond to exercise reasonable 
diligence and care in the preservation and disposal of 
moneys, securities, and other property of the district, is 
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not guilty of any breach of official duty in deposit­
ing funds of the district in a bank, so long as he acts 
in good faith and without negligence in making such 
deposits. 
Stevenson and Rice v. The District Township of Summit -- Stevenson and 
Rice contracted with the District Township of Summit to construct a 
schoolhouse. The Board of Education had agreed to make three install­
ment payments, and the building was constructed according to specifi­
cations. Later, one segment of the District was reorganized and became 
an independent district under the provisions of law. Stevenson and Rice 
brought suit against that portion of the district which reorganized and 
became a part of another district. The defendant contended the plain­
tiffs could not hold it liable. The issue: Could the plaintiffs hold 
a claim against the district which became part of another district due 
to reorganization? The Court ruled in favor of Stevenson and Rice. 
A division of assets and liabilities must be agreed upon following 
boundary reorganization. The contract was valid and all proceedings 
appeared to meet the statutory requirements (63, p. 462). 
Contracts—organization of independent district. The 
organization of one of the sub-districts of a district 
township into an independent district according to the 
method pointed out by the statute, does not affect the 
right of a party holding a claim against the whole dis­
trict as originally constituted, and he may enforce it 
accordingly. 
District Township of Taylor v. Norton — Morton, school treasurer, had 
School District money stolen from his home through no fault of his own. 
The Board did not go on record to relieve him of the responsibility. 
The issue: Does a board of education have the authority to relieve a 
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school official of responsibility when money is stolen? The Court de­
cided in favor of the plaintiff. There is no authority by statute to 
discharge an official of this reponsibility. This is why school districts 
bond their employees at the present time (64, p. 550). 
Power to release debt. The directors of a school district 
have no power, in the absence of any consideration, to direct 
the release from liability of one justly indebted to the 
district. 
District Township of Bluff Creek v. Hardinbrook — In 1874 the Court 
ruled that the Treasurer of a school district was liable for all the 
money he handled in the capacity of that position (65). 
Fraud 
Cases involving fraud were seldom referred to the Supreme Court. 
The decision of the district court was usually accepted as final. 
Scott V. Independent School District of Harding -- The subject of fraud 
came before the Supreme Court in 1894. The Harding Board of Education 
and a contractor jointly cheated and defrauded the District through the 
improper use of building construction transactions. The Board attempted 
to defray attorney and court costs for itself from tax funds in a pre­
vious case. Scott brought suit charging that the use of public funds to 
defend a board of education wilfully promotes fraud. The issue: Can 
district funds be used to employ legal counsel for school officials who 
are guilty of fraud? A Court decision was rendered in favor of the 
plaintiff because of statutory provisions pertaining to fraud (66, p. 156). 
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Power to pay counsel. Code 1740 does not authorize 
directors to pay counsel fees or court expenses in­
curred in defending a fraud perpetrated by the direc­
tors upon the district. 
Runyan v. Farmers Bank of Liberty Center — The Iowa Supreme Court ruled 
in 1942 that school district funds, when embezzled by a bank official, 
are a liability of the bank. The amount is to be reimbursed from the 
state fund which guarantees public deposits if the bank is unable to 
make restitution (67). 
Independent Consolidated School District of Dow City v. Crawford County 
Trust and Savings Bank of Denison — A case involving the misappropri­
ation of school funds was decided in 1942. The School Treasurer, who 
was also an employee of the Crawford County Trust and Savings Bank of 
Denison, misappropriated school funds. He did this by issuing several 
checks to himself and another check made payable to the bank, for which 
he obtained cash. The Independent Consolidated School District of Dow 
City brought suit against the bank in an effort to recover the misap­
propriated funds. The issue: Is a depository bank liable for unlawful 
withdrawal of school funds without its knowledge and participation? The 
Court decided in favor of the defendant and reasoned that the bank was 
not aware of the participation (68, p. 506). 
Unlawful withdrawal of funds--nonparticipation by depos­
itary. A bank which is the depositary of school funds is 
not liable to the school district for the unlawful with­
drawal of such funds by the school treasurer without 
proof of participation, knowledge or notice on the part 
of the bank. 
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CHAPTER VI: BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS 
Property may be acquired and held by school districts which are 
quasi-corporations of the state. The various school districts hold 
title to all property as agencies of the state. Property control is 
actually under the jurisdiction of the legislature in that legal owner­
ship is in the name of the state. There are no contractual relations 
between the state and local school districts. 
The statutes of the State of Iowa provide that each board of 
education act in a trustee capacity for the public at large. Author­
ity to build includes the right to purchase land for playgrounds and 
other educational needs. 
School boards have the authority to carry on the business of a 
district. They may insure property against such hazards as wind, fire, 
and severe storms. The sale and purchase of property requires approval 
of the voters, except that a site can be purchased from the receipts of 
a one mill site levy. This levy can be implemented through official ap­
proval of the board. 
The statutes have not permitted the construction of a bus barn 
other than by a vote of the people. It has also been impossible for 
districts to legally build dormitories in Iowa. 
Bids 
The letting of bids has been a common practice since the creation 
of school districts in Iowa. Technicalities arose in some instances, 
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which resulted in Court decisions that serve as a guide for bidding 
procedures. 
Hanlin v. Independent District of Charles City — In 1885 the Iowa 
Supreme Court rendered a decision relative to a controversy in the award­
ing of a contract to the lowest responsible bidder. The Charles City 
School District advertised for bids for the construction of a schoolhouse. 
The Board of Education reserved the right to reject any and all bids. 
The Board failed to award the contract to the lowest bidder through 
error. Hanlin was the lowest bidder by an amount of $300 and asked that 
the contract be awarded to him. The issue faced by the Court: Was the 
contract legally awarded? A decision was rendered in favor of the Board 
of Education. The Court reasoned that the plaintiff knew the Board of 
Education reserved the right to reject any and all bids. Plaintiff 
could not force the Board to award him the contract. The defendant had 
full and complete jurisdiction of the matter and there were no just 
grounds for reversal of the award (69, p. 69). 
Awarding contract for schoolhouse mandamus. Where the 
school board, in inviting proposals for the erection of 
a schoolhouse, stated: The contract will be awarded to 
the lowest responsible bidder. The board reserves the 
right to reject any and all bids, held that mandamus 
would not lie, at the instance of one who claimed to be 
the lowest responsible bidder to compel the board to 
award the contract to him. 
Weitz V. Independent District of Pes Moines — Five years later a sim­
ilar case was considered by the Court. The Independent District of Des 
Moines advertised for bids for the purpose of constructing a high school 
building. Weitz submitted a bid and was awarded the contract, even 
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though one bidder submitted a lesser figure. The Board rejected the 
lowest bid because it believed it was submitted by an irresponsible 
person. Weitz did not have a written contract showing the time of com­
pletion and payment schedule as required by law. Upon further inves­
tigation of the bids, the Board found it was in error and that Weitz was 
not the second lowest responsible bidder. Weitz had in the meantime 
commenced construction, and in an effort to correct its error the Board 
halted his progress. Subsequently, Weitz brought suit against the 
District. The issue; Did the plaintiff possess a contract when it was 
not placed in writing as stipulated by law? A decision was rendered in 
favor of the District because the statutory requirements for a written 
contract were not met. The Court felt the plaintiff was not financially 
injured because he had been paid for services and materials rendered to 
date. Boards of education are required to accept the lowest responsible 
bid (70, p. 423). 
School districts--contract for schoolhouse—what necessary. 
Under Section 1723 of the Code, a school district cannot 
enter into a valid contract for the erection of a school-
house except with the lowest responsible bidder upon his 
giving bond for the faithful performance of the contract; 
and the mere acceptance of a bid by mistake, which is not 
the lowest responsible one does not constitute a contract 
with the bidder. 
These two decisions, which were rendered within a period of five years, 
still stand. Contracts must be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder; 
however, the term "responsible" is difficult to determine. School offi­
cials may reject any and all bids. 
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Sites 
Condemnation and location were the most common controversies 
relative to school district sites. The Court decisions established 
guidelines for boards to follow. 
Haggard v. Independent School District of Algona — This 1901 condem­
nation case set a precedent in the State. Haggard was forced to yield 
a portion of a city lot for school purposes. Acquisition of the frac­
tional portion of the lot by the School District rendered the remaining 
portion useless to the owner. Haggard was seeking an increase in damages 
from $250 to $350. The School District contended that it was not 
responsible for more than the condemned land. The issue: Does the 
condemnation of given land affect adjoining property? A decision was 
rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the reason that damages were not 
limited to the parcel of land acquired by the School District (71, 
p. 486). 
Measure of damages. On an award of damages for the ap­
propriation of half a lot for school purposes, the other 
half being occupied by the owner's dwelling, the damages 
are not limited to the value of the land taken, but may 
include the damage to the entire premises, if occupied as 
a whole. 
Seaman v. Baughman -- A Scott County case was tried by the Supreme Court 
in 1891 wherein Seaman attempted to restrain the collection of a tax 
for the purpose of constructing a schoolhouse on a central site. The 
original building of the District was too remote for the children to 
attend. A bond issue pertaining to the construction of a centrally-
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located schoolhouse was favorably voted by the people. The plaintiff 
claimed that tax should not be collected due to the fact that the site 
had not been purchased at the time of the referendum. In addition, he 
claimed that the new building was not necessary. The issue faced by the 
Court: Is a bond issue legal at a time when a site is not owned by a 
school district? The Court decided in favor of Baughman, a school 
board member, because a site can be purchased by the Board at any time 
that funds are available. Taxpayers may vote a tax to erect a school-
house at a centrally-located site (72, p. 216). 
Additional schoolhouse: Necessity. Where a school dis­
trict two miles wide from east to west had one school-
house situated one-half mile east of the center, which 
was about thirty years old, but in reasonably good con­
dition, yet was too remote for some of the children of the 
district to attend school, held that the electors of the 
district were warranted in voting a tax for the erection 
of a new schoolhouse at the center of the district. 
Smith v. Maresh — In this 1939 case the size of a school site was chal­
lenged in the Supreme Court. Smith sought to prevent the Iowa City Board 
of Education from entering into a contract with the Federal Government 
for a grant which was to have paid 45 per cent of the costs of a new high 
school, not to exceed $326,250. The plaintiff's main objective was to 
locate the new building in the center of the school district. In order 
to obtain this he brought suit charging the district, naming Maresh, a 
school official, as defendant, with ownership of a site in excess of 
statutory limitations. The issue: Must school districts abide by the 
statutory limitations relative to the size of school sites when a 
building occupies a portion of it? The judges decided in favor of the 
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defendant, reasoning that the proposed building would utilize an area 
of 640 X 350 feet and would not exceed the statutory limitations. The 
Court also said that a district may retain title to a site which is 
larger than provided by statute. Finally, boards of education have 
authority to determine building sites (73, p. 552). 
School site--title valid as to part--no injunction. 
A school district's title to its site for a high school 
is not wholly invalid simply because the size may be 
greater than the statutory limitation on the amount 
that can be obtained by condemnation. When the size of 
the building is not so great as to cover more ground 
than the statute allows, and when the title, if defec­
tive at all, is defective only as to the excess land, an 
injunction will not lie on the theory that the district 
had no title. 
Location of school--no injunctive relief. The deter­
mination of the location of site of a new high school is 
with the power of the school board and its decision can­
not be controlled by injunction. 
Van Es v. Independent Consolidated School District of Newkirk — A 1924 
Iowa Supreme Court decision gave boards of education the authority to 
select sites. Van Es initiated an injunction to enjoin the erection of 
a building on a site one mile east of the geographical center of the 
district. The Court considered the issue of a geographical center for 
school sites. A decision was rendered in favor of the Newkirk District 
for the reason that boards of education have been granted statutory au­
thority to determine site locations (74, p. 348). 
Schoolhouse sites—selection. The selection of a school-
house site, unquestioned by an appeal by aggrieved parties, 
is conclusive, and especially so after the schoolhouse has 
been erected. 
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James v. Gettinger — A 1904 Lucas County case resolved a protest re­
lative to the moving of a schoolhouse in the Whitebreast School District. 
Gettinger wished to move the building one-fourth mile south of the orig­
inal location. James charged that the old site was located in the center 
of the District and that the District officials must give notice of in­
tent to the people. He also contended that two-thirds of the patrons 
preferred the original site. The issue: Does a board of education pos­
sess statutory authority to determine a school site? The Supreme Court 
held for the defendant because statutory provisions give boards of 
education this power (75, p. 199). 
Change of schoolhouse site. The directors of a school 
township have the power under Code, Section 2773, to 
change the site of a schoolhouse without authority by 
a vote of the electors of the district; and when there 
is nothing before the court except an application for 
a mandatory injunction and a demurrer to the same, and 
expediency of removal cannot be considered; nor will 
the action of the board be considered on a simple al­
legation that it was surreptitiously taken in the ab­
sence of a statement of facts upon which the complaint 
is based. 
Reversion and Sale 
The question, of reversion priority to land no longer utilized for 
public education has long been a controversial issue. The Court has 
rendered several decisions which serve as guidelines concerning rever­
sion priority and sale of the land. 
Johnston v. District Township of Ellsworth — Martin Sheley executed a 
a deed to the public school for a parcel of land in the sum of one 
dollar. At a later date Johnston acquired property from Sheley from 
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which was excluded the school site. The District Township of Ellsworth 
ceased to use the property for school purposes. In 1959 Johnston claimed 
return of the land for the sum of one dollar. An examination of the deed 
disclosed that it expressed the purpose for which the land was to be 
utilized, but did not contain any conditions or restrictions. The issue: 
Does the land deeded to the School District for one dollar revert to the 
plaintiff? Consideration was given to the term "conveyance for school-
house site." The judges all agreed in favor of the School District. 
Their reason was that the grantor of a school site is not entitled to 
repossess it for a fee of one dollar, which was the law at the time said 
deed was delivered. Current laws now entitle the former owner to an 
option of repossession of the land (76, p. 470). 
Schoolhouse site—reversion--statute applicable. The 
rights of reversion to schoolhouse sites being wholly 
statutory are subject to such changes as the legislature 
may make, therefore, when a schoolhouse was abandoned in 
1954, Section 297.15 et seq., C., '58, were in force and 
should be followed, and so the grantor of the tract was 
not entitled to it on payment of one dollar as provided 
by the statute in force when the deed was made. 
Deed to schoolhouse site—title not limited by language 
used. A recitation in a deed of a tract of land to a 
school district, said conveyance being made for school-
house site, merely expresses the purpose for which it was 
made and does not in any way limit the title conveyed by 
the terms of the warranty. 
Waddell v. Aurelia Board of Directors — The Aurelia Consolidated 
Independent School District abandoned five rural schoolhouse sites. 
This resulted in a Court case initiated by Waddell, one of the owners 
of the land adjacent to the vacated sites. The plaintiff claimed that 
the land automatically reverted to the owners. The Aurelia Board of 
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Directors contended that the land was obtained prior to the passage of 
the reversion law. The issue: Do adjacent landowners have legal right 
to the land according to present reversion statute? The Court ruled in 
favor of the School District; however, the plaintiff had an option to 
purchase the parcels of land. All options could be accepted or rejected 
by the Board. No constitutional rights of the plaintiff had been vio­
lated. The rights of the plaintiff are statutory and school district 
compliance rests with the supremacy of the legislature (77, p. 400). 
Schoolhouse site—sale. The right of the voters of a 
school corporation to direct the sale or make other 
disposition of any schoolhouse or site is subject to 
the prior right of the proper landowner to purchase an 
abandoned schoolhouse site. (Section 2749, Code 1897). 
Consolidated School District v. Thompson -- The matter of reversion 
rights came before the Court in 1922. A site had not been used for 
school purposes for a two year period. According to the wishes of 
Thompson, the schoolhouse was sold separately and the parcel of land 
was sold to him at the highest bid. He did not pay for the land and 
relied on his alleged ownership under the provisions of a quit claim 
deed. The issue: Did the defendant acquire the right to claim normal 
reversion of the site without payment therefor? A decision was rend­
ered in favor of the School District inasmuch as the defendant did not 
acquirc the right to command reversion and cannot contest title held by 
the District (78, p. 662). 
School site—forfeiture of right of reversion. The 
right of a property owner to a reversion of a school-
house site which has been carved out of his farm may be 
forfeited by failure to meet statutory conditions to such 
reversion. 
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Suck y. Benton Township School District — In 1954 the Supreme Court 
ruled on the ownership of property formerly used as a school site. The 
parcel of land, which had been used for school purposes for more than 
50 years, was originally extracted from land now owned by John and Kathryn 
Suck. A quit claim deed was held by the District throughout the time of 
ownership. Benton Township attempted to purchase the site and because of 
a dispute between the School District and Suck as to ownership initiated 
condemnation proceedings. A condemnation jury declared the land value to 
be $350. The plaintiff asked $1,000 in his appeal. The issue: Who 
actually owns the parcel of land and how shall its value be determined? 
A decision was rendered in favor of the School District because the quit 
claim deed continued to be in effect after the site was no longer used 
for school purposes. The statutes provide for the determination of land 
value (79, p. 1.). 
Sale of school site—statutory compliance—necessity. The 
execution of a quit claim deed to a schoolhouse site which 
was not in compliance with the statute did not divest a 
school district of the title or estop it to deny the con­
veyance. 
Sale of school site—determination of value. There are 
but three ways by which the value of a school site may be 
determined prior to a sale: (1) by agreement between the 
owner of the tract from which it was originally taken and 
the school district; (2) by appraisement secured through the 
county superintendent of schools if they cannot agree; and 
(3) by the highest bid received at a public auction. 
Sections 297.15, 297.19, Code 1954. 
Roads 
The question of financing the construction of roads to make public 
schools accessible to the patrons was an important issue. This topic 
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resulted in a limited number of Court cases. 
— Independent District of Flint River v. Kelley — A controversy relative 
to the authority of boards of education in providing roads to their 
schoolhouses was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court as early 
as 1881. The Flint River Board of Education authorized the Secretary 
to initiate proceedings and make payment for the opening of a road. 
Kelley contended that this was an illegal expenditure. The issue: Did 
the Board of Education have proper authority to secure a road to a school-
house and pay for it? A decision was rendered in favor of the School 
District inasmuch as the Board had this authority. No highway was 
present and one was needed to deliver students, fuel, and other sup­
plies (80, p. 568). 
Powers of directors. The board of directors of an in­
dependent school district may properly authorize steps 
to be taken to secure the location of a highway by its 
schoolhouse, there being none, and may bind the district 
for expenses incurred in connection with an application 
for such highway. 
Bogaard v. Independent District of Plainview — In 1894 the Independent 
District of Plainview paid $250 to establish and open a road to its 
schoolhouse. Bogaard claimed that a highway was not required for the 
operation of a school. His children used the neighbor's land to walk 
to school. He attempted to enjoin the Board from proceeding with the 
opening of a road even though the voters had approved it. The issue: 
Does the statute provide for the opening of a road to a schoolhouse 
when the electors approve? A decision was rendered in favor of the 
Board of Education. The Court found that the plaintiff had not appealed 
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to the County Superintendent, which was proper and necessary in this case. 
The Board of Education also possessed the necessary authority to secure 
a road to its schoolhouse (81, p. 269). 
Schools--highway. The Code permits the board to buy high­
way access to schoolhouses when the electors of a district 
township authorize the acquisition and a tax therefor. 
Held, the board of an independent district has the same 
power, upon vote of the electors of the district. 
Locker v. Keller -- A schoolhouse in Greene County was located in the 
center of four sections of land. The Board of Education made payment to 
open a road to the school after approval was obtained from the electorate. 
Later, further extension of the road was sought by the citizens. Locker 
was not in favor of the road and brought suit to enjoin payment for both 
projects. He charged that the County Board of Supervisors is responsible 
for the construction of roads. The issues: May districts construct im­
mediate and extended roads? How may a county board of supervisors be 
petitioned to provide extended roads? A 1900 decision was ruled in favor 
of the defendant for the opening of a necessary road to the schoolhouse. 
This was legal if there was a need to deliver students and supplies. A 
board of supervisors must be petitioned by local citizens in behalf of a 
school district for the provision of extended roadways because a board 
of education does not possess this authority (82, p. 707). 
Petition for highways—who may present. Under the school 
law (Code 1873, Section 1717, as amended by laws 1882), 
empowering the electors at a meeting to authorize board 
of directors to obtain a highway necessary for access to 
the schoolhouse, petition to the board of supervisors for 
the road may be made by the electors, as individuals, in 
the interest of the district, and by reason of the power 
given the directors by the electors. 
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Construction 
Construction has been a continuous process throughout the history 
of education within the State of Iowa. Abandonment of a schoolhouse 
construction project prior to completion, payment for materials, and the 
levy of a schoolhouse tax were the main controversial issues brought to 
the attention of the Court. 
Green Bay Lumber Company v. Odeboldt School District — The Odeboldt 
School District entered into a contract with C. H. Weaver to construct 
a schoolhouse, with the contractor to furnish the materials and labor. 
Periodic payments were made to Weaver in accordance with the building 
progress reports submitted by the architect. The Green Bay Lumber Com­
pany brought suit against the School District because said contractor 
had not met his obligation for payment of materials. Weaver abandoned 
the construction project and it appeared he had been overpaid in re­
lation to the progress of the project. The Board immediately employed 
someone else to continue construction of the building. Two issues were 
considered by the Court: Does the school have the right to complete the 
building? Is the building progress report submitted by the architect 
binding on the School District, contractor, and supplier relative to 
financial payments? The Supreme Court, in 1904, decided that the School 
District did have contractual and legal rights to complete the work on 
the construction project and that the building progress reports of the 
architect were binding on the contractor. School District, and supplier. 
Liability for payment of materials to the Green Bay Lumber Company was 
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chargeable to the District schoolhouse fund, which was voted by the people. 
The judges rendered the decision on the basis of the contractual agree­
ment and statutory provisions (83, p. 227). 
Building contract. Where a building contract provided 
that upon abandonment of the work, the school district 
might complete the same, and that the architect's cer­
tificate of the cost thereof should be conclusive, the 
amount so certified was binding upon third parties in 
the absence of fraud. 
Casey v. Independent School District of Nutt — In 1884 Casey initiated 
action to enjoin the levy of a schoolhouse tax for the construction of 
a schoolhouse. He charged that the Board of Education failed to consult 
with the County Superintendent relative to the building project, which 
was required by law. He also claimed that the lowest bid was not accepted 
by school officials. The issue: In view of the statutory noncompliance 
of the Board, was the tax levy legal? A decision was rendered in favor 
of the School District because minor irregularities shall not prevent 
the levy of a tax. Payments must be met after construction has been com­
pleted (84, p. 695). 
Erection of schoolhouse; Failure to comply with statute: 
Restraining collection of tax: Objection made too late. 
Where a schoolhouse has already been erected and a tax 
voted by the electors to pay for the same, a taxpayer can­
not restrain the collection of the tax on the grounds that 
the board failed to consult with the county superintendent, 
and that no proposals for the erection of the building were 
invited, and that the work was not let to the lowest bidder, 
and that no bonds were required of the contractor. 
Site Measurement 
Historically it was determined that a rural school site contain one 
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acre of land. With the development of roads it became necessary for 
the Court to determine the site measurement. 
Salisbury v. Highland Township — Salisbury owned land adjacent to an 
established road and along the section line. Highland Township was at­
tempting to condemn one acre of his land for school purposes. The issue: 
Shall the one acre include the area extending to the center of the road, 
or shall the School District be eligible to condemn one acre of land ex­
clusive of that utilized by one-half of the road? An 1887 decision ruled 
that the State allows one full acre for school purposes and the fraction 
of land used for a road or highway shall not be inclusive. It reasoned 
that the road is devoted to public use of a different nature (85, p. 556). 
Site—construction of statute. Under Code, Section 1825, 
authorizing the condemnation for the location and con­
struction of a schoolhouse of not more than one acre of 
land, and Section 1826, requiring the site to be on some 
public highway, a school district is entitled to condemn 
a full acre of land, exclusive of the highway. 
Easement 
One Supreme Court case was found regarding an easement controversy. 
Two important headnotes were developed from this case which have estab­
lished a system of compliance. 
Ionia Independent School District v. DeWilde — DeWilde entered the school 
property and installed a drain to carry sewage from his home to an area 
of lower elevation. His home was located adjacent to the school site. He 
claimed to have oral permission from the Board; however, the matter had 
not been voted upon by the people, or compensation paid. The Ionia Board 
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of Directors brought suit in equity to compel DeWilde to remove his tile 
and stop using the drainage. The issues: Can an easement be acquired 
when the issue is not voted upon by the electorate of the district, or 
no compensation paid? Is oral permission to lay a drain on a school site 
subject to revocation of use at a future date? A 1952 decision was rend­
ered in favor of the plaintiff because an easement cannot be obtained 
after a drain is laid across school property if authorization of the 
electorate had not been acquired, or compensation not realized. The 
decision also stated that the license to use a drainage system installed 
upon a school site is automatically revoked by court action initiated by 
a school district (86, p. 685). 
Easement in school property--not obtained where no vote of 
electors or compensation paid. One who laid a tile sewage 
drain across property of an independent school district 
after oral permission was obtained from members of the 
school board, for which there was not authorization by a 
vote of the electors and no compensation paid, cannot 
obtain an easement over the school property. 
Tile drain across school grounds—license—revocation by 
action to enjoin use. Where a defendant who had obtained 
oral permission from members of the school board to lay a 
tile drain across school grounds claimed the right to use 
the school property as a license, such license, if estab­
lished, being one which was revocable at the pleasure of 
the school board was in effect revoked by the action 
brought by the board seeking injunctive relief against 
the defendant's use. 
Board Committee Expenditure 
Ad hoc coTomittees duly appointed by boards of education frequently 
need financial assistance to perform their assignments. Responsibility 
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for payment of these obligations is clearly defined in the case set 
forth below. 
Driscoll V. Independent School District of Council Bluffs — The Board 
of Education appointed a committee of its own organization to develop 
plans for a new schoolhouse. The committee viewed drawings and asked 
Driscoll, an architect, to modify a set of plans according to its 
desires. A technicality arose when the plaintiff billed the District 
for the time expended in modifying the plans. The Board of Education 
did not feel responsible for the bill inasmuch as the request to the 
architect was not official board action. The issue: Do appointed 
board committees have the authority to expend district funds for 
services rendered? A decision was rendered in 1883 by the judges of 
the Court in favor of the plaintiff. It was believed the committee 
was justly selected to represent the Board and the architect was en­
titled to compensation in proportion to the task (87, p. 426). 
Taking case from jury. Where the evidence introduced by 
plaintiff showed that defendant's board of directors 
appointed a committee to procure plans for a schoolhouse, 
and that the committee called upon the plaintiff, an 
architect, and, after looking at some plans, selected 
one, and directed plaintiff to modify it in some parti­
culars, which he did, held that the action of the com­
mittee bound the defendant to pay the reasonable value 
of plaintiff's time and labor bestowed on the plan 
selected, and evidence having been offered as to the 
value of such time and labor, it was error for the court 
to instruct the jury to find for the defendant. But 
such instruction was not erroneous as to another branch 
of the case as to which there was no evidence to estab­
lish plaintiff's claim. 
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Lease-Purchase Agreement 
Lease-purchase agreement is a relatively new method of acquiring 
mobile classrooms. The lease implies that a district may rent, with an 
option to purchase. 
Porter v. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction — The Central Webster 
Community School District attempted to lease seven mobile classrooms. 
Two leases were agreed upon between the school officials and the lessor. 
First, the District entered into a contract with the lessor to rent a 
portion of the school sites on which the classrooms were to be located. 
Second, the School District entered into a lease-purchase agreement 
with the lessor to rent the classrooms for a period of five years. Upon 
expiration of the agreement the District had the option of making an 
additional payment for which the classrooms would become the property 
of the District. If option was not honored, the classrooms would be 
removed by the lessor. The School District intended to make the rental 
payments out of the general fund and without a vote of the people. 
Porter, an interested citizen, contended this was an illegal practice. 
He and other interested citizens appealed to have the board plans re­
viewed by the County Superintendent, who sustained the appeal and rec­
ommended the Board consider other alternatives. Whereupon, said case 
was appealed to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction by the 
Board, who affirmed the decision of the County Superintendent. Upon 
further appeal to the Iowa State Board of Public Instruction, the deci­
sion of the State Superintendent was overruled. This action was brought 
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to the Supreme Court in 1966. The issue: Does this case comply with 
the provisions of Section 297.12, Code of Iowa, which permits boards of 
education to rent a room and employ a teacher on a yearly basis when 
ten or more children are enrolled for whom there are no educational 
facilities, and pay these expenses from the general fund? A decision 
was rendered in favor of Porter inasmuch as the law was not specifi­
cally followed by school officials and the lessor. A lease-purchase 
agreement requires a vote of the people (88, p. 571). 
Leasing agreement for erection of seven-room school build­
ing—invalid. School board was not authorized by statute 
to enter into an agreement in 1964 for the leasing of a 
seven-room building to be erected by lessor on school land 
for a five-year period with option by the school district 
to purchase at the end of the rental period, and the state 
board acted illegally in approving the lease. 
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CHAPTER VII: TEACHERS 
Teachers are not considered public officers in Iowa even though 
they perform a governmental service. The legislature prescribes teacher 
qualifications through the statutes and requires teachers to possess 
certificates. Certification was designed to indicate the necessary qual­
ifications or preparation. 
The Iowa Department of Public Instruction has been delegated the 
responsibility of teacher certification. This agency may not refuse to 
issue a certificate to a qualified candidate without good cause. The 
certificate is a license and not a contract between the teacher and the 
State. It may be revoked for just cause and the legislature may im­
plement added qualifications upon prospective teachers. 
Districts may not legally pay salaries if teachers are not prop­
erly certified. In Iowa teachers may be contracted prior to certifi­
cation; however, they must be certified before they begin to teach. 
Public school teachers find themselves in a unique position in 
relationship to their students. They take the place of parents in 
loco parentis in educational functions and the parents relinquish the 
powers which are necessary to train their children while in school. 
Teachers are not exempt from liability or free from court action in 
cases of negligence or action which is not reasonable in nature. 
Teachers are not liable for injuries suffered by children attend­
ing school if negligence is not proven. School employees are expected 
to forsee dangerous situations, and failure to correct them, which 
results in injury, may cause the teacher to be liable. Negligence can 
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be described as the circumstances which deprive a student of the ability 
to protect or defend himself. These circumstances are expected in many 
instances to be controlled by the teacher. 
Dismissal 
Teacher dismissal is as old as teacher employment. Various means 
have been implemented to dismiss teachers which did not meet statutory 
provisions. Several of these cases were appealed to the Supreme Court 
of Iowa. 
Hull V. Independent School District of Aplington — Helen Hull was con­
tracted by the President of the Board of Education to teach school. She 
reported for work on August 29, 1887 and taught until September 13, 1887, 
at which time she was notified she would be replaced. Hull appealed to 
the County Superintendent, who reversed the action taken by the local 
Board of Education. The Board of Education then appealed to the State 
Superintendent, who affirmed the decision of the County Superintendent. 
Hull brought suit for the recovery of wages. The issue: Is a teacher's 
right to recovery dependent upon the legality of the contract and wrong­
ful discharge? A decision was rendered in 1890 in favor of the plain­
tiff because the contract entered into was valid. The President of the 
Board did possess authority to contract the teacher and the accusation 
of incompetence was placed in the records as a reason for not approving 
the contract. A contract requires that the teacher be "legally quali­
fied." The plaintiff was property certified (89, p. 686). 
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Discharge. A discharge of a teacher for incompetency can 
only be made in the manner prescribed by Section 1734 of 
the Code, and a discharge by any other method is wrongful. 
VanPeursem v. Consolidated Independent School District of Laurens — 
VanPeursem was awarded a contract, with written instructions to return 
it on or before April 15. He failed to comply and in the meantime much 
criticism relative to his attitude and disciplinary control was directed 
to the Board. A special meeting was scheduled on May 12, at which time 
the President of the Board informed VanPeursem that his duties would be 
terminated at the conclusion of the school year. VanPeursem failed to 
appeal to the County Superintendent. He brought suit claiming that the 
Board did not abide by Section 279.24, Code of Iowa, in his discharge 
because the provisions for a notice and hearing had not been met. A re­
view of the board minutes did not indicate a record of separation; how­
ever, the matter was discussed. The issue: Was Section 279.24, Code of 
Iowa, complied with in the process of termination? All judges agreed 
upon the decision which favored the defendant. The Court reasoned that 
a meeting scheduled by the Board on May 3 aided in deciding the issues 
which were acted upon at the May 12 meeting. The attendance of all board 
members and the teacher at a hearing prior to the dismissal did constitute 
a hearing (90, p. 1100). 
Teachers discharge—presence of teacher at meeting—waiver 
of defects of notice. Where all the members of the school 
board are present, as well as the teacher, and the com­
plaints then before the board are considered and the teacher 
participates in the meeting any want of notice or defect of 
notice is not material. 
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Benson v. Township School District of Silver Lake — A hearing tech­
nicality and contract validity in connection with the termination of a 
teacher's contract were brought before the Court in 1896. Benson was 
contracted by a sub-district director to teach for a nine month period ; 
however, the Board President did not formally sign her contract- She 
taught for six months and was prohibited by the Silver Lake Board from 
continuing her services. Benson brought suit for a continuation of con­
tract. The defendant contended that the contract was made without author­
ity in that it was not signed by the President of the Board. A board 
member did acknowledge validity of the contract prior to the Court case. 
The plaintiff charged that she was entitled to a hearing which was not 
held. The issues: Did the plaintiff hold a valid contract? Must a 
hearing be given to a teacher prior to dismissal? The Court ruled in 
favor of the plaintiff. The contract was considered valid because the 
president of a board has no authority to select a teacher in a sub-
district. A hearing must be scheduled for a teacher before she can be 
dismissed prior to the expiration of a contract (91, p. 328). 
Discharge of teacher—hearing. Under Code, Section 1734, 
a school teacher cannot be discharged before the expi­
ration of her term, without an opportunity to be heard. 
Schrader v. Rural School District of Audubon County -- Dorothy Schrader 
was employed for a term of eight and one-half months to teach a rural 
school in Audubon. The Board was dissatisfied with the services rend­
ered by the teacher and proceeded to charge her with lack of faithful 
performance and failure to file a school report. A hearing was scheduled 
on October 19, 1933 for the teacher's release and she was asked to attend. 
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She thought the meeting was called to discuss the discipline problems 
she had experienced with one of the board member's children. A petition 
has also been presented to the Board by the patrons of the district 
seeking Schrader's dismissal. The Board voted to dismiss her and she 
was terminated the following day. Schrader brought suit against the 
Board for recovery of three weeks salary and the remaining unpaid balance 
of the contract. She accused the Board of dismissal without a notice of 
hearing, and further charged that she did not have time for defense 
preparation. The issues: Did the scheduled board meeting constitute a 
hearing prior to the dismissal? Does failure to submit a report nullify 
a financial settlement? A decision was reached which directed the Board 
to pay the plaintiff for three weeks work. The balance of the contract 
wage could not be collected. The Court reasoned that the teacher did 
have a hearing in which she willfully took an active part. The plain­
tiff was discharged with incompetency as acted upon by the Board (92, 
p. 799). 
Teacher discharge—informality of procedure--effect. The 
discharge of a teacher by the school board, on supporting 
evidence, will not be deemed illegal because of the marked 
informailty of the proceedings, when the record reveals 
the presence of the elements of jurisdiction, to wit: 
charges before the board of incompetency on the part of 
the teacher, and a hearing on said charges at which the 
teacher was present, and in which she participated. 
Teachers action for salary—insufficient defense. In an 
action by a teacher to recover salary accrued and unpaid at 
the time of her discharge by the board, it is no defense 
that the teacher did not make the report required of teachers 
at the close of the term (Section 4339, C., '35), said 
teacher having been discharged prior to the close of said 
term. 
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Smith y. District Township of Knox — Smith brought action upon the con­
tract issued to him by the District Township of Knox. The teacher was 
prevented by the Board from performing his duties due to the deceitful 
manner in which he obtained his contract. The Board contended that Smith 
fraudulently obtained his contract by claiming he had discussed his em­
ployment with the parents of the district who sought his services. Smith 
was also accused of falsely obtaining the contract signature of the Board 
President by reporting the positive attitudes of board members and dis­
trict constituents relative to his employment. Smith initiated Court 
proceedings for the implementation of his contract. The issue: Did 
the plaintiff possess a legal contract? The Court decided in 1816 that 
the case be referred to the lower court for retrial. Discharge of a 
teacher is not a ministerial function. It is of a judicial function 
established by statute (93, p. 522). 
Directors: Judicial acts. The duties imposed upon 
school directors by Section 1734 of the Code, respect­
ing the discharge of teachers, are of a judicial 
character. 
White V. Holstein Board of Education (Wahlenberg, board member) 
White had a contract to teach in the school system but was discharged 
after teaching a portion of the year. The teacher appealed her griev­
ance to the County Superintendent, who overruled the dismissal action 
of the Board on the grounds that she was not given an opportunity to be 
heard. New charges were brought against White and a time for hearing 
was scheduled, even though she had not been reinstated to her position. 
A question arose as to whether or not White could be charged a second 
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Liirn- inasmuch as she had not been restored to her position. White 
brought suit to nullify the termination, thus enabling her to complete 
the year. The issue: Can a board act as both judge and accuser? The 
Court, in 1901, ruled in favor of the Board, stating that if cause is 
proper the Board should not be denied the right of dismissal. The board 
is a tribunal before which a hearing can take place; however, a teacher 
who possesses a contract may not be terminated before it expires without 
proper hearing (94, p. 236). 
School board may act as accuser and judge. Code Section 
2782, provides that the board of school directors, by a 
majority vote, may discharge any teacher for incompetency 
or any good cause, after a fair investigation made at a 
meeting held for that purpose, at which time the teacher 
shall be permitted to make a defense. Held, that a trial 
of charges against the teacher by the board of directors 
was not objectionable on the ground that they were 
accusers rather than judges, and because of their pre­
judice . 
Courtright v. Consolidated School District of Mapleton — A breach of 
contract and recovery damages were considered by the Court in 1927. 
Courtright entered into a contract with the Consolidated School District 
of Mapleton. The Superintendent, Board and patrons were dissatisfied 
with his inability to carry out assigned duties. A board meeting was 
held with Courtright, at which time his dismissal was discussed and 
contract terminated. Courtright appealed to the County Superintendent 
stating that the charges were not specific. After due consideration 
the County Superintendent affirmed the action of the Board. Courtright 
later appealed to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, who 
affirmed the decision of the County Superintendent. The teacher filed 
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charges for recovery of balance due him on contract. The issue: May 
a teacher duly discharged by a board of education sue for damages re­
lated to the dismissal? A decision was rendered in favor of the de­
fendant because a teacher may be discharged for incompetence. Court 
action may not be brought against a district for recovery of the 
balance of a contract when dismissal is brought about due to incom­
petence (95, p. 26). 
Teachers--dismissa1--jurisdiction of courts. A teacher 
who has been discharged by the board of directors on 
charges of incompetency, after due notice to the teacher 
and hearing, may not maintain an action in the courts 
for damages consequent on such discharge. 
Contracts 
A teacher's contract is a written or oral agreement of employment 
entered into between an employee and a school district. For many 
years, Iowa law has required that teacher contracts be placed in writ­
ing. Various contract technicalities are cited in the cases set forth 
below. 
Place V. District Township of Colfax — Place entered into a written con­
tract with the sub-director for a twelve week term on April 7, 1879. 
The contract was properly executed by the sub-director and teacher; how­
ever, it was not received by the President of the Board for signature. 
The Board President did not approve of the teacher and attempted to stop 
payment of wages, claiming he had not signed the contract. Place brought 
action in an attempt to recover payment of wages. Court records show 
that the sub-director instructed the plaintiff to complete the term. 
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Tlic- issue: Is a teacher's contract valid if not signed by the president 
of ;i board? A decision was adjudicated in favor of Place because sub-
directors have the authority to manage and contract for teachers. A 
president must not be the judge of teachers (96, p. 573). 
Teacher's contract: When not enforceable. No recovery 
can be had on a contract to teach school made with a sub-
director, but not approved by the president of the board, 
unless such approval has been waived and the contract 
ratified by the district; the fact that the teacher pro­
ceeds thereunder and completes the performance of the 
contract is not sufficient to constitute such ratification 
and authorize a recovery. 
Shill v. School Township of Rock Creek -- A sub-director of the School 
District of Rock Creek entered into and signed a contract with Shill. 
A petition indicating dissatisfaction of school patrons was filed with 
the President of the Board after he had signed the teacher's contract. 
The Board met to decide what should be done about the situation. An 
informal meeting was held in which Shill participated. An accusation 
was made by the President claiming that Shill had informed him of 
parental approval relative to the contract. Consequently, he signed 
the document. The Board voted not to retain the teacher and a replace­
ment was employed. Shill brought suit for fulfillment of the contract. 
Tho issue: Is a contract revocable when properly signed by all parties? 
In 1930 the Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff because the contract 
was properly executed, signed, and filed (97, p. 1020). 
Teachers--employment--nondiscretionary duty of president 
to sign contract. When a sub-director of a school town­
ship orally and under due authority from the school board 
employs a teacher, the president of the board has no dis­
cretion to refuse to sign the formal written contract 
required by statute. 
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James v. School Township of Troy — James entered into a contract with 
the School Township of Troy for thirty-two weeks. A small number of 
students attended the school. Shortly after the school term began one 
family decided to enroll their children in a parochial school. A meet­
ing was scheduled on November 2 to discuss the matter, with the teacher 
in attendance. The Board decided to continue even though there might be 
even fewer students in attendance as the year progressed. At a later 
date the school was closed for lack of students and the teacher was 
asked not to return, even though her services were available. James 
filed charges for the balance due her on contract, which was $640. 
The Board claimed that she had taught for only a portion of the year and 
did not fulfill the terms of said contract. She was also charged with 
failure to seek other employment. The issue: Is a teacher's contract 
valid when a school is closed for lack of students? The Court ruled in 
1930 for the plaintiff, claiming that the contract was properly con­
tracted and filed. No effort to obtain other employment is necessary 
and the teacher made herself available to teach. A teacher cannot 
legally sign a contract with another district when she has another con­
tract (98, p. 1059). 
Teachers—contract—enforcement—non-duty to seek employ­
ment elsewhere. A duly employed teacher who, in com­
pliance with the direction of the board, holds herself in 
readiness to teach, but is furnished no pupils, need not, 
in an action on her contract, show that she made any 
effort to secure employment elsewhere as a teacher. 
Smith V. School District of Grove — Smith signed a contract with the 
School District of Grove in Adair County. The teacher fulfilled the 
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ten week obligation and immediately signed a contract to teach for an 
additional twenty-six week term. This contract was signed by the 
teacher and sub-director and left with the Secretary, who filed it. A 
discipline problem arose between the children of one of the board members 
and Smith. The Board of Education met and passed a resolution dismissing 
the teacher and closing the school. Smith filed suit for recovery of 
wages. The board members contended that she could not collect additional 
wages because the President failed to sign the contract. The teacher had 
made her services available to the District. The issue; Did the teacher 
hold a legal contract and could wages be recovered? A decision was 
rendered in 1933 in favor of the plaintiff because the contract was 
ratified when the Board knew of the terms (99, p. 1047). 
Contract; Ratification. Where a teacher has been em­
ployed by a sub-director, and after the school had 
continued for a time the board voted to discontinue the 
school, paying the teacher a certain designated amount 
for her services, held that the payment did not con­
stitute a ratification of the contract of hiring, bind­
ing the district to pay for the services of the teacher 
after the time when the directors had voted the school 
should be discontinued. 
Jackson v. Independent School District of Steamboat Rock — Charges of 
a broach of contract were ruled upon by the Supreme Court in 1900. 
Jackson, a teacher, entered into a contract to teach in the intermediate 
elementary grades. She served in that capacity until November, at which 
time she was dismissed from the duties specified in her contract. The 
Board claimed she could not maintain discipline and offered her a posi­
tion at a higher academic level. The teacher refused the new assignment, 
although she made her services available for teaching at the level for 
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which she was contracted. An appeal was made by Jackson to the County 
Superintendent, who ruled in her favor. The Board then appealed to 
the Superintendent of Public Instruction, who affirmed the decision of 
the County Superintendent. Jackson brought suit to recover the con­
tracted wage. The issue: Was the employee wrongfully discharged be­
cause she would not accept a teaching assignment other than that stip­
ulated in her contract? The Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff be­
cause she did not have to accept different employment unless it was in 
a similar field. There had been no modification of the original agree­
ment (100, p. 313). 
Discharged teacher--tender of new place no defense to 
action by. In an action by a school teacher employed 
to teach in one department of a public school to re­
cover for a wrongful discharge, an allegation that 
defendant tendered plaintiff a position to teach 
another department of the school was not a sufficient 
defense, where it did not appear that plaintiff could 
have accepted such new position without modifying the 
original contract. 
Burkhead v. Independent School District of Independence — Burkhead was 
contracted as superintendent and instructor for a period of five years. 
No stipulations were placed in his contract indicating the time the 
school term was to commence. According to board policy the term began 
September 1 and ended June 1. At the beginning of the fourth year of 
his contract Burkhead was informed that his services were no longer 
needed. He was told that his contract was void because specific infor­
mation governing the commencement and closing of the school year was 
not stipulated in his contract, and that it was improper to extend a 
contract for a period of five years. Burkhead brought suit objecting 
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to the cancellation of his contract. The issue: Must a specific time of 
commencing and closing a school be specified in a contract when rules 
governing the matter have been adopted by a board of education? A deci­
sion was rendered in favor of the plaintiff because the supplemental 
rules of a board fix the time of the school year (101, p. 29). 
Contract with teacher. A contract to teach is not in­
valid because it does not state the time the school was 
to be taught, as required by the Code, Section 2778, 
where the rules and regulations of the district fixed 
the time the schools were to be open and were made a 
part of the contract. 
Miner v. Lovilia Independent School District -- Miner held a contract 
which indicated the grade assignment, with the words "fifth grade" 
written in the upper margin. Upon arrival for the new school year she 
was informed by the Superintendent that she was reassigned to the fourth 
grade due to the creation of a combination room of fifth and sixth grade 
students. The teacher rejected the new assignment and brought court 
proceedings against the District for restoration to her contracted assign­
ment. A substitute teacher was employed. A clause appeared in the 
teacher's contract which gave either party the right to terminate the 
employment upon 20 days notice. The issue: Did the plaintiff or 
defendant create the breach of contract? A decision was reached in 1931 
for the plaintiff. The Court reasoned that the Board of Education could 
not terminate the contract because the teacher refused to accept a change 
in assignment; any contract may be cancelled for other reasons if it 
includes a termination clause (102, p. 973). 
Teachers—contract of employment—termination on notice— 
validity. A provision in a public school contract authoriz­
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ing either party to the contract to terminate it by 
giving written notice of such termination for a named 
number of days, is not violative of or inconsistent 
with either Section 4229 or Section 4237, Code 1927. 
Mulhall V. Pfankuck — In a meeting held by a board of education, one 
sub-director left prior to adjournment or before the members officially 
voted to close one of the schoolhouses. Mulhall was contracted by the 
sub-director to teach school in the building which had been previously 
voted closed. At a later date the Board sought advice from the County 
Superintendent and also from the State Superintendent. Both parties 
recommended to keep the school open. The teacher taught for one month 
and the Board again voted to close the school because of the lack of 
students. The plaintiff brought suit against Pfankuck for the balance 
of his contract sum. The issue: Was the contract valid? A 1928 
decision was rendered in favor of Pfankuck because the contract was not 
approved by the Board other than by the sub-director (103, p. 1139). 
Teachers—employment—legality. The official action of 
a board of school directors in authorizing each sub-
director to employ in his sub-district the teacher of 
his choice necessarily constitutes no authority to a sub-
director to hire a teacher in a district the school of 
which the board orders closed. 
Smith v. Rural School District of Adair County — Grace Smith signed a 
ten-week contract in 1933 to teach a rural school in Adair County. A 
contract was properly drafted, signed by all parties, and the teacher 
fulfilled her contract obligation. She was asked to continue her ser­
vices as a teacher for the ensuing twenty-six weeks, for which she signed 
another contract. This contract was not signed by the Board President. 
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The teacher encountered some discipline problems with two of the board 
member's children. A board meeting was held on December 6 and Smith 
was dismissed. The schoolhouse was locked; however, the teacher did of­
fer her services. Smith initiated Court proceedings for payment for the 
remainder of the year. The issue: Was the teacher entitled to con­
tractual payment for the balance of the year? A decision was rendered 
in favor of the plaintiff because the contract was ratified by the Board, 
even though the President had not placed his signature upon it. The 
defendant was directed to pay the teacher for the services rendered and 
for those which the teacher had offered to perform (104, p. 1047). 
Teachers—ratification of contract. A contract of employ­
ment of a teacher in a public school, signed by the teacher 
but not signed by the president of the board (Section 4229, 
C., '31) is ratified for the full term of the contract by 
the action of the board in accepting the services of the 
teacher, and paying her therefor, with knowledge of said 
contract. 
Clay V. Independent School District of Cedar Falls — The Cedar Falls 
District had a number of buildings throughout the district. The Iowa 
State Teachers College campus school was located in the same territory. 
Students in a given area of the district were required to attend the cam­
pus school. Some of the teachers acted as critic teachers at the campus 
school for a portion of a day and were employed for the remainder of the 
day by the Cedar Falls District. Payments to the teachers were made on 
a pro rata basis. A number of citizens, represented by Clay, thought 
this was a poor practice and became very disturbed about the shared-time 
agreement between the State institution and the public school. Court 
proceedings were initiated by Clay to stop this practice. The issue: 
94 
Can teachers legally divide their time between two schools? A 1919 
decision was rendered in favor of the School District because it is legal 
for a teacher to divide time and serve two schools. Compensation can be 
received if both employers agree and it is justly prorated (105, p. 89). 
Teachers—employment in two schools. A school teacher 
may lawfully divide her time and labor and services between 
two schools and receive compensation from both of them, 
where both employers consent, and her payments are equit­
ably proportioned between the schools. 
Independent School District of Eden No. 2 v. Rhodes — In 1891 the Board 
of Directors of the Independent District of Eden No. 2 voted to employ 
Gambell for a nine month period. The contract was properly signed by 
the teacher and filed with the Secretary of the Board; however, Rhodes, 
the Board President, refused to sign the document. He charged that 
Gambell was not of good moral character. The patrons also protested 
his employment because of an unsuccessful tenure in a previous school. 
The Board of Education brought suit against Rhodes at the lower court 
level for his refusal to sign the contract. The decision was rendered 
in favor of the Board. Rhodes appealed to the Supreme Court. The 
issue: May a president of a board cause a ratified contract to become 
void by refusing to attach his signature to the instrument? A decision 
was rendered sustaining the decision of the district court inasmuch as 
a ratified contract is valid and need not be signed by the president. 
(106, p. 570). 
Contracts with teachers—powers and duties of board and 
president. In independent school districts, the power 
to employ teachers is vested in the board of directors 
as such; and when they have, in due form, entered into a 
contract with a teacher for his services, it is the duty 
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of the president to approve and file the contract, and 
if he refused to do so on the ground that the teacher 
employed is not of good moral character, and is inef­
ficient, and is not acceptable to the patrons of the 
school, he may be compelled by action of mandamus to 
perform his duty, since these are matters wholly with­
in the discretion of the board. 
McGuffin V. Willow Community School District — McGuffin was contracted 
to coach and teach at the Willow School. His duties were to continue 
until August 1, 1969 as a summer school instructor. He wrote several 
notes to the Superintendent criticizing his administrative responsi­
bilities. The Superintendent did not appreciate these criticisms and 
wrote a note to McGuffin stating that he defended him before parents, 
teachers, and the Board. The Superintendent charged McGuffin with in­
subordination and recommended that he be dismissed under Section 279.24, 
Code of Iowa. McGuffin replied in writing, "I accept your challenge." 
A meeting was held to discuss the situation and the Board went on record 
terminating the teacher's contract on April 25, 1969 and pay him for the 
remainder of his contract. McGuffin had a conference with the President 
of the Board and was asked to resign. He refused, and upon returning to 
teach the next school day found that the Superintendent had cancelled 
his classes. McGuffin brought suit charging that his services were being 
discontinued under Section 279.13, Code of Iowa, or the continuing con­
tract statute. The Board contended he was terminated under Section 
279.24, Code of Iowa, because of insubordination. Plaintiff did not ap­
peal to the County Superintendent. The issue: Must a teacher who has 
been terminated from classes pursue proper administrative remedy? Which 
statute applies to the dismissal? A decision was rendered in favor of 
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the School District. The Court ruled that Section 279.24, Code of Iowa, 
applied to the dismissal, and that McGuffin did not pursue proper admin­
istrative appeal (107, p. 165). 
Schools and School District. Where teacher was still 
subject to assignments elsewhere until August 1, 1969, 
dismissal, under contract providing his duties to be 
'Elementary and Secondary Art, Boys Wrestling, Coach, 
and extra-curricular duties as assigned by adminis­
tration,' even if administration relieve him of his 
classes in art on April 25, 1969, teacher's failure to 
pursue his administrative remedy by appealing his dis­
missal at August 1, 1969, hearing was fatal to action 
at law for damages. 
Voting Residence 
Teacher residence for voting purposes became an issue in the election 
of a county supervisor. The decision left no doubt relative to the 
establishment of teacher residence. 
Dodd V. Lorenz -- In 1930 Dodd and Lorenz were opposing candidates for 
the position of county supervisor of Tama County. Tabulation of the 
election returns indicated a 1299 to 1298 victory for Dodd. Lorenz 
brought action at district court level challenging the votes of three 
teachers. The three teachers were unmarried and had taught and lived in 
Traer since 1927. These teachers had entered into teaching contracts 
with the intent of making Traer their place of residence. The district 
court decided in favor of Lorenz, and Dodd appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The issue; Did the teachers establish their residence for voting pur­
poses? The Court reversed the decision of the district court and ruled 
in favor of Dodd, stating that he was elected to office. It reasoned 
97 
that a nine month contract does not disqualify a teacher's voting 
privilege. It would be unusual not to call the place of employment for 
teachers their home (108, p. 513). 
Qualifications of voters—school—teachers. Adult un­
married school teachers become 'residents' of the county 
in which they teach, within the meaning of the con­
stitutional provision governing suffrage, when the employ­
ment is entered upon with the good faith intention of 
making the place of employment their permanent home or 
residence so long as the employment continues. 
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CHAPTER VIII: STUDENTS 
A child's educational training was determined by his father under 
English common law. This practice prevailed in the American colonies, as 
well as the State of Iowa, until compulsory attendance laws were enacted. 
Compulsory attendance is not enforced when a student of school age 
has satisfactorily completed the highest grade offered in the school; 
when a student of school age marries; when a student attends a nonpublic 
school; and when school attendance becomes a mental or physical handicap. 
The statute is not clear as to what comprises sufficient schooling in 
lieu of public school attendance. 
Public school attendance is not absolute. Students may be expelled 
from school for not abiding by reasonable regulations enacted by a board 
of education. Students may be suspended from school by teachers, prin­
cipals, and superintendents for a period of three days. 
Boards of education do not possess the authority to expel students 
for an indefinite period of time. The expulsion must not extend beyond 
the present school year. A student may seek an injunction for admit­
tance to school where unreasonable rules are enforced by a board of 
education. 
Racial Discrimination 
Racial discrimination became an issue at a very early time in our 
history. The intent of the Iowa Constitution was clearly set forth as 
early as 1839. 
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The Ralph case, not a school controversy, did much to establish 
the rights of black people in Iowa. Montgomery, a Missouri slave owner, 
permitted his slave to move to Dubuque to work in the lead mines. Ralph 
agreed to pay Montgomery $550 for his freedom. At a later date the 
slave owner wished to reclaim his slave. In 1839 the Court ruled that 
Ralph was a free man. It reasoned that one man cannot restrain the 
liberty of another human to gain his own objective. 
Clarke v. Muscatine School District -- The Muscatine School District 
operated a separate school for black children, with proper facilities 
and teacher. On September 10, 1867, Susan B. Clarke attempted to en­
roll in her neighborhood grammar school and was refused admittance be­
cause she was black. Her father brought suit in her behalf against the 
Muscatine School District for denying his daughter admission to the 
grammar school. The Court reviewed the historical development within 
the State of Iowa concerning education. 
1. The First General Assembly provided for common schools which 
were to be open and free to all white students. 
2. In 1851 the Legislature decided that all property of blacks 
was exempt from tax. 
3. The Legislature provided for separate schools for blacks in 
1858. This law was declared unconstitutional that same year. 
The issue: Does the Constitution of Iowa provide for equal educational 
opportunities for all children, without distinction of color? The 
Court ruled in favor of Clarke for constitutional reasons. This deci­
sion also applied to such matters as religion, nationality, and other 
discriminatory characteristics (109, p. 266). 
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Schools: Colored children: Discretion of district board: 
The Constitution and statutes in force effectuating it (Const. 
Art. 9, 12; Rev. 2023, et seq.; Laws of 1862, ch. 192, 12; 
Laws of 1866, ch. 143, 3) provide for the education of all 
the youths of the State, without distinction of color; and 
the board of directors have no discretionary power to require 
colored children to attend a separate school. They may ex­
ercise a uniform discretion, operative upon all, as to the 
residence or qualification of children to entitle them to 
admission to each particular school, but they cannot deny a 
youth admission to any particular school, because of his 
color, nationality, religion, or the like. 
Smith V. Independent School District of Keokuk — The Keokuk Board of 
Education provided a separate room and competent teacher for black high 
school students. A 16 year old boy of African descent had previously 
completed the elementary requirements and passed the required exam­
ination for high school admission. In 1874 he was refused admission 
to the Keokuk High School. As a result of the refusal Smith initiated 
Court proceedings. The defendant Board contended that it had provided 
for black students by establishing a separate room with a competent 
teacher. The issue: Does the Constitution of Iowa provide for equal 
educational opportunities for all children, without distinction of 
color? A decision was reached by the Supreme Court which held for the 
plaintiff. It reasoned that the plaintiff was entitled to his con­
stitutional rights which provides equal educational opportunity for all 
children, without distinction of color. The previous case of Clarke v. 
Muscatine School District was used as a precedent (110, p. 518). 
Exclusion on account of color. A pupil, otherwise eligible 
cannot be excluded from the public schools of this state on 
account of his color, nor, if colored, can he be compelled 
to attend a separate school for colored children. Clarke 
V. Muscatine School District, etc., 24 Iowa 266. 
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Corporal Punishment 
Corporal punishment became an issue in the Supreme Court at an 
early period of Iowa educational history. Both criminal and civil 
cases have been reviewed. 
State V. Mizner — This criminal case was tried before the Supreme Court 
on two different occasions. Mizner, an instructor, was prosecuted by 
the State of Iowa because this was a criminal case. He was charged with 
assault and battery for whipping Ida Brumer for misconduct. Her father 
had written an excuse in her behalf asking that she be excused from an 
algebra course each afternoon for health reasons. The student was 
accused of writing the excuse and the instructor asked for the sub­
mittal of succeeding excuses. As a result of a verbal controversy, the 
instructor struck the student over the shoulder with a hickory stick 
which was approximately one-half inch thick and four feet long. Brumer 
claimed that she was struck twelve times and that her shoulder was 
bruised for two months. During the initial Supreme Court proceedings 
Mizner claimed that he was restrained at the lower court level from 
presenting evidence relative to the reasonableness of the punishment. 
This case was referred to district court for retrial, at which time he 
was permitted to present added evidence in his behalf. The district 
court again ruled for the plaintiff. Consequently, Mizner appealed to 
the Supreme Court for retrial. During the court proceedings the question 
of whether or not Ida Brumer had reached her twenty-first birthday be­
came an issue. The issues: Was the punishment administered for reason­
able cause? May a student be punished for something the parent has 
102 
asked his child to do? Was the student subject to the compulsory at­
tendance statute? A decision was rendered in behalf of the State. The 
Court reasoned that the remedy was not corporal punishment, but expulsion 
because the student was not subject to compulsory attendance statutes. 
A student cannot be punished for something a parent requests his child 
to do (111, p. 145). 
Punishment of pupils. In the absence of proof to the con­
trary, the law will presume that a teacher punishes a pupil 
for a reasonable cause, and in a moderate and reasonable 
manner; but this presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
Punishment. The punishment of the pupil must be for some 
specific offense which the pupil has committed, and which he 
knows he is being punished for. 
Authority of teachers. The teacher is not authorized to 
punish a pupil for refusing to do something the parent has 
requested that the pupil be excused from doing. The teacher 
may be justified in refusing to permit the attendance of a 
pupil whose parent will not consent that he shall obey the 
rules of the school. 
State V. Davis -- May Downing was asked by Davis, an instructor, to 
assist in carrying water from a well some 40 or 50 rods away from the 
school. Her father had instructed her not to assist the larger chil­
dren with this task due to health reasons. The student informed the 
instructor of this situation and he whipped her with a stick which was 
three feet long and the thickness of the second finger. Approximately 
25 blows were stuck. The State filed assault and battery charges in 
behalf of the student against Davis because this was a criminal case. 
In the testimony rendered, the instructor claimed that he punished May 
Downing because she was disrespectful and not because she would not 
carry water. The issues: Did the defendant administer the punishment 
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because the student would not carry water, or because of disrespect? 
Was the punishment administered for justifiable cause, moderate, and 
suitable to the size and sex of the student? A decision was reached 
in 1913 in favor of the plaintiff because the Court reasoned that pun­
ishment was inflicted because the defendant became angry when the stu­
dent refused to carry water. The defendant had no authority to punish 
the student for something the parents had instructed the child not to 
do (112, p. 502). 
Criminal law: Corporal punishment: Instructions. An 
instruction requiring the jury to find whether the de­
gree of impudence and defiance of a pupil was the 
violation of a reasonable rule of discipline in the 
school, was not objectionable as requiring a finding as 
to what was a reasonable regulation, and whether it was 
reasonable to forbid saucy and impudent conduct. 
Tinkham v. Kole — A corporal punishment issue which occurred in the 
Nevada Public School was ruled upon in 1961. Tinkham, a junior high 
student, obtained a pair of white gloves from the desk of a student in 
frontof him and put them on. Marius L. Kole, instructor, directed him 
to remove them. In the process of the removal of the gloves the in­
structor struck the student on the side of the head. He continued to 
strike Tinkham after he stated he would not do it again. The student 
informed his parents and it was later found by the family doctor that an 
eardrum was broken. The lower court decided that the punishment was 
administered in a reasonable manner and that the instructor had the right 
to use necessary force to maintain discipline. It was appealed to the 
Supreme Court by Tinkham as a civil matter. The issue: Was the punish­
ment reasonable in the manner in which it was inflicted, and was this 
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case appropriate for the lower court to try before a jury? The Court 
ruled that the case should be returned to the lower court where 
reasonableness of the punishment must be decided (113, p. 1303). 
Pupil punished by teacher--reasonableness—jury question. 
In an action for injuries to a pupil from punishment ad­
ministered by a teacher, where it appears the punishment 
was due to the pupil's lack of speed in obeying the 
teacher's command to take off some white band gloves he 
had put on at the beginning of the class period, and the 
teacher struck plaintiff several times in anger causing 
injury to his eardrum and continued to strike him after he 
had said he 'would not do that again', the reasonableness 
of the punishment was a question of fact for the jury. 
Special Education 
Special education has become a part of our educational curriculum 
within recent years. Controversies arose, as in other educational 
phases, which resulted in a small number of Supreme Court cases. 
The State Board of Education v. Petty -- Marcus Petty was a deaf child 
and it appeared that he could not obtain an adequate education in the 
country school which he attended. The special instruction which he 
needed could not be provided by the regular teacher. Failure of the 
parents to consider enrolling him in a school for the handicapped 
resulted in a district court trial and the parents were instructed 
to enroll him in the Iowa School for the Deaf at Council Bluffs. 
They appealed to the Supreme Court. The issue; Does a parent hold the 
destiny of his child's education? A 1950 decision was rendered in 
favor of the plaintiff. The Court reasoned that education includes 
that learning which incorporates conversation, observation, and any 
other means. The child should be educated to make him independent of 
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his parents and provide an element of self-reliance. Enrollment at the 
State School for the Deaf was directed (114, p. 506). 
Handicapped child—ordered sent to state school for deaf. 
In a proceeding brought under Sec. 299.18, C., '46, to com­
pel attendance of a deaf child at the state school for the 
deaf the evidence is reviewed and it is held, with the 
physical handicaps the child has it does not appear he can 
obtain in the country schools he would attend an adequate 
education and in his best interest trial court was justified 
in ordering the parents to take him to the state school. 
Education—definition in broad sense and as applied to 
handicapped child. Education in its broadest sense includes 
all knowledge whatever we learn by observation, conver­
sation, or by other means, away from what has been im­
planted by nature, but in the case of a child handicapped 
by deafness, education should be of a nature to develop his 
self-reliance and make him nondependent on his family or 
the state. 
State of Iowa v. Christ -- The parent was charged with failing to cause 
a child to attend school. Iowa statutes require school attendance be­
tween the ages of seven and sixteen, unless the child has reached his 
fourteenth birthday and is employed; excused by a court; has completed 
the eighth grade; or is attending a private or parochial school. 
Christ's child attended the public school at Ames where he was a member 
of the first grade for three years. He was enrolled in the second 
grade for one year and dropped after having enrolled in the third grade. 
Subsequently the child attended the parochial school; however, he 
returned to the public school as a fifth grade pupil. The Board of 
Education directed the Christ child to attend the Franklin School 
which was prepared to educate students with special problems. The 
parents objected and asked that the child continue in the same grade 
and school which he previously attended. This case was introduced in 
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the Court in 1937 when the parents failed to keep the child in school. 
The issue: Are the parents required to make a child attend school when 
the child is not exempt? The decision required the parents to keep the 
child in school because there were no health or mental reasons for 
exemption (115, p. 1069). 
Pupils—compulsory attendance—power of board and duty of 
custodian. A school board may validly establish an un­
graded school along with and as a part of the district's 
established system of graded schools, and may, so long as 
it does not act unreasonably, validly require the proper 
custodian of a child over 7 and under 16 years of age to 
cause said child to attend said ungraded school only, pro­
vided said child is continued in the public schools. So 
held as to a child who was in physical and mental con­
dition to attend school but was unable to make the grades 
in the graded schools. 
Discipline 
Under the provisions of common law, teachers assume the authority 
of parents in maintaining discipline while children are attending 
school. The right of children to attend school is not absolute. 
School boards may expel children who disobey reasonable rules which 
were established by the directors. 
Burdick v. Babcock -- Burdick caused his children to be absent from 
school when visiting relatives. They were frequently tardy when caring 
for the shrubbery and the cows. Babcock was Superintendent of the 
Decorah Schools. He claimed that repeated tardiness and absences re­
sulted in injury to the school and were not beneficial to the children. 
As the result of a controversy between Burdick and Babcock the children 
were suspended from school and subsequently resulted in Court action. 
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The issue; Does a board of education have the authority to expel 
children for repeated tardiness and absences? A decision was rendered 
for the defendant and the Board did possess the authority to expel 
the students for tardiness and absences. The Court reasoned that the 
work which the children were doing was not for their support or that 
of the parents. Parents must sacrifice out-of-town visits which cause 
their children to be absent from school (116, p. 562). 
Enforcement of rules—dismissal of pupils. Under the 
constitution and laws of Iowa, it is competent for boards 
of school directors to provide by rules that the pupils 
may be suspended from the schools in case they shall be 
absent or tardy, except for sickness or other unavoidable 
cause, a certain number of times within a fixed period. 
Such rules are reasonable and proper for the government 
of schools, and their enforcement is essential to their 
well-being and the success of pupils therein. 
The power under the statute and constitution to provide 
by rules or regulations for the government of schools is 
limited to the conduct of pupils while at schools, and 
cannot (except in cases of gross immorality) extend to 
the conduct of pupils out of school, or their failure to 
attend and the like. These matters are within the right­
ful control of the parents or guardian. 
Murphy v. Board of Directors of the Independent School District of 
Marengo — The suspension of high school students was brought to the 
attention of the Supreme Court in 1870. The Marengo Board of Education 
visited a rhetoric class. Murphy, along with other students, was in­
censed by the Board's criticism and caused articles to be published in 
the Marengo newspaper. This resulted in ridicule which may have been 
injurious to the influence and control of the Board. Consequently, the 
Board of Education expelled the students on February 8, 1870. Murphy 
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brought suit against the Marengo Board of Directors, seeking high school 
reinstatement. The issues: Does the Board of Education have authority 
to expel students for conduct outside the school? Was the violation 
classed as immorality? A decision was rendered in favor of the plain­
tiff because the authority of the Board in this case was not provided 
by statute. A board has no authority to expel students who are crit­
ical of it if immorality or habitual violations of school regulations 
are not evident (117, p. 428). 
Power of directors to dismiss pupils. While the board 
of directors of a school district have power, under the 
statute to dismiss a pupil for gross immorality or for 
persistent violation of the regulations of the school, it 
has not power to dismiss or suspend for conduct short of 
this, as for acts done out of school, which, though hav­
ing a tendency to incite ridicule of the directors, and 
insubordination in the school, are not immoral or pro­
hibited by any rule or regulation. 
Perkins v. Board of Directors of West Pes Moines -- Perkins attended the 
West Des Moines School. He batted a ball through a school window and 
consequently was suspended by the Superintendent. The Board of Edu­
cation had adopted a policy whereby anyone causing damage to school 
property would be excluded from school until satisfactory restitution 
had been made to the President of the Board. According to the policy, 
the parent and child were to appear before the Board President to make 
payment. The father refused to make payment and initiated mandamus 
proceedings in 1881 for reinstatement of the student. The issue: May 
a child be removed from school for breaking a window? A decision was 
reached in favor of the plaintiff. The Court reasoned that the child 
was not removed from school for breaking the window but for failure to 
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make restitution. The rule was made to enforce payment and not to 
create order in the school (118, p. 476). 
Powers of directors. Mandamus. The courts may by man­
damus compel the reinstatement in the public schools of 
a pupil excluded under a rule of the board of directors, 
which is void for want of power in the board to adopt 
it. In any case wherein the jurisdiction and powers of 
directors or school officers are brought in question a 
party is not confined to his remedy by appeal to the 
county superintendent, but may maintain an original 
action in the courts. 
Tuition 
The domicile of a child has been considered by the Court in tuition 
controversies. A child need not establish a domicile in a community 
to gain the right to a free education if he has not moved to a dis­
trict to further his educational opportunities. 
School District of Soldier Township v. Moeller — A 1949-50 Crawford 
County tuition dispute was solved by the Court when three children 
from Soldier Township School District were assigned to the Danbury 
Independent School District. Soldier Township protested the payment of 
tuition after the amount had been reviewed and approved by the County 
Board of Education. Court action was initiated by Soldier Township to 
prevent Moeller, the county treasurer, from making payment to the 
Danbury School District. The plaintiff claimed that the children were 
not designated by its District to attend the Danbury School. The issue: 
Can tuition be legally collected when student designations are not made? 
The Court decided in favor of the defendant, authorizing him to make pro­
per payment of tuition to the receiving school. The Court reasoned that 
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the Danbury District accepted the children in good faith and therefore 
entitled to tuition. Designations were not acted upon but evidence 
was found which indicated the intention of the Board (119, p. 239). 
Board proceedings--shown by minutes of other evidence. 
Statutory provisions for an official record of board 
proceedings is directory only and the actions of the 
board may be shown by evidence outside the official 
minutes. 
Preston v. School District of Marion — A tuition problem was brought to 
the attention of the Court in 1904. Preston reached school age and at­
tended the local school in the town where she continued to live after 
her parents moved. Her attendance was not questioned by the Marion 
School District until the end of the first semester when tuition was 
demanded of her for the second semester. A board meeting was called 
and Preston presented an affidavit pertaining to her residence and 
school age. A motion was made by the Board declaring her a nonresident 
student. A writ was initiated by Preston demanding attendance without 
payment of tuition. The issue; Did plaintiff pursue the proper 
remedy? A decision was rendered which returned the case to the juris­
diction of the lower court. The judges reasoned that initiation of a 
writ was not proper and suggested that remedy be sought with an appeal 
to the County Superintendent (120, p. 355). 
Admission of pupil—mandamus. The action of a school 
board in denying a pupil free admission to the school 
on the ground of nonresidence cannot be reviewed in a 
mandamus proceeding; the remedy is by appeal. 
Carbon School District v. Adams County — An attempt to collect tuition 
from a county was reviewed by the Supreme Court in 1936. The George 
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Rhamey family moved into the Carbon School District and resided in a 
building which had formerly been erected by the Adams County Home to 
isolate a diseased citizen. Educational services were provided for the 
children by the Carbon School District, who sought to collect tuition 
from Adams County because the children resided on county property. The 
issue; Were the Rhamey children considered inmates of the County Home? 
A decision was rendered in favor of the defendant because the children 
were not considered residents of the County Home. The Court ruled that 
the students resided in the District and were entitled to free edu­
cation (121, p. 1047). 
Payment for tuition. Record reviewed and held that minor 
children moving into plaintiff school district and actually 
residing there with their parents had acquired a residence 
for school purposes, and that said district could not recover 
of the county tuition for said children. 
Mt. Hope School District v. Hendrickson — The Court ruled in 1924 on 
the establishment of residence for school attendance purposes. Two 
children lived in Canada with their parents until the mother passed 
away in 1919. The father did not remarry and believed that his sons 
should have a woman's care. Consequently the boys moved to Warren 
County and made their home with an uncle and aunt, who later adopted 
them. The Mt. Hope School District claimed the children were not resi­
dent students and refused to assume tuition responsibility for them. 
The School District brought suit against Hendrickson, the boys' uncle, 
for tuition payment. The students attended high school in another dis­
trict because the Mt. Hope District did not have one. The issue: Were 
the students residents of the district where they resided? A decision 
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was rendered for the defendant because the students were considered 
residents of the district and had no intention of returning to Canada 
in the immediate future. Resident districts are responsible for the 
education of their children (122, p. 191). 
Payment for tuition—school residence. Minors who have 
been sent by their father to make their home with rela­
tives in order that they might have a woman's care and 
home comforts, and who have brought property with them, 
which is taxable in the county of their new residence; 
who have a legally appointed guardian in said new resi­
dence; and who express their intention of remaining 
there until their majority are residents of the school 
district to which they have moved, and entitled to claim 
its school privileges. 
Salem Independent School District v. Kiel — A charitable institution 
was established in Lee County for homeless and unfortunate children. 
The institution owned 1200 acres of land and had been in operation for 
a number of years. Four of the children housed at the institution at­
tended the Salem Independent School during a portion of the year. The 
Salem District attempted to compel Kiel, county auditor, to initiate 
and deliver an order to the County Treasurer for the reduction of the 
proper tuition charges from the amount due the Chestnut Hill School 
District and deliver the amount to the Salem District. The Salem Dis­
trict was a sub-district of the Chestnut Hill School District. The 
issues: Were the students in question resident students? Was the 
institution their domicile? A decision was rendered in 1928 which re­
strained the County Auditor from initiating an order for payment of 
tuition. The Court reasoned that the children were residents of the 
District which must assume responsibility for their education. An 
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institution is a permanent home because there is no other home 
(123, p. 967). 
School attendance—residence for high school purposes. 
Children of school age who are so apprenticed to a charit­
able institution that such institution is their only home 
until they reach the age of 21 years become residents of 
the school district in which such charitable institution 
is located; and if such district does not maintain a high 
school, such children may attend high school in some other 
district which does maintain such school, and the tuition 
for such schooling shall be paid by the district of which 
the child is a resident as aforesaid. 
Center Township School District v. Oakland Independent School District --
A case involving the method of computation of tuition costs used in bil­
ling sending districts was heard by the Court in 1960. The Center Town­
ship School District had approximately 100 pupils attending classes in 
the Oakland District. The Center Township District charged that the 
Oakland School included its bonded indebtedness in the statistical com­
putation of tuition costs. In addition. Sections 279.18 and 282.20, 
Code of Iowa, do not include this expenditure item for computational 
purposes. The Center District brought charges for the improper cal­
culation of tuition rates. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff had 
no jurisdiction over the matter and that administrative relief had not 
been exhausted because they did not appeal to the State Superintendent. 
The issue: Did this case belong in the Court, or should it be solved 
through administrative relief? A decision was rendered in favor of the 
plaintiff. The Court said that a dispute between two school districts 
may be brought directly to court without an appeal to the State Super­
intendent (124, p. 1113). 
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Dispute regarding tuition—appeal to state superintendent 
not a pre-requisite to an action in district court. A 
disagreement between a school district and another school 
district and the county board of education over the in­
clusion in the expenditures from which tuition fees are 
computed of an item of payment on the schools' bonded in­
debtedness need not be appealed to the state superintendent 
of public instruction before resort may be had to the dis­
trict court, since the complaint is that in computing 
tuition rates and including an item which the statute does 
not permit, the board exceeded the power conferred by 
statute. 
Center Township School District v. Oakland Independent School District -
In view of the first decision, rendered in 1960, stating that the con­
troversy should be decided in Court, the case was retried. Declaratory 
judgment action was brought against the Oakland School District in 1962 
by the Center Township District. The plaintiff claimed that excessive 
tuition charges had been made due to the inclusion of bonded indebted­
ness in the statistical computation. The issue: Were statutory pro­
visions complied with in the tabulation of tuition costs? A decision 
was affirmed for the plaintiff and the defendant district was instructed 
to compute tuition rates as provided by statute (125, p. 391). 
Tuition costs—interest on debts included in computation. 
Only the interest paid incident to the various items of 
debt service is includable in computing tuition costs. 
Sections 279.18 and 282.20, Code of 1958. 
Tuition costs—statutory purpose to require sending dis­
trict to pay fair share. As between a receiving district 
and a sending district, the purpose of the tuition statute 
is to require the latter to pay its fair share of the school 
costs, but no more than its fair share. 
Tuition costs—computation—amounts paid to retire principal 
of debt payable from schoolhouse fund not included. The 
tuition statutes are construed to mean that factor to be in­
cluded in determining costs for the purposes of fixing tui­
tion rates between the sending district and the receiving 
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district shall include depreciation to be determined by the 
statutory formula but shall not include any amount paid by 
the receiving district to retire or discharge any part of 
the principal amount of any debt payable or paid from the 
s chooIhouse fund. 
Diploma 
Much emphasis has been placed upon the value of a high school diploma. 
Students have certain implied rights pertaining to this arârd upon 
satisfactorily completing a required course of study. 
Valentine v. Independent School District of Casey — Valentine, a stu­
dent, satisfactorily completed the course of study as required by the 
Casey Board of Education. The school provided graduation caps and gowns 
for all students. The Superintendent insisted that all students wear 
them for the exercises and anyone not complying with this order would 
not be awarded a diploma. These garments were fumigated and Valentine 
claimed that the odor made her ill and that she would not wear the gar­
ment. A diploma was not issued to her. The student claimed that she 
had successfully completed the required courses and was entitled to some 
record indicating this completion. The school officials claimed the 
issue was a matter discretionary with the Board and that Valentine had 
not appealed the case to the County Superintendent. The student brought 
mandamus to require the District to issue her the diploma. The issues: 
Was the order arbitrary and unreasonable? Did the plaintiff have grounds 
for a case? A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff because 
she did have grounds for a case. The case was returned to the district 
court for retrial (126, p. 555). 
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Pupils, grades, and graduation—diploma. The public cere­
monial of graduating exercises is not a graduation. It is 
not the ceremonial, but it is the completion of the pre­
scribed course, which entitled one to a diploma, which is 
simply an evidence that the course has been completed, and 
so evidenced by the graduation. 
Pupils, grades, and graduation—diploma—duty of officers 
to issue. Even without a statute requiring the issuance of 
a diploma, there is imposed a legal duty on the officers of 
a public high school to issue written evidence of a pupil's 
graduation in the form of a certificate, a diploma, or the 
like, to those who have satisfactorily completed the pre­
scribed course of study, unless for sufficient reason they 
are justified in not doing so. 
Valentine v. Independent School District of Casey -- Valentine brought 
the case before the district court a second time in an attempt to secure 
her diploma. A lower court decision was decided in favor of the plain­
tiff. The Casey Board appealed to the Supreme Court. It claimed that 
the directors had full power to establish rules and regulations for the 
conduct of its school. The issue: When a curriculum is established, 
must a diploma be awarded for successful completion of the requirements? 
A decision was rendered in favor of Valentine because the duty of award-
a diploma is not specifically mandated but the element of implication 
is present (127, p. 1100). 
Mandamus: When writ will lie—issuance of diploma. Man­
damus will lie to compel a school board to perform its 
legal duty to issue a diploma and a certification of grades 
to a pupil who has completed the course of study pre­
scribed for the school, such legal duty admitting of no 
discretion on the part of the board, in the absence of a 
violation of some reasonable rule or regulation made by the 
board. 
Directors—duty to issue diploma. A school board is under 
legal duty to issue a diploma and a certificate of grades 
to a pupil who has, under its rules and regulations, com­
pleted the course of study prescribed for the school; and 
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such duty may not be avoided by any arbitrary action on 
the part of the board. So held where the refusal to issue 
the diploma was based on the pupil's refusal to obey an 
order by the board to the effect that the pupils must 
wear caps and gowns at the graduating exercises. 
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CHAPTER IX: TRANSPORTATION 
The 26th General Assembly, in 1897, authorized the transportation 
of school children at district expense. This service had a positive 
influence on school district structure. 
The Buffalo Township School District of Winnebago County, Iowa, was 
reorganized in 1895. A central school and a number of rural schools 
served the District at that time. On August 23, 1897, the patrons of 
one rural school requested transportation for their children to the 
central school. Student enrollment increased from 170 to 350 in the 
Buffalo Central attendance center within a five year period after the 
transportation service was implemented. The children were transported 
in six horse-drawn hacks. 
Motor-driven vehicles were introduced in Iowa %n 1915, and the 
transition of replacing the horse-drawn hack was underway. There were 
262 automobile busses in the 1919-20 school year, and this number was 
increased to 574 in the 1921-22 school year. There are 6,644 school 
busses being used in Iowa at the present time. 
State aid was appropriated and a transportation division was cre­
ated at the state level by the 51st General Assembly in 1945. The first 
transportation appropriation totaled $2,000,000 for the 1945-46 school 
year. Transportation aid is currently nonexistent as such. It was 
combined with the state equalization aid appropriation in 1967. 
Supreme Court decisions determine the course of action relative 
to student transportation in the various districts of the State. 
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A small number of transportation conflicts have been tried by the Supreme 
Court when compared with other related educational areas. 
Mandated Transportation 
Statutes which required the transportation of students have been 
held constitutionally legal. Transportation laws were enacted to provide 
equal educational opportunities for children living some distance from 
their attendance centers as compared to students living near their 
schools. 
Mumm V. Troy Township School District — The responsibility for trans­
porting children was brought to the attention of the Court in 1949. 
The closing of a schoolhouse in the Troy District prevented the attend­
ance of the Mumm children. The students were designated by the Board 
of Education to attend school in Williamsburg, which was located three 
and one-half miles from their home. No busses were owned by the Troy 
District because of the financial burden which would supposedly be 
placed upon the property owners. Mumm brought mandamus proceedings to 
compel the Troy District to provide transportation for them. He claimed 
the School District was partial in that some of the children were trans­
ported by their parents due to a contractual agreement with the Board. 
The defendant contended that the plaintiff did not act in good faith be­
cause he was attempting to force the Board into an unreasonable contract 
for providing transportation. The issue: Must a district which desig­
nates students to another school provide for their transportation? A 
decision was rendered by the Court in favor of the plaintiff because a 
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district may not close a schcolhouse and hold the parents responsible 
for transportation. The defendant failed to provide transportation 
service as mandated by statute (128, p. 1057). 
Transportation of children—no duty on parent. Where he 
came within the provisions of Sec. 279.19, C. '46, a 
parent has no statutory duty to transport his own children 
to school or to contract with the district to do so. 
Transportation of children—district cannot discriminate. 
Under Section 279.19, C., '46, the school district has no 
right to discriminate and transport some of the children 
but refuse transportation to others because of the cost. 
Lampshire v. Tracy Consolidated School — A case to compel a school 
district to provide transportation was tried by the Court in 1938. 
Lampshire, who resided along a public highway and outside the city 
limits, claimed that he resided beyond the legal walking statutory 
limits and requested transportation for his children. The District 
refused and Lampshire filed suit without first appealing to the County 
Superintendent. The defendant asked that the plaintiff's petition be 
dismissed because proper administrative relief had not been sought. 
The defendant claimed that parents were required to transport students 
up to two miles to bring children to an established bus route. The 
issue: Are parents required to transport their children up to two miles 
to meet a bus on an established route? A decision was rendered in favor 
of the plaintiff because consolidated districts must provide transpor­
tation for children living over one mile from an attendance center. 
Parents can be required to furnish transportation to meet a bus up to a 
distance of two miles; however, they must be reasonably compensated 
(129, p. 1035). 
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Subjects—transporting consolidated school pupils—board * s 
discretion--remedy by appeal. Mandamus will not lie to 
compel a consolidated school board to transport pupils when 
by statute it is also given a discretion to suspend service 
and to require a two mile transportation by the parent to 
the established bus route. A parent dissatisfied with the 
school board's procedure has an adequate law remedy by 
appeal to the county superintendent. 
National Emergency Measure 
A National Emergency Measure to conserve gasoline, tires, and parts 
was implemented during World War II. This did affect the transportation 
of school children and the implementation was initiated by the Office of 
Defense Transportation. 
Flowers v. Independent School District of Tama — Flowers attempted to 
require the Independent School District of Tama to supply bus transpor­
tation from his home to the school instead of picking up and discharg­
ing his children on a main highway. Prior to 1943 the children were 
hauled over the entire route. The Board of Education of the Tama Dis­
trict discontinued the house-to-school service because of the war 
emergency to conserve gasoline, tires, and bus equipment, in compliance 
with a request made by the Office of Defense Transportation and the State 
Department of Public Instruction. This practice was to continue for the 
duration of World War II. Mandamus was initiated by Flowers to secure 
the transportation. The issue: Must a school district transport stu­
dents on a door-to-door basis, or is a reasonable discretion of such 
business left up to a board? A decision was rendered in favor of the 
defendant because reasonableness was the intent of the legislature. A 
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door-to-door system is most feasible if a national emergency does not -
exist (130, p. 332). 
Transportation of pupils--Sections 4233.4 and 4233.5, C., 
'39. The rule is reaffirmed that Sections 4233.4 and 4233.5, 
C., '39 regarding the transportation of school children, are 
mandatory, but it is held that they should be applied with 
reasonable discretion under the facts of any given case. 
Recovery of Payments 
Parents have provided transportation for their own children on 
given occasions. Reimbursement by the districts and contracting between 
the parents and school districts created a few controversies. The cases 
set forth below reveal some of these implications. 
Harwood v. Dvsart Consolidated School District — Harwood brought suit 
against the Oysart School District to recover compensation for trans­
portation he had furnished for his daughter. The Office of Defense 
Transportation asked the schools to limit bus service due to the war 
emergency. Harwood had supplied transportation from the opening of 
school in September. On December 29, 1943, the Dysart District agreed 
to reimburse for transportation at the rate of eight cents per mile 
and an agreement was entered into with a number of parents. Harwood was 
attes^ting to collect $38.40 for transportation furnished prior to the 
agreement. The issue: Can the plaintiff be condensa ted for transpor­
tation lAich was not agreed upon by a contract? A decision was rendered 
in favor of the plaintiff for the reason that transportation must be pro­
vided in a consolidated district. Plaintiff's service prior to December 
29 was considered voluntary; however, he was awarded compensation for 
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previous service upon the statutory requirement. The Office of Defease 
Transportation did not ask the school districts to violate the law 
(131, p. 237). 
Transportation expense recovered by parent—Sections 
4179-4182, C., '39. Sections 4179-4182, C., '39, are 
considered and it is held that under said statutes the 
parent of a pupil residing in a consolidated school 
district could recover reasonable compensation for 
transportation of said pupil without an agreement with 
the school board therefor. 
Woods V. Independent School District of Oto — In 1918 Woods brought suit 
against the Oto School District to recover for transportation services 
provided his children to a school outside the District. He lived four 
miles from the schoolhouse in the resident District, which was a greater 
distance than the distance to the sbhoolhouse outside the District. 
The father transported his five children for a period of 19 weeks and 
claimed the resident District owed him $95.00. The defendant moved to 
strike the claim on the grounds it had not entered into a contract with 
the plaintiff and the children were not designated to the neighboring 
district. Woods was paid a sum of $35.00 for his services. The issue: 
Does the initial payment by the defendant to the plaintiff bind the Board 
of Education if the first payment is not adequate? A decision was ruled 
in favor of the plaintiff. The Court reasoned that a one dollar payment 
would have committed the Board and that full payment, which was judged 
to be reasonable, be made. Initial payment served as though a contract 
had been entered into prior to the service (132, p. 902). 
Ratification of contract. The act of a school board in 
auditing and allowing a claim for transporting school 
children to a school even though in an amount less than 
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claimed, with full knowledge that such transporting had 
been done without any prior contract with the board, ir­
revocably ratifies and confirms the act of transporting--
places the district in the same position as though it had, 
through its board, specifically entered into such a con­
tract, prior to the rendition of the services. (Sec. 2774, 
Code 1897). 
Riecks v. Danbury Public School — Recovery for school transportation 
services rendered was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court in 
1934. Riecks transported his children to the Danbury Public School 
after the schoolhouse in his sub-district was closed for lack of enroll­
ment. He transported his three children a distance of two miles. Fail­
ure of the Danbury School to make payment caused Riecks to initiate an 
action at law for compensation for services he claimed were the responsi­
bility of the resident District. The plaintiff appealed to the County 
Superintendent who ruled in his favor. The issue: Is a resident dis­
trict which closes a schoolhouse obligated to assume responsibility for 
the transportation of the children attending other schools? A decision 
was delivered in favor of the plaintiff inasmuch as it is correct by 
statute for districts to provide transportation for children according 
to the provision established by the legislature (133, p. 101). 
Government—transportation—refusal to furnish. A school 
board which closes its school for want of the necessary 
five pupils is under a mandatory duty to provide transpor­
tation for its pupils, if any, to some other district as 
provided by statute, and in case of failure to perform 
such duty, the parent should seek relief in court, not by 
appeal to the county superintendent. 
Dermit v. Sergeant Bluffs School District — Action to recover reason­
able compensation for transporting children from a resident district to 
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one outside the State of Iowa was heard by the Court. The Sergeant 
Bluffs School District was located in western Iowa and adjacent to the 
Missouri River. Nature caused a change in the course of the river and 
Dennit was then living on the west side of the river. There was no 
bridge or ferry available to him in crossing the river and his closest 
route to the Sergeant Bluffs school was by way of Sioux City, which was 
in excess of 25 miles. The issue: Does the State of Iowa possess lia­
bility for transporting its children to a public school outside the 
State? A 1939 decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the 
defendant was mandated to pay the plaintiff. The Court reasoned that 
the legislature intended that all students living beyond the statutory 
walking distance be transported. No written contract was necessary 
(134, p. 344). 
Pupils—duty of district to transport—refusal—right of 
parent. When a state boundary river renders a portion 
of a consolidated school district inaccessible to the 
consolidated school, and the school authorities agree 
with the parent of grade pupils, residing on such inac­
cessible lands, to pay the tuition of said pupils in a 
school in a foreign state, but later refuse to pay for 
transporting said pupils to said school (a distance of 
five miles), the parent may supply the transportation in 
the foreign state and the district will be liable for the 
reasonable value thereof. 
Bruggeman v. Independent District No. 4 Union Township School — 
Bruggeman transported his children from March 21, 1934 to June 1, 1937 
to the Independent District No. 4 Union Township School. The distance 
was two and one-half miles. A claim of $733.33 was presented to the 
School District, but the Board claimed they were not responsible because 
a contract had not been validated. Bruggeman then brought suit for pay-
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ment. The issue: Is a district responsible for transportation of 
children of its district when they live beyond the statutory walking 
distance? A 1939 decision was ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the 
defendant was liable for payment. The school is a quasi-corporation of 
the state and the statute has imposed the duty of transportation upon 
the board (135, p. 661). 
Mandatory duty to transport pupils—governmental function. 
A statute providing that a school board shall furnish 
transportation to children living two and one-half miles 
from the school creates a mandatory duty to transport pu­
pils which is governmental function, but whether the duty 
be considered as ministerial or governmental, the school 
district, being a quasi-corporation cannot be sued for 
failure to furnish such transportation when such right 
of action is not expressly given by statute. 
Private School Children 
The separation of church and state has been a factor relative to 
the transportation of private and parochial students. Recently, the 
issue has continuously been brought to the attention of the legislature 
by the non-public school people. 
Silver Lake Consolidated School District v. Parker -- The Silver Lake 
District filed suit seeking the answers to two issues. First, may 
private school children be transported on public school busses? 
Secondly, may public and private schools jointly own and operate busses 
for the benefit of all children? A decision was rendered in 1947 which 
ruled against private school children riding public school busses. The 
judges reasoned that the laws provide for a public school system of 
schools which are to be administered by state officials. This excluded 
127 
the possibility of jointly owned busses. There is no authority to trans­
port private school children (136, p. 984). 
Transportation of private school pupils by school district— 
forfeiture of right to state aid for reimbursement of trans­
portation expenses—Chapter 285, C., '46. The right of a 
local school district to receive reimbursement from the state 
for transportation of its pupils under Chapter 285, C., '46, 
will be forfeited where the district also transports pupils 
who are in attendance at private schools, even though the 
parents of such pupils pay for said transportation. 
Unwarranted Use of Busses 
The law is specific as to who may be transported in public school 
busses. There are exceptions or emergencies when adults may be trans­
ported by school busses. 
Schmidt v. Blair — A controversy occurred in 1927 regarding the policy 
of the Board of the Consolidated District of Lytton. The School Dis­
trict provided bus transportation to adults attending athletic events, 
oratory contests, movies, picnics, visit to the reformatory at Rockwell 
City, and transported teachers to an institute. Schmidt brought action 
to stop the illegal use of busses. The issue: Does a district have 
the authority to provide transportation to its adult citizens? A 
decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff because transportation 
is to be provided for every eligible child to and from school. A quasi-
corporation can exercise only those powers conferred upon it. Taxpayers' 
money is restricted to the transportation of children (137, p. 1016). 
Transportation of pupils—illegal use of busses. School 
busses of consolidated school districts may legally be 
enç)loyed, and funds for their operation may legally be 
expanded, for the one purpose only of transporting to 
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and from school, children of school age who live more 
than a mile from school. 
Purchase of Vehicle 
The statute has been liberal in permitting boards of education to 
conduct necessary business affairs in conjunction with school transpor­
tation. They are usually purchased through a bid-letting process and 
paid for at the time of delivery. 
Hare v. Boyer Township — In 1957 the issue of purchasing a school bus 
with tax money was brought before the Court. Hare contended that Boyer 
Township had no authority to remove a schoolhouse from the district 
even though it was badly destroyed by fire. He charged the removal of 
the building resulted in the purchase of a bus without a vote of the 
people. The children were transported to and from a school located away 
from the immediate area. The issue: May a bus be purchased by a board 
of education without a vote of the people? A decision was rendered in 
favor of the defendant because bus transportation is required and legal. 
The law has given boards the authority to maintain and operate bus 
routes; consequently, there is no reason to seek approval of the voters. 
All judges concurred (138, p. 1355). 
Schools and school districts: Township's authority to 
purchase and operate school bus. Township school board 
had the authority to purchase a school bus to transport 
pupils from other sub-districts where schools were 
closed to another sub-district within the district with­
out obtaining authority from the electors of the county 
board. 
129 
Driver's Contract 
Written contracts entered into between school districts and bus 
drivers are required by statute. Standard contracts are written for 
the duration of one school year; however, some have termination pro­
visions written into them. 
Black V. Thayer Consolidated Independent School District — A suit for 
damages for an alleged violation of a bus driver's contract was brought 
to the attention of the Supreme Court in 1928. The Board of Education 
asked Black to discontinue driving a bus on one of the established 
routes. He had driven for a period of three months and three weeks 
prior to the action of the Board, when his services were discontinued 
because of unsatisfactory services. Black had been paid in full for 
the services rendered; however, he brought suit to recover the balance 
for which he had been contracted. A termination clause had been 
written into and made a part of the contract. The issue? Does a 
board of education maintain the right to terminate a contract which has 
a termination clause written into it? A decision was rendered by the 
judges in favor of the defendant because contracts must" be reduced to 
writing and the right of dismissal can be made a portion of the con­
tract (139, p. 1386). 
Contracts—termination without cause. A contract for the 
transportation of pupils for an entire school year, but 
containing a reservation by the board of right to termi­
nate the contract at any time, enables the board to 
terminate the contract pre-emptorily at its pleasure, 
and without assigning any reason for such action. 
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CHAPTER X: SCHOOL DISTRICT REORGANIZATION 
The organization of school districts began with township districts, 
which were legislatively created in 1858. Throughout the history of 
reorganization there have been several district structures: independent 
consolidated, and community. 
The districts in existence at the time of the creation of township 
districts became sub-districts. This reduced the number from 3,200 to 
932. The number of township districts remained rather constant; however 
the number of sub-districts increased considerably. This is proven by 
the fact that from 1862 to 1905 the township districts only increased 
from 1,105 to 1,182, while the sub-districts increased from 5,000 to 
9,403. 
In 1858 the Legislature made it possible for incorporated cities 
to become separate school districts. Two years later this power was 
given to unincorporated towns and villages with a population of 300. 
Consequently, some 400 independent districts were legally created by 
1872. 
An apparent need for larger districts was considered by the legis­
lature, and in 1906 statutory provisions were made for the creation of 
consolidated school districts. The districts were to have no less than 
16 sections of land. A state appropriation was made in 1913 for the 
creation of these districts, and 440 were organized by 1921. A majority 
of consolidated districts encompassed towns and/or villages, and many 
exceeded the minimal statutory size. 
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Following the era of consolidated school district reorganization, 
the legislature created two school commissions, which were organized in 
1941 and 1944. Both encouraged reorganization. In 1945 the Legislature 
mandated each county board of education to study and approve a county 
plan of organization. The county boards were to consult with school 
district officials and hold public hearings when necessary. The State 
Department of Public Instruction rendered assistance to the county boards, 
and appeals relative to territories in two or more counties were brought 
to its attention for adjudication. All decisions at this level were 
final. In 1953 the Legislature repealed the law dealing with consol­
idated boundary changes and mergers. Legislation at this time provided 
for newly created or enlarged districts, known as community school dis­
tricts. A minimum of 300 students was required. Currently, the State 
of Iowa has 453 community school districts. 
A number of Supreme Court decisions relating to school district re­
organization which were decided many years ago still apply. Some have 
been incorporated within this chapter because of their effect upon 
education today. 
District Enlargement 
School districts are permitted to extend their boundaries in ac­
cordance to statutory provision. Statutes have been modified from time 
to time as changes were recognized. 
Independent District of Lynnville v. District Township of Lynn Grove — 
This case pertained to a controversy of school district expansion. The 
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Lynnville School District boundary was the same as that of the incor­
porated Village of Lynville. An order was filed by the Lynville District 
demanding that additional land from the Lynn Grove Township be attached 
to its District. Lynn Grove rejected the order, claiming that no statu­
tory provision existed for the extension of district boundaries and the 
Lynnville District should be required to provide a school even though 
financial difficulties may prevail. This resulted in a suit filed by the 
Independent District of Lynnville. The issue: May an independent dis­
trict, which has an incorporated town within its boundaries, extend into 
an adjacent territory? An 1872 decision was rendered in favor of the 
plaintiff because school districts may be expanded. The intent of the 
legislature was always favorable for boundary change (140, p. 169). 
Extension of boundaries. An independent school district 
which has within its borders the whole territory of an 
incorporated town may, under Section 1809 of the Code of 
1873, be extended so as to include any adjacent territory 
in the township, by the concurrent action of the respec­
tive boards of directors. 
Kirchgatter v. Thompson — The validity of the positions held by school 
directors was brought into Court in 1921. Kirchgatter brought suit, 
claiming that the School District of Carpenter was not reorganized ac­
cording to law and that a consolidated district cannot reconsolidate and 
include added territory without first dissolving the district, as pro­
vided by statute. Thompson claimed that the newly created district had 
been formed in compliance with the law. The issue: May a consolidated 
district reconsolidate without disabandonment of its district? A deci­
sion was reached in favor of the defendant because the Court found no 
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illegality in the reorganization proceedings. A consolidated district 
may follow the legal process of reorganization and add to its territory 
(141, p. 1160). 
Consolidated districts--reconsolidation. A consolidated 
independent school district may reconsolidate, and take in 
additional territory. 
County Boards 
County boards were created to act as a connecting link between the 
Department of Public Instruction and the local schools. This agency has 
solved many school district reorganization problems and has aided the 
cause with local planning. Reorganization proposals with territory in 
more than one county requires the action of a joint board, which is com­
prised of two or more county boards. 
Davies v. Monona County Board of Education — Action in equity was ini­
tiated by Davies attacking a proposed boundary line which was agreed 
upon between the Monona Community School District and the Castana School 
District. Plaintiff asked that the agreement be declared void and that 
the Monona District be prohibited from jurisdiction of the elementary 
territory formerly held by the Castana District. The Monona County 
Board of Education was charged with increasing the tax burden of the 
Castana District; the method of attachment was not done according to law; 
and a prior proposal prevented the District from making the boundary line 
changes. The issue: Were all statutory provisions followed and should 
the Court evaluate the financial burden placed upon various school dis­
tricts? A decision was rendered in 1965 in favor of the defendant for 
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the reason that statutory provisions had been met. An added hardship may 
have been placed upon the taxpayers of the Castana District; however, the 
Court is not a judge of an issue of this kind (142, p. 985). 
Change of boundaries--by agreement—bad plan—inter-"" 
ference by court. School boards by an agreement to 
change boundaries may have been mistaken and adopted a 
bad plan, but upon this the court may not sit in judg­
ment or interference. 
Hubka v. Mitchell County Board of Education -- The Riceville Community 
School District filed a petition for school district reorganization with 
the Howard County Superintendent. An area in Howard and Mitchell Counties 
comprised the proposed district. The County Boards met in joint session 
and approved the plan with minor changes and amended its respective county 
plans. Necessary publications were placed in the proper newspapers and 
the election was scheduled for May 26, 1958. On May 21 Hubka and a number 
of residents who were encompassed within the boundary lines of the new 
district issued a writ of certiorari to temporarily enjoin the proceed­
ings. The issue: Did the County Boards proceed according to statutory 
requirement? A decision was rendered for the defendant, and plaintiff 
was directed to pay Court costs. The Court reasoned that the Boards had 
studied and complied with county plans and had acted in good faith (143, 
p. 659). 
County plan—amendments—discretion of joint board. Joint 
county boards acting as a single board have authority to 
amend tentative county plans and in exercising that au­
thority have a discretion as to whether such change is for 
the best interests of all parties concerned, having due 
regard for the welfare of adjoining districts. 
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Community School District of Malvern v. Mills County Board of Education — 
The Malvern School District attempted to reorganize its boundaries, which 
were to include all or certain portions of 19 school districts. It filed 
a petition with the Mills County Board asking for a reorganization. The 
County Board altered the proposed boundaries. The Malvern School District 
brought suit against the Mills County Board of Education, claiming that 
the defendant was in error in not granting the district formation as 
requested and that its plans were capricious, arbitrary and unreasonable. 
The defendant contended that the plan was efficient and economical. The 
issue: Were statutory requirements met by the County Board? A 1959 
decision was reached in favor of the defendant. The Court reasoned that 
the Board did not exceed its authority and there were no violations of 
state statutes (144, p. 1240). 
Establishment of boundaries—legislative function although 
quasi-judicial. Fact that the action of the county board 
of education in the establishment of the boundaries of a 
proposed school district might be termed quasi-judicial 
would not remove it from the legislative category, or make 
it, in fact, judicial; nor would the availability of 
certiorari enlarge the appeal provided by statute. 
Everding v. Floyd County Board of Education — The Joint Board, com­
prised of Floyd, Cerro Gordo and Mitchell Counties, established re­
organization boundary lines for the Nora Springs School District, which 
included the territory of the Falls Township District. Everding, a resi­
dent of the included territory, appealed the decision of the Joint Board 
to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. The appeal was dis­
missed on the grounds that an action of this nature can only be brought 
by an aggrieved board of education. Everding filed suit, claiming that 
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inclusion of the Falls Township District should have been an issue for 
the voters of that District to decide. The defendant contended that it 
had acted as a single board in establishing boundary lines and had met 
all statutory requirements. The issue: Is the resident of an existing 
school district authorized to appeal a decision of a joint board to the 
State Superintendent? A decision was reached in favor of the defendant. 
The Court found that an individual citizen cannot appeal to the State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction. It further found that no statutes 
had been violated in the reorganization proceedings (145, p. 743). 
Reorganization--amendment to county plan by joint boards— 
board and not individuals may appeal. Under the provisions 
of Section 275.16, C., *54, for fixing boundaries of a 
joint district by the county boards of counties in which any 
territory of the proposed district lies, acting as a single 
board, only an aggrieved county board may, in the event of 
an amendment to its county plan, appeal to the state depart­
ment, and if its decision is adverse to the district court 
and it was not the intent of the legislature that individ­
uals be permitted such right of appeal. 
Archer v. Fremont County Board of Education -- Archer charged the 
Fremont Board of Education with acting improperly in approving a peti­
tion for reorganization of the Community School District of Farragut. 
The plaintiff was a resident of the District which was considering re­
organization. The Farragut Board of Education intervened on the side 
of the defendant. Archer claimed that the defendant erred in its 
studies and surveys; that the boundaries did not correspond to the 
county plan; that board action was arbitrary and for private rather than 
public reason; and that the studies were obsolete. The issue: Must a 
county board make additional studies of its territory prior to any sue-
137 
cessive changes in boundary lines? A decision was reached in favor of 
the defendant. The Court reasoned that where school district planning 
had been prepared and completed, additional studies need not be made 
prior to district line alterations (146, p. 1077). 
Studies and surveys—not prerequisite to changing county 
plan once adopted. Completion of a county plan pursuant 
to studies, surveys and hearings, as provided by Sections 
275.1 to 275.5, Code of 1958, is a prerequisite to any 
proposal to change district boundaries, but once a county 
plan is adopted additional studies and surveys are not a 
prerequisite to the fixing of boundaries which differ 
from the county plan. 
Remnant Districts 
Remnant districts are generally created by landowners opposing the 
inclusion of their property in school district reorganization proposals. 
The law requires remnant lands to be attached to larger districts when 
they do not meet statutory size requirements. 
Robrock v. Chickasaw County Board — In 1959 the Supreme Court ruled on 
a case involving an area of less than four sections of land which was 
to be assigned by a county board to a newly created district from which 
it was formerly removed by objection. The Fredericksburg Community 
School District reorganized its boundaries, and as a result of the pro­
posal a parcel of land located in the Dresden Township Independent 
School District was excluded. This land was set aside due to objections 
at the regularly scheduled hearing prior to the election. Following the 
election and creation of a new district, the Chickasaw County Board at­
tempted to assign the area of less than four acres to the Fredericksburg 
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District. Robrock initiated certiorari to have declared invalid the 
assignment of this land. He claimed this assignment was illegal and not 
in the best interest of the area to be assigned. The issue: Can lands 
which were removed by objection from a reorganizational proposal be 
attached to the same district by a county board following an election? 
A decision was reached in favor of the plaintiff. The Court reasoned 
that the territory in question could not be reassigned to the district 
from which it had been excluded. The statutes state that fragment 
territory must be assigned to another school district (147, p. 422). 
Attaching territory to 'another' school district— 
district from which it was excluded not 'another' 
district. Where a part of an independent school 
district having an area of less than four sections 
of land was excluded from the county plan on objec­
tions of residents of the area, the attaching of the 
excluded area to the newly formed community district 
is not an attaching to 'another school district or 
districts' within the meaning of Section 275.5, C., 
'58, inasmuch as the area was originally a part of 
the proposed new district and then taken out of the 
plan. 
Rural Independent School District of Eden v. Ventura Consolidated 
Independent School District — The Ventura District reorganized and 
acquired territory from the District of Eden; however, less than four 
sections of the Eden District remained above the level of Clear Lake. 
Statutory provisions require that four sections of a district must re­
main with the original district when territory has been removed from it 
for reorganization purposes. The Eden School District initiated Court 
proceedings contesting the legality of the area of land which was under 
water. The issue: Can inundated land be counted as territory for school 
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district purposes? A 1919 decision was rendered in favor of the plain­
tiff because land which is under water cannot be considered as school 
district territory. The Court also ruled that a school corporation from 
which territory had been taken to form a consolidated district must con­
tain at least four sections (148, p. 968). 
Consolidated district—size of remaining corporation. In 
determining the amount of land to be left in a school dis­
trict from which land has been taken to form a consolidated 
district, under the provisions of Section 279A, Code Sup., 
1913, that no school corporation from which said territory 
is taken shall after the change, contain less than 'four 
government sections', and so situated as to form a suit­
able school corporation, the unsurveyed portion of certain 
sections covered by a lake cannot be used in making up the 
necessary remaining 'four sections', where the school dis­
trict from which the land was taken did not extend beyond 
the shore line of the lake. 
Hufford V. Herrold -- The Consolidated Independent District of Jefferson 
planned to remove a schoolhouse, formerly used by a sub-district, to a 
site within another district and to sell bonds for the construction of 
a new schoolhouse. Camp Dodge had acquired two sections of land from 
the District which reduced its area to less than 16 sections, as 
required by law. In 1920 Hufford brought suit to enjoin the removal of 
the schoolhouse and the sale of bonds voted at a special election. He 
charged that the reduction in the size of the district would restrict 
the tax levy. The defendants were the Board of Education, and the 
Auditor and Treasurer of Polk County. The issue: Does the removal of 
land by the Federal Government from a consolidated district disrupt the 
incorporation when reduced to less than the minimal number of sections? 
A decision was reached in favor of the defendant, reasoning that the 
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District could conduct its business affairs and that necessary taxes 
should be levied for operational and construction purposes. Land obtained 
for federal purposes does not invalidate a district even though it is 
reduced to less than statutory minimal size (149, p. 853). 
Consolidation—acquisition of land by Federal govern­
ment. The acquisition by the Federal government of lands 
within a consolidated school district in no way disturbs 
the legal incorporation of the district, even though the 
lands taxable for school purposes are reduced below 16 
sections. 
Monroe Community School District v. Marion County Board — The Summit 
Township District of Marion County existed until 1958 as an area of less 
than three square miles. An election failed to unite it with the Monroe 
Community School District; consequently, the territory was to be assigned 
to a 12 grade district. The Marion, Mahaska, and Jasper County Boards 
of Education approved a proposal to form the Pella Community School Dis­
trict, which included the southern portion of the Summit District. The 
decision of the Joint Board was appealed to the State Department of 
Public Instruction by the Summit Township District of Marion County. 
The State Department excluded the territory in question from the Pella 
proposal. This appeal decision was followed by immediate attachment of 
the Summit territory to the Pella District by the Marion County Board. 
A suit was filed by the Monroe Community School District against the 
Marion County Board. Certiorari was initiated stating that the action 
was illegal and that the defendant was without authority to attach the 
Summit territory to the Pella District because it did not constitute 
"another" school district as stipulated by law. The issue: Were the 
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statutes followed? A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. 
The Court reasoned that boundary establishment is a legislative function 
and the Court system cannot review these policies nor judge this action. 
The compliance of statutes is determined by the Court (150, p. 992). 
Boundaries--fixing as a legislative function—power of 
court. Fixing school boundaries is a legislative function 
and the courts have no power to review the policy and 
judgment of such a legislative decision, although courts 
have authority to determine whether the law has been com­
plied with. 
Greene v. Webster County Board of Education — The Webster County Board 
attached a parcel of land to the Dayton Community School District, pur­
suant to Chapter 275, Code of Iowa. A hearing was scheduled but no 
objections were heard from patrons within the District. At approxi­
mately the same time an election was held on a proposed plan for the 
Central Webster Community District, which was approved. Certiorari to 
challenge the actions of the Webster County Board of Education was 
initiated by Greene, who represented a group of citizens living outside 
the reorganized Central Webster Community District. He charged that the 
Dayton School did not provide as many opportunities for the children as 
the Central Webster District. Plaintiff claimed that the Dayton grade 
school was overcrowded and in poor condition and the system did not have 
a qualified guidance counselor. The issue: Shall a Court decide which 
district will provide the greatest opportunities for children? A 1962 
decision ruled in favor of the defendant and the parcel of land was 
assigned to the Dayton District. The Court reasoned that the policy of 
the state was to encourage the reorganization of school districts wher­
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ever necessary, efficient, and economical. Furthermore, the Court must 
not attempt to judge districts and their ability to provide educational 
opportunities for children (151, p. 1198). 
Remnant district—attachment—determination which adjoin­
ing district affords better opportunities—legislative 
function. Where the county board by proper procedure 
attached an area of less than four sections of land to an 
adjoining school district, the court will decline to de­
termine whether another district would afford better 
educational opportunities to the students of the area, 
since the determination is a legislative function and the 
courts may not interfere. 
Osprey Rural Independent School District v. Monroe County Board of 
Education — A 1961 case was brought to the attention of the Supreme 
Court relative to assignment of the Osprey School District. The Joint 
Board of Lucas, Wayne, and Monroe Counties did not see fit to include 
the territory with the reorganization proposal for the Russell Commu­
nity School District. Subsequently, the Albia District sought school 
district reorganization and acquired a portion of the Osprey territory 
through assignment by the Monroe County Board. This reduced the Osprey 
District to 80 acres of land, which was assigned to the Russell District 
by the Lucas County Board. The Osprey School District initiated certi­
orari action for the inclusion of the land previously attached to the 
Albia District to be reassigned to the Russell District. It charged 
that the law did not provide for fragmentary attachment to more than one 
12 grade district without a vote of the people. The defendant contended 
that it had followed the statutes in its attachment of land to the Albia 
District. The issue: May districts of less than four acres be attached 
to more than one 12 grade school district without a vote of the people? 
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A decision was rendered in favor of the defendant. The reason was that 
a county board may attach any land of less than four sections without the 
vote of the people (152, p. 253). 
Remnant areas—attachment of fragments to more than one 
district. A county board is authorized by statute to 
attach parts of a remnant district of less than four 
sections of land to more than one 12 grade district 
without a vote of the electors. 
Contiguous Territory 
Contiguous territory is defined as being able to travel from one 
part of a district to another without leaving its boundaries. This 
arrangement is necessary for the establishment of efficiency in school 
bus service. 
DeBerg v. Butler County Board of Education — The Greene School District, 
located in Butler County, voted upon a school district reorganization 
proposal in 1957. The vote on the reorganization carried in six non­
contiguous districts and failed in one. DeBerg brought certiorari pro­
ceedings to challenge the right to form the Greene Consolidated District. 
The school year had commenced in the newly established District before 
the Court decision was rendered. The issue: Can a new district become 
a corporation if the land is not contiguous? The Court ruled that the 
case be returned to the trial court to permit the District to act as a 
de facto district until the end of the current year (1957-58). Recom­
mendation was made to dissolve the District no later than July 1, 1958. 
The judges reasoned that the territory of a school corporation must be 
contiguous for operational purposes (153, p. 1039). 
144 
Formation—noncontiguity of territory--no de facto exist­
ence. Where voters in one of seven districts failed to 
approve the proposed organization thereby leaving the six 
remaining districts noncontiguous the districts approving 
could not exist as a de jure corporation. 
Brown v. Community School District of St. Ansgar — Brown charged that 
the County Board and Superintendent did not have jurisdiction to proceed 
with the established St. Ansgar School District because the Spring Valley 
School District was surrounded by land which favorably voted itself into 
the newly reorganized District. He further claimed that the territory 
of the St. Ansgar District was not contiguous; that an error had been 
made in the petition which described the land; and that the term "not 
less than 1214 voters" instead of "not more than 1214 voters" appeared 
on the proposed petition. The St. Ansgar School District plead the 
statute of limitations. It also claimed that the isolation of the 
Spring Valley School District did not invalidate the reorganization. 
The St. Ansgar District became effective July 1, 1957. The issue: 
Must the land of a school district be a solid body to be contiguous? 
A decision was rendered in favor of the defendant because the Court 
reasoned that the land of a district need not be a solid body. Further­
more, all areas were connected and one could travel to all parts of the 
district without leaving the territory (154, p. 1226). 
Organization—contiguous territory—statutory compliance. 
Fact that one school district which did not approve of the 
proposed organization of a community district was left 
entirely surrounded by territory which voted approval did 
not defeat formation of the new district where all the 
remaining territory did connect. 
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Increased Taxes and Constitutional Rights 
Taxation has always been a subject of complaint. The Courts and 
the United States Constitution have rendered taxation legal for the 
support of education. 
Wall V. Johnson County Board of Education — On July 6, 1965 a petition 
was filed with the County Superintendent of the Johnson County Board of 
Education for the reorganization of portions of four different districts 
with the Lone Tree School District. On September 6 a petition was filed 
which had been signed by 130 electors of the Pleasant Valley District, 
opposing the reorganization proposal. One week later an injunction was 
filed by Wall and other taxpayers to prevent the election and formation 
of the proposed area. Wall charged that an error had been made in the 
description of boundaries; that the election would result in more than 
one reorganization election per year; that legal notices were not prop­
erly captioned; and that the reorganization would result in an in­
creased tax rate. The issue: Does the prospect of increased taxes 
violate a citizen's constitutional right? A decision was rendered in 
favor of the defendant. The Court reasoned that the reorganization of 
two school districts, resulting in an increased tax, does not violate a 
citizen's right. All other charges were dismissed (155, p. 985). 
Reorganization—changes in taxation—effect on consti­
tutionality. Changes in taxation created by the re­
organization of a school district is not a violation of 
constitutional rights. 
5 
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Jurisdiction of Land 
The inclusion of a parcel of land in a school district reorganiza­
tion proposal creates jurisdiction of the territory. Land included in 
two reorganization proposals simultaneously was an issue decided by the 
Court. 
Harberts v. Klennne Community School District -- The legality of a school 
district reorganization petition was determined by the Court in 1955. 
The Belmond School District filed a reorganization petition with the 
County Superintendent of Wright County, which included the Goodell 
Independent School District. Shortly thereafter the Klemme School Dis­
trict, located in Hancock County, filed a similar petition which in­
cluded the same Goodell District. Harberts initiated quo warranto pro­
ceedings to test the legality of the reorganization petition of the 
Klemme School District. The plaintiff charged that the Klemme District 
proceedings were void and illegal because the Goodell District was 
previously in another reorganization plan. He also claimed that the 
Hancock County Board of Education attempted to destroy the Belmond Dis­
trict by approving a plan to organize a separate district in its County. 
The issue: May a designated parcel of land be within the jurisdiction 
of two pending reorganizations at the same time? A decision was reached 
in favor of the plaintiff. The Court reasoned that a given area of land 
could not be subject to two pending school district reorganizations at 
the same time. The decision also stated that the Hancock County Board 
of Education had no jurisdiction over the land in question until the 
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Belmond District had abandoned or completed the reorganization (156, 
p. 48). 
Jurisdiction of two districts of same land. The same 
land cannot be within the jurisdiction of two pending 
school district reorganization proceedings at the same 
time. 
Linden Consolidated School Board v. Dallas County Board — The Court 
ruled in 1961 that during a pending reorganization of joint districts, 
citizens and districts with no territory involved may not interfere 
(157). 
Publications 
Statutes require newspaper publication during a school district re­
organization. Compliance with the law is vital in district boundary 
line changes. 
Cox V. Consolidated School District of Readlyn — The Court was faced 
with a publication and cost dispute in the reorganization of the Readlyn 
School District. A reorganization petition was filed with the Bremer 
County Superintendent. He continued the proceedings by having the re­
quired notices published in the Waverly Democrat. The law required that 
publications appear in newspapers located within or nearest the proposed 
area, which should have been the Tripoli Leader. Cox brought suit, 
claiming the Readlyn School District was a de facto corporation after it 
had commenced the school year. The issues: Will publication violations 
invalidate a school district after it has commenced its first school 
year? If the district is de facto, who will bear the costs? A decision 
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was rendered in favor of the plaintiff because publications must be in 
accordance with the statutes. The District was permitted to operate to 
the end of the year prior to dissolvement, with the cost to be paid by 
the defendant (158, p. 566). 
Formation--jurisdiction of county superintendent—notices— 
statutory compliance. When a petition for the formation of 
a consolidated school district was filed in compliance with 
statute the county superintendent acquired jurisdiction to 
proceed, but to retain that jurisdiction the prescribed sub­
sequent notices must be given in substantial compliance with 
the statutes. Sections 276.4, 276.5, 276.11 and 276.18, and 
the superintendent is not entrusted with any discretion in 
selecting the medium of publication. 
Costs where school corporation held to be de facto. In quo 
warranto proceedings questioning the legality of a consol­
idated independent school district where the court found the 
purported district to be a de facto public corporation, which 
may continue to function until the end of the school year, 
and taxed the costs to the individual defendants, held the 
decree should be modified to permit defendants to apply to 
payment of costs any funds available that would have be­
longed to the district had it been de jure, and the judgment 
to stand against them for any deficiency remaining. 
Division of Assets and Liabilities 
The division of assets and liabilities must be accomplished by the 
school districts involved in boundary changes. A neutral committee is 
selected in accordance with the statute if the affected boards of educa­
tion cannot reach an agreement. 
District Township of Franklin v. Wiggins — In 1900 the Court iruled on 
a case pertaining to the division of assets and liabilities. The District 
Township of Franklin brought suit in equity to enjoin Wiggins and the re­
mainder of the Board of the Cooper District from authority over a school-
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house and furnishings. For several years the District Township of 
Franklin was organized as a school district. The unincorporated Village 
of Cooper was located within the district. The Cooper people held a 
meeting and decided to reorganize, thereby forming a district of their 
own. This was legal according to a law enacted by the 29th General 
Assembly. After reorganization the Cooper Board was accused of remov­
ing some of the fixtures from a schoolhouse which they had inherited. 
The plaintiff charged this was improper because there had not been a 
settlement of assets and liabilities. The issue: Did the defendant 
have authority over the equipment of the schoolhouse? A decision was 
reached in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant had no right to re­
move any building fixtures until a settlement was reached (159, p. 702). 
Settlement between--powers of courts. Under McClain's 
Code, Sections 2821, 2921, requiring in case of a school 
district being formed out of part of another district, 
chat the respective boards of directors meet and make 
equitable division of the assets and liabilities, and 
if they fail to agree, that the matter be submitted to 
arbitrators chosen by the parties; demand for settle­
ment and division must be made by one authorized to 
make demand on one authorized to act, and then, one of 
the boards of arbitrators failing to act, mandamus will 
lie to compel action; but the new district cannot take 
what it considers itself entitled to, nor can the courts 
make the division. 
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CHAPTER XI: ELECTIONS 
The Iowa Legislature did not intend for boards of education to con­
trol all the business affairs of school districts. Statutes have been 
enacted which require the approval of the voters on given issues. 
Cases pertaining to elections which were brought to the attention 
of the Supreme Court of Iowa related to the reorganization of school dis­
trict boundaries and bond issues. A 60 per cent majority vote is required 
for the passage of a bond issue. The Iowa Constitution limits indebted­
ness to five per cent of the actual valuation of a district. The law pro­
vides for the levy of a tax to purchase sites and the retirement of bonds 
for school construction (160, pp. 1081, 1573, 1075, 1745). 
Statutory provisions for school district boundary reorganization 
have been altered from time to time. When a reorganization election is 
required, a simple majority of affirmative votes is necessary for passage. 
Iowa law forced small independent districts to join a 12 grade dis­
trict by April 1, 1966, or be attached to an eligible district by action 
of a county board (161). The law did provide for a vote of the people 
to decide which district they preferred. Several attachments were 
taken to Court and decisions have not been rendered at this time. 
Concurrent action of boards was provided by statute. A remnant of 
land not attached cannot be smaller than four sections (162). This 
method is frequently used to adjust boundary lines. A vote of the people 
is not required. 
The legislature enacted a law providing a detailed manner for re­
organization (163). The county superintendent and county board administer 
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the affairs of this procedure. A petition must be filed, hearings sched­
uled, boundary lines established, notices published, and elections 
scheduled. 
A merger plan whereby all of a district must undergo reorganization 
was also established by law. This procedure requires a vote of the people. 
Reorganization 
Elections are mandated for school district reorganizations, except 
in the process of concurrent action by boards of education. A simple 
majority is required in all elections. 
Taylor v. Independent School District of Earlham -- A school district 
boundary reorganization election was scheduled in Madison and Dallas 
Counties. Three citizens had not resided within the County for 60 days, 
even though they had lived within the proposed district for that period 
of time. They moved from one County to the other and consequently were 
denied the right to vote. Taylor, one of the citizens, brought suit 
against the School District of Earlham contending his right to vote. 
The issue: Is the requirement an essential qualification or a pre­
cautionary measure? In 1917 the Court ruled in favor of the defendant, 
stating that the requirement was an essential qualification. Statutory 
requirements stipulate 60 days of residence within a county to qualify 
as a voter. The law is not obligated to make it possible for all cit­
izens to have a right to vote (164, p. 544). 
Qualifications of voters—residence—school and school dis­
tricts. The constitutional requirement that a citizen shall 
have resided in the county in which he proposed to vote. 
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for 60 days preceding the election, is an absolute 
requirement—just as absolute as the requirement that 
he shall have reached the age of 21 years. Where a pro­
posed consolidated school district comprised territory 
within two adjoining counties, held that an elector who 
had resided in the proposed district for more than 60 
days, but had moved from one county to the other less 
than 60 days prior to the election to consolidate, was 
not qualified. 
Crawford v. School Township of Beaver -- A petition was presented to the 
Beaver Township Board of Education requesting the formation of a con­
solidated independent school district. The area included 16 sections of 
land. An election was scheduled and notices were posted 15 days prior 
to the election, in lieu of the required 10 days. The referendum ap­
proved the change in boundary lines, and the Board sought an election 
for a new board of education. Crawford charged that the posting of 
notices at an earlier time invalidated the election. The issue: Did 
the posting of notice at an earlier date than required by law invali­
date the election? A decision was rendered by the judges in 1918 which 
held for the School District. The Court reasoned that the statute did 
not specify a maximum time for the posting of notices (165, p. 1324). 
Election—notice. The statutory requirement that "not 
less" than ten days notice of elections shall be given 
does not prohibit a fifteen days notice. (Section 2746, 
Code 1897). 
Warrington v. St. Ansgar Community School District -- Three major deci­
sions resulted from the 1956 reorganization case. Warrington, by quo 
warranto, challenged the validity of the reorganization of the St. 
Ansgar Community School District. He claimed that the voters were 
forced to come to a different polling site; that the election notices 
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were improper; and that an election judge assisted an elderly citizen 
in voting. The Court was concerned whether the place of voting was known 
to the citizens of the proposed district; whether the considered area was 
contiguous; and if fraud was involved. The issues: Does changing a 
polling place from the site stipulated in the election notice invali­
date an election? Do minor infractions invalidate an election if pre­
judice is not evident? The decision was unanimously rendered in favor 
of the defendant. It reasoned that the statute requires that a polling 
place be located somewhere within a village, town, or city; that minor 
election violation procedures do not void an election if fraud is not 
evident; and that board members did not play a part in the election 
results. Statutory requirements were met in that the area was contig­
uous (166, p. 1167). 
Elections—change of place of voting to adjoining build­
ings—election not invalidated. Fact that in a school 
election the officials changed the voting place from 
that designated in the notice to the building next door 
would not constitute sufficient grounds for setting 
aside the election in the absence of showing that anyone 
was prevented from exercising his voting privilege by 
the change. 
Elections—breach of a ministerial duty—effect. Breach 
of a ministerial duty does not invalidate an election 
unless a prejudice is shown, and prejudice will not be 
presumed. 
Election—aid to aged voter by one judge—election not 
invalidated. In an election on the formation of a pro­
posed community school district where one election judge 
aided an aged voter, his conduct, which is a breach of a 
ministerial duty, did not invalidate the election in the 
absence of a showing the voter was influenced or that 
prejudice resulted from such act. 
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State y. Booth — The legality of the newly formed Consolidated School 
District of Alleman was decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa in 1915. 
The State of Iowa charged that the judges failed to provide separate 
ballot boxes, one within the unincorporated village of Alleman and the 
other for the territory outside these limits. The school officials 
claimed that two ballot boxes were not required in that Alleman was an 
unincorporated village. The issue: Must a separate ballot box be pro­
vided for an unincorporated village when a reorganization election is 
conducted? A decision was rendered in favor of the defendant. The 
Court reasoned that even though two ballot boxes were required, election 
irregularities do not necessarily void an election (167, p. 143). 
Separate ballot boxes—when not necessary--schools 
and school districts. The violation of a law re­
quiring separate ballot boxes, in certain contin­
gencies, does not necessarily render the election 
void. 
Hains v. Consolidated Independent School District of Wright — Hains, 
a resident of the Wright School District, initiated certiorari proceed­
ings to test the validity of that newly created School District. He 
claimed that the law had not been followed in the reorganization pro­
ceedings because the petition was not filed with the Board of Directors 
of the district with the greatest population. He also charged that two 
ballot boxes should have been provided and that the election judges were 
not sworn. The issue; Was it necessary to provide two ballot boxes 
when the territory included a village, town, or city? Would the filing 
of a petition with an incorrect board invalidate the election? A deci­
sion was rendered in favor of the defendant. The Court said that two 
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ballot boxes should have been supplied; however, this irregularity had 
no influence on the outcome of the election (168, p. 401). 
Elections—ballot boxes. Failure to provide separate 
ballot boxes for the voters (a) inside villages and (b) 
outside villages is fatal to the validity of consoli­
dation proceeding, when it appears that, had such boxes 
been furnished, the consolidation would have been de­
feated. (Section 279-a, Code Sup. 1913). 
Independent School District No. 10 v. District of Kelley — In 1903 a 
petition was presented to the Kelley Board of Education to form school 
boundaries contiguous with the boundary limits of the town. The Legis­
lature had just enacted a statutory provision for this kind of organi­
zation. The proposed reorganization would have included one district 
which was totally located within and one partially located within the 
corporate limits of Kelley. School District No. 10, which was located 
partially within the town limits, wanted to become totally included in 
the boundary change and consequently brought suit against the District 
of Kelley. The issue: Was it valid for two districts, one totally 
located within and the other partially located within the city limits, 
to be reorganized into a new district which formed the same boundaries 
as the city? The Court ruled in favor of the defendant and reasoned 
that school district boundaries may be changed at any time as permitted 
by statute. The element of time does not fix school district boundaries. 
Independent school districts are subject to legislative control and 
viewed the same as other districts (169, p. 119). 
Appeal—adjudication. Time does not settle the boundaries 
of an independent district so that they cannot be changed 
according to law. 
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A C L  C o m m u n i t y  S c h o o l  D i s t r i c t  v .  W a y n e  C o u n t y  B o a r d  — The Allerton-
Clio-Lineville School District brought suit against the Wayne County 
Board due to the approval of the Wayne Community School District re­
organization proposal. Portions of the plaintiff's territory had been 
removed and included in the new proposal. The defendant claimed that 
the Allerton-Clio-Lineville District had recently reorganized and the 
pending reorganization was illegal according to Chapter 275, Code of 
Iowa. The issue: Can a school district, which was reorganized under 
the provisions of Chapter 275, Code of Iowa, be reorganized at a later 
date so as to deviate from the original district boundaries? The 
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision by unanimous vote for 
the defendant. It reasoned that there is nothing sacred about school 
boundaries and they may be altered at any time, provided that statutory 
requirements are met (170, p. 846). 
Boundaries of reorganized districts are not sacrosanct. 
There is nothing sacrosanct about boundaries of organized 
or reorganized school districts. 
Manders v. Consolidated Independent School District of Community Center — 
Manders filed an injunction to prevent the Community Center Board of 
Education from expending funds to keep three outlying rural schools open. 
The voters previously failed to approve an issue for the construction of 
a central building. He demanded that the District pay tuition and trans­
portation for the education of certain children to schools outside the 
District. The Community Center District did not provide a central 
attendance center, as provided by law. The lower court ruled in favor of 
Manders and the defendant Board appealed to the Supreme Court. The 
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issues: Is it legal for a board of a consolidated school district to 
operate outlying rural schools when the voters fail to approve the con­
struction of a central building? Is a board of education obligated to 
pay transportation and tuition to other districts when a central build­
ing is not available? The Court ruled in 1950 in favor of the Community 
Center School District. It reasoned that the district court had erred 
because boards do have the authority to educate children in existing 
buildings and need not pay the cost of tuition and transportation to 
other schools (171, p..883). 
Consolidated district—existing schools operated when 
no contra! building voted. Where after the organi­
zation of a consolidated school district the electors 
by vote refused funds with which to build a central 
building, held the school board has authority to 
operate the country schools which were located in the 
district before the consolidation and an injunction 
of the district court forbidding the operation can­
not stand. 
Zilske V. Albers -- In a Hardin County case, relative to school district 
reorganization, 110 voters residing within the proposed district signed 
a required petition for an election. The County Superintendent fixed 
a date for filing objections. A total of 185 citizens challenged the 
wisdom of the establishment of the district, and 52 of the original 
110 petitioners signed to have their names withdrawn. Zilske claimed 
that the citizens could withdraw their names from the petition. Albers, 
county superintendent, claimed jurisdiction of the petition when it was 
filed. He overruled the objections of the plaintiff and the electors 
voted favorably for the reorganization. The issue: Can names be 
withdrawn from a petition? The Court ruled in favor of the defendant. 
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It reasoned that reorganization is permissible and names cannot be with­
drawn from a filed petition (172, p. 1050). 
Statutes for establishment—consolidated districts— 
liberal construction--where establishment is approved 
at special election. The statutes providing for 
establishment of consolidated school districts should 
be liberally construed, and courts will go no further 
than to see that the methods pursued are in substantial 
accord with those prescribed by statute. The Supreme 
Court is not disposed to annul proceedings for estab­
lishing of a school district upon narrow or technical 
grounds, and particularly so where the proceedings 
have been approved at a special election by a majority 
of the electors. 
Petitions—when signers may withdraw. Signers of a 
petition for the establishment of a consolidated school 
district may withdraw therefrom, with or without cause, 
any time before the petition is filed with the officer 
to whom it is addressed, but no withdrawal may be made 
after final action is taken. 
Liberty Consolidated School District, demons Consolidated School Dis­
trict, and Drew v. Schindler — A petition was filed with Schindler, 
Story County Superintendent, for the formation of the Zearing Community 
School District. The proposal included a portion of land located in 
Marshall County and a portion of the Liberty Consolidated School Dis­
trict. The area included in the proposal reduced the Liberty School 
District to less than 16 sections of land. Suit was initiated by the 
Liberty Consolidated School District, demons Consolidated School Dis­
trict and Drew against Schindler to enjoin the holding of an election. 
A decision was rendered in district court to dismiss the petition. An 
election carried favorably, which resulted in the creation of the 
Zearing Community School District. The plaintiffs appealed to the 
Supreme Court. The issue; Nay a consolidated school district be 
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reduced to less than 16 sections by a reorganization process? The Court 
ruled in 1955 in favor of the defendant. It reasoned that the statute 
did not restrict reorganization proceedings from reducing an existing 
district to less than the minimum sections of land as required in the 
reorganization of a new district. The decision of the judges was un­
animous (173, p. 1060). 
Community school district—formation—legality of re­
duction of an existing consolidated district. In an 
action to enjoin an election to establish a community 
school district alleging the area of plaintiff dis­
trict would be reduced below 16 sections of land in 
violation of Section 274.3, C., *50, '54, held this 
Code section, construed in the light of Section 276.20, 
C., *50, even before its repeal in 1953, contains no 
definite prohibition against reducing below 16 sections 
an existing consolidated school district maintaining no 
approved central high school by the formation of a new 
district. 
Altman v. Independent School District of Gilmore City — A school dis­
trict reorganization proposal of the Gilmore City School District was 
decided by the Supreme Court in 1948. Two petitions had been circulated 
for the adjustment of boundary lines, one within the original Gilmore 
City District, and one in the proposed outside area. The petition from 
outside the district did not have a majority of signatures from each of 
the sections of land involved. Polling sites were established in each 
district. An election was scheduled and the voters in both areas ap­
proved the proposal. Altman initiated a petition challenging the 
legality of the election, charging that the petition circulated in the 
territory outside the original Gilmore City District did not bear a 
majority of signatures from each section of land. The Independent School 
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District of Gilmore City filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's peti­
tion. The issue; Is a school district reorganization petition signed 
by the voters at large valid, or must a majority of signatures be ac­
quired from each section of land? A decision was rendered in behalf of 
the defendant. The Court could not find anything in the statutes which 
required a majority of signatures by sections of land. All other pro­
visions for the election were met. The new district was legally formed 
(174, p. 635). 
Enlargement of independent school district--suf-
ficiency of petition from territory to be added. 
The statute relating to the addition of contig­
uous territoy to an independent school district 
(Section 274.23, C., '46) requires only a major­
ity of the resident electors of the entire contig­
uous territory proposed to bo added sign the peti­
tion therefor, and not a majority of the resident 
electors of each government section of land in 
said territory. 
Brooker v. Ludlow -- In 1919 a petition for the consolidation of several 
sections of Union Township, Madison County, was filed with the County 
Superintendent. Regular proceedings were followed and a hearing for 
objections was scheduled. At the hearing a request was filed asking 
that Sub-District 9 be included in the proposal. The County Superin­
tendent ruled on the request and added the territory to the proposal. 
An appeal was made by Brooker, a resident of the area in question, to 
the County Board, which sustained the decision of the County Superin­
tendent. Brooker brought suit, charging that County Superintendent 
Ludlow and the County Board did not have authority to exclude or include 
territory once a petition was filed with the County Board. He also 
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chargcd that the County Board had no jurisdiction over the appeal deci­
sion of the County Superintendent. The issue: Does a county board of 
education have jurisdiction on an objection from a ruling of a county 
superintendent to change school district boundaries? The Court ruled in 
favor of the plaintiff and reasoned that a county superintendent has the 
authority to establish the boundaries established in a petition; however, 
he has no authority to add territory. The Court also ruled that a county 
board is prohibited from enlarging a territory when a petition for re­
organization has been filed (175, p. 760) . 
Consolidated districts—enlarging proposed district. 
The county board of education, on appeal to it ^  re 
petition for a consolidated school district, has no 
jurisdiction to order the inclusion of territory not 
already embraced within the boundaries as set forth 
in the petition. (Section 2794-a, Code Supp. 1913 
as amended by Chapter 149, Acts 38 G.A.). 
Molyneaux v. Molyneaux — A reorganization petition was properly filed 
to bring together some rural area in Prairie Township of Keokuk County. 
Elections were held on two separate days. The issue carred at the 
polls, and another election was conducted to elect board members of the 
new district. Molyneaux brought action against Molyneaux and the re­
maining officers of the original Prairie Township District. (The plain­
tiff and defendant bear the same name; however, the Iowa Reports failed 
to explain this). The plaintiff claimed the elections were irregular 
because they were not scheduled on the same day and the petitions were 
insufficient. The defendant contended that the plaintiff voted in the 
reorganization and board elections and therefore could not deny the 
validity of the newly created district. Two issues faced the Court: 
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Must elections be conducted on the same day when deciding a reorganization 
proposal? Does the participation of a plaintiff in reorganization and 
board elections restrain him from contesting the validity of a newly 
created district? A 1960 decision was rendered in favor of the defend­
ant. Elections need not be scheduled at the same time. Participation in 
elections by the plaintiff does not void his position in challenging the 
validity of a district (176, p. 100). 
Conduct of election. The elections in the different dis­
tricts with reference to the consolidation need not be 
held on the same day and at the same time. If any such 
requirement is contemplated by the statute it is directory 
merely. 
Pleasant Hill Independent School District v. Norris — On April 30, 1953, 
a school district reorganization petition was filed with the Polk County 
Superintendent. The proposal was to consolidate 12 rural districts into 
one from land located in Polk and Jasper Counties. The Joint County 
Board met and fixed the boundary lines; however, several conflicts with 
the proposal delayed the election for a considerable length of time. 
Pleasant Hill Independent School District and a group of interested tax­
payers filed a petition to stay the election and any further proceedings. 
They were unsuccessful in this move, and the election was conducted, with 
a favorable vote cast for the reorganization. The plaintiff then charged 
that the votes of its District were counted with those of the town of 
Altoona and that a separate ballot box should have been provided for the 
Pleasant Hill District. It also claimed that the vote must be favorable 
in each polling place. The Pleasant Hill population grew very rapidly 
and exceeded 200 after the time the petition was filed with the County 
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Superintendent. The issues: Must a separate ballot box be provided for 
the voters in a town which grows to a population of 200 after a petition 
has been filed? Can the votes of two urban centers exceeding a population 
of 200 be incorporated? The Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff be­
cause it was the intent of the legislature to provide for separate polling 
places. When separate ballot boxes are provided by statute, the vote 
shall be counted separately and each district must vote favorably upon 
the proposition (177, p. 546). 
Consolidated proceedings--town incorporated before elections-
separate ballot box required. Where proceedings for the 
formation of a consolidated independent school district were 
begun in 1953 when there was incorporated therein which con­
tained more than 200 inhabitants, the statutory requirement 
for a separate ballot box in any district containing such 
a town related to the time of the election and not to the 
time the proceedings to form the district were started, and 
it is mandatory that the proposition for organizing the 
district carry in each of the respective territories pro­
posed be included. 
Election--votes of two urban centers in proposed new dis­
trict—counted separately. Where in the proposed formation 
of a consolidated school district two of the districts that 
were proposed to be included contained towns with more than 
200 inhabitants, they constituted "respective territories" 
and the votes of the two towns cannot be counted together. 
Turnis v. Monticello Board of Education - The Monticello School District 
initiated school district reorganization, and all proceeded well until 
Turnis petitioned for a writ of certiorari challenging the actions and 
jurisdiction of the Joint County Board. The plaintiff charged that the 
Jones, Linn, Dubuque, and Delaware County Boards established a polling 
place outside the boundary area and that they had no authority to estab­
lish boundary lines due to the interruption of a stay order. The 
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election resulted in a vote of 1200 for and 184 against the reorgani­
zation election. The issues: Does the assignment of a polling place 
outside the proposed boundaries invalidate an election when an issue is 
carried by a majority? Does a stay order hinder the establishment of 
boundary lines for a reorganization proposal? A 1961 decision was 
rendered in favor of the defendant. A polling place outside the proposed 
district does not invalidate an election when it does not enter into the 
decision of the voters. The Joint Board acted correctly after the effect 
of the stay order was removed by rescheduling, serving notices, and meet­
ing to establish boundaries in accordance with the proposal (178, p- 922). 
Elections—polling place outside the boundary—legality. 
The use of a schoolhouse located a few feet beyond the 
boundary line of the proposed district did not invali­
date the election where it appears 12 of the 17 qualified 
voters in that district who voted favored the proposed 
community district and the election carried by a vote of 
1200 in favor and 184 against the proposal, the deviation 
from the statutory requirement as to location of the poll­
ing place being but an irregularity. 
Stay order--compliance--delay in fixing boundaries—no 
abandonment of proceedings. Where, because of a stay 
order from the district court, the joint board did not 
proceed to establish boundaries at the meeting called for 
the purpose, the inaction did not constitute the abandon­
ment of the organization proceedings, where upon release 
of the stay, new notice was given and a hearing held. 
Rollins V. Halverson -- A feasibility study for the reorganization of 
school district boundaries was conducted in the town of Oakland and 
adjoining areas. This resulted in a petition requesting school district 
reorganization which was filed with the Pottawattamie County Superin­
tendent. Legal descriptions differed in three or four instances from 
the plat and the notice of the time scheduled for objections did not 
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stipulate the method of board selection. Four persons presented objec­
tions at the proper meeting. Those objecting did not challenge the 
method of electing a board of education. Following the hearing, the 
County Board, with two members absent, decided to recess the meeting and 
defer final decision to a later meeting. There were no appeals from the 
decision of the County Board within the 20 day waiting period, as estab­
lished by law. The polling places were designated and the judges and 
clerks of the election were named. The voters favored reorganization 
and a board was elected on February 3, 1964. Rollins charged that 
Halverson had selected homes of those in favor of the issue as polling 
places and that several of the election officials favored the propo­
sition. Rollins also charged that all of the county board members were 
not present at the meeting when objections were heard and that the 
method of electing board members was not included in the notice of 
hearing. The issues: Did election officials and home owners influence 
the voters of the district? Must all county board members be present 
at a hearing for objections to a reorganization proposal? Must the 
method of board selection be mentioned in the notice of hearing for 
objections? A decision was rendered in 1965 for the defendant. The 
Court decided that none of the charges were valid and no fraud was 
found. A new district was created (179, p. 399). 
Election on plan for reorganization—validity. An 
election resulting in approval of a plan for reorgani­
zation of a school district was not unfairly conducted 
because several of the voting places were in homes of 
those known to favor the plan and several judges and 
clerks were advocates of it, in the absence of showing 
of acts of any of the parties which might influence the 
voters that day. 
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Hearing on objections to tentative plan—quorum of board 
sufficient—absent members qualified to vote on final 
decision. There is no statutory requirement that all 
members of the county school board be present at a hear­
ing on objections to a proposed reorganization, and a 
quorum is sufficient, and members who were not present 
at the hearing may participate in a later decision to 
amend the plan. 
Electing directors--method need not be set out in notice 
of hearing. There is no statutory requirement that the 
method of choosing school directors be set out in the 
notice of hearing on objections to a petition for school 
reorganization. 
Alley V. Mills County Board of Education — In 1961 Alley brought suit 
against the Mills County Board to prevent that body from attaching 
territory of less than four sections to the Malvern School District. 
The Mills County Board had previously fixed the boundaries of the pro­
posed Nishna Valley Community School District which resulted in remnants 
of land, one of which was the residence of the plaintiff. Alley charged 
that the defendant had exceeded its authority in the boundary settle­
ment of the Nishna Valley District so as to exclude land already ex­
cluded from the Malvern District. He also claimed it was improper to 
assign the remnants of land to Malvern without a vote of the people. 
The issues: May a county board fix boundary lines for school district 
reorganization prior to an election? May the citizens of an area of 
less than four sections vote as to their assignment to a larger district? 
A decision was rendered for the defendant. A county board may alter pro­
posal boundary lines prior to an election. An election by the people 
for attachment of territory was not provided by statute (180, p. 1142). 
Reorganization--authority of board to amend proposed 
boundaries. A county board has authority to amend the 
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boundaries of any reorganization proposal submitted to it 
before the proposal is placed before the electorate. 
Attachment of remnant districts—vote of electorate not 
required. There is no statutory provision for a vote by 
the residents of remnant school districts, which have 
been excluded from a school reorganization proposal, as 
to which contiguous district they desire to join. 
Sheridan Rural School District v. Gurnsey Consolidated School District — 
On January 28, 1958, a petition for the reorganization of the Grinnell-
Newburg Community School District was filed with the County Superintend­
ent of Poweshiek County. The area described in the petition included 
land located in Jasper and Poweshiek Counties. A meeting of the Joint 
Board was scheduled and boundary lines were established; however, por­
tions or all of nine sections of land were excluded from the proposal. 
The State Board of Public Instruction approved the action of the Joint 
Board when an appeal was brought to its attention by the Grinnell Board. 
An election was scheduled which resulted in the creation of the new 
district, effective July 1, 1958. On January 31, 1958, a petition for 
reorganization was filed in behalf of the proposed Brooklyn-Gurnsey-
Malcom Community School District. The petition included 24 sections, 
which at that time were pending in the Grinnell-Newburg proposal. At 
a hearing for objections, John Talbott, an attorney for the Brooklyn-
Gurnsey-MaIcom proposal, requested withdrawal of the 24 sections from 
the petition. The Joint Board met to set boundary lines and at that 
meeting set aside nine sections of land from the Brooklyn-Gurnsey-Malcom 
District which were originally in the Grinnell-Newburg proposal- An 
appeal was submitted to the State Board of Public Instruction. A deci­
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sion was rendered and the nine sections of land were reassigned to the 
Brooklyn-Gurnsey-Malcom District. The Sheridan Rural School District 
brought the case to the Supreme Court, claiming that the State Board was 
unreasonable and had no authority to overrule the Joint Board. It wished 
to keep the territory from becoming a part of the Brooklyn-Gurnsey-Malcom 
District. The Gurnsey District was named defendant to prevent it from 
becoming a portion of the Brooklyn-Gurnsey-Malcom District. The issue: 
Does a board have jurisdiction over territory which is included in a 
prior petition for reorganization? A decision was rendered in favor of 
the plaintiff. The Court removed the nine sections of land from the 
Brooklyn-Gurnsey-Malcom School District. • Territory previously included 
in a school district proposal is not under the jurisdiction of another 
district (181, p. 460). 
Overlapping--territory—priority of district first filing 
a petition. An attempt by a school board to exercise 
jurisdiction over and include territory in a proposed 
school district which has been included in a prior petition 
filed by another district is in excess of its authority. 
Peterson v. Joint County Board of Boone and Hamilton Counties -- A peti­
tion was filed with the County Superintendent of Hamilton County for the 
boundary reorganization of the proposed South Hamilton School District. 
The Joint Board of Boone and Hamilton Counties met to establish boundary 
lines and amend the joint county plans. Voters of the proposed area 
adopted the measure by a vote of 1007 to 694. The election carried in 
11 of 13 districts and a board of education was elected at a later date. 
Peterson brought charges against the Joint County Board of Education, 
claiming that the Stanhope District had recently reorganized and main­
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tained its identity by operating a 12 grade system. He also claimed 
that the Stanhope District could not be included in another district by 
outsiders if that District did not vote to do so prior to July 1, 1962. 
The Stanhope District was one of the two districts which failed to ap­
prove the South Hamilton proposal at the polls. The issue: Could the 
Stanhope District be legally included in the South Hamilton proposal? 
A 1960 decision was rendered in favor of the defendant. The Stanhope 
District became a part of the South Hamilton District because districts 
are always permitted to reorganize (182, p. 1306). 
Districts maintaining twelve grade schools—attachment 
to another district—statutes governing. A community 
school district maintaining a twelve-grade system is not 
included in the area over which a county board is given 
authority to attach a twelve-grade system by the pro­
visions of Section 275.1, C., '58, the proceedings to in­
clude such district into a new community district being 
governed by Sections 275.12 to 275.20 inclusive pertain­
ing to uniting two or more districts in different counties 
into a single district. 
Brighton Independent School District v. Joint County Board of Keokuk, 
Jefferson, and Washington Counties — In 1961 a reorganization petition 
was circulated to form the Lake Darling Community School District, with 
land in Keokuk, Washington, and Jefferson Counties. The Joint Board 
met to hear objections and established the boundaries, with some minor 
changes, by a vote of nine to five. A few days later the same Joint 
Board met and reconsidered the boundary establishment and by the same 
vote decided not to approve the proposed reorganization. The Joint Board 
did not go on record to dismiss the petition. The Lake Darling District 
appealed to the State Department of Public Instruction. A decision was 
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rendered which declared the petition had been dismissed by the Joint 
Board. The Brighton Independent School District, which was a part of 
the Lake Darling proposal, brought suit against the Joint County Board, 
charging that failure to approve the petition did not create a dismissal. 
The issue: Does the failure to approve a petition by a joint board re­
sult in its dismissal? A decision was reached in favor of the plaintiff. 
The Court stated that a joint county board is mandated to establish school 
boundary lines or dismiss a reorganization proposal (183, p. 734). 
Joint boards--mandatory duty to establish district or 
to dismiss petition. Joint county boards have a man­
datory duty to establish the boundaries of a proposed 
school district or to dismiss the petition for organi­
zation thereof. 
Shilling V. Jefferson Community School District — Two school district 
reorganization proposals were circulated in 1959 which brought forth an 
issue relative to filing time. A petition proposing the creation of a 
new Central Tri-County Community School District, with land in Greene, 
Guthrie, and Dallas Counties, was circulated. Another petition was 
circulated at the same time for adjustments in the Jefferson Community 
School District boundaries located totally in Greene County. This 
petition was filed with the Greene County Superintendent at approxi­
mately 11:15 P.M. on April 27, 1959. The petition was marked "filed" 
and taken by the Superintendent to his office at 7:30 A.M. the following 
day. The petition for the revised Central Tri-County Community School 
District was filed with the Guthrie County Superintendent at her home 
at approximately 3:20 A.M. on April 28, 1959. This petition was marked 
"filed" and taken to the office of the County Superintendent at 6:00 A.M. 
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on that day. A hearing for the Central Tri-County proposal was held on 
May 11, 1959. The Greene County Board attended and participated in the 
hearing, after relating that it waived none of its rights by being a 
participant. A motion was made and affirmed to dismiss the petition. 
The Greene County Board approved the Jefferson proposal and it success­
fully carried at the polls. Shilling brought suit against the Jefferson 
Community School District by quo warranto action, testing the legality of 
the organization of the District. The issue: Does a difference in time 
establish priority in filing a petition for school district reorganiza-. 
tion? A decision was rendered in favor of the defendant, thereby declar­
ing it a legally constituted district. The Court reasoned that priority 
did exist with the time of filing (184, p. 491). 
Schools and school districts. Petition--filing—priority 
in time. A petition for organization of a school district 
is filed when left with the proper superintendent for fil­
ing in the usual manner, and where a petition for a single 
county district was received by the county superintendent 
at his home at 11:15 p.m. on April 27 and marked filed at 
that time the proceedings had priority over proceedings 
for a tri-county district by a petition filed by a county 
superintendent at her home at 3:20 a.m. on April 28. 
Grant v. Norris — Ralph Norris, Polk County superintendent, received a 
petition to consolidate 11 school districts located in Polk and Jasper 
Counties. The petition was filed on April 30, 1953, to form the bound­
aries of Southeastern Polk and Jasper Counties. Publication laws were 
complied with and a hearing for objections was held. The objections 
were overruled, with the exception of a small parcel of land in Jasper 
County. An appeal of the County Superintendent's ruling was made by 
the objectors to the Joint County Board- The Joint Board excluded three 
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and retained eight districts in the proposal. An election was scheduled, 
and six of the eight districts voted favorably for the proposal. The 
Polk County Superintendent proceeded under the provisions of Chapter 276, 
Code of Iowa, and considered the proposition carried because a majority 
of districts voted favorably upon the measure. He then.called an elec­
tion for a district treasurer and five board members. The Legislature 
repealed Chapter 276 during the course of the reorganization. Grant, 
representing the Pleasant Hill District, filed a petition for writ of 
certiorari against the Joint County Board and its Superintendents. The 
plaintiff charged that the Joint County Board exceeded its jurisdiction 
in fixing the boundaries and in calling the election. The defendant con­
tended that the plaintiff waived his right to bring action because he 
had voted in the election; also, that the Joint Board had the authority 
to establish district lines. The issues: Did the plaintiff waive his 
right when he voted in the election establishing a school district? 
Could the reorganization become a reality under Chapter 275 due to the 
repeal of Chapter 276, Code of Iowa? A decision was reached in 1957 
which permitted the District to stand; however, the County Superintend­
ent was required to republish his order following the final disposition 
of appeal. The hearing of the Joint Board was held and the Superintend­
ent and Joint Board proceeded under Chapter 276, Code of Iowa (185, 
p. 236). 
Participation in election—voter not estopped to question 
validity. Participation in an election to pass on a pro­
posal to create or alter a school district does not estop 
a voter to attack the validity of the creation or altera­
tion. 
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Right of electors who voted in election of school 
officers to challenge validity of district. Plain­
tiffs in certiorari action to test legality of for­
mation of a school district who filed objections with 
the county superintendent and appealed to the joint 
boards of education of the two counties involved did 
not waive their right to maintain their action in 
certiorari by voting for directors and treasurer at 
the election called by the superintendent to choose 
these officers for the new district. 
Bond Issues 
Bond issues usually provide for funds to construct, remodel, or 
repair school buildings and the purchase of school sites. 
Strawn v. Independent School District of Indianola — The Indianola 
School District held an election in 1925 to approve the sale of bonds 
for the construction of a schoolhouse. The issue carried by a majority 
of 99 votes. Strawn questioned the validity of the election, charging 
that unqualified voters were permitted to cast ballots. Simpson College 
students were claimed to be ineligible to vote. The issue: Did the 
ineligible students who voted in the Indianola bond issue election 
influence the results? The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the 
defendant. It reasoned that the number of students permitted to vote 
did not influence the outcome of the election. Only five student votes 
were in question. All judges concurred (186, p. 1078). 
Elections—illegal votes—effect. The reception of illegal 
votes at an election becomes unimportant when such votes 
are insufficient to change the results. 
Brakes v. Farragut -- Frakes inititated court action in equity against 
the Farragut Community School District due to irregularities in a 
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special bond election. The plaintiff claimed that some favorable votes 
were improperly counted and some negative votes improperly rejected. 
He also challenged the votes of two nonresident students, Max and 
Charlotte Livingston, who were attending college in Tarkio, Missouri 
at the time. They were residents of the Farragut community; voted in 
previous elections; attended church in Farragut; and filed Iowa income 
tax. The issues: What constitutes a student's residence? May a stu­
dent vote in a place of his residence? A 1963 decision was rendered in 
favor of the defendant. It is reasonable for college students to estab­
lish their residence at home. One may vote in the place of his resi­
dence (187, p. 88). 
Bond election—couple attending college in Missouri— 
qualified to vote. A young married couple whose home 
had been in Fremont County, Iowa, and who went to 
Missouri for the sole purpose of attending college with 
no intention of making a permanent home there, and after 
graduation intend to return, were qualified to vote in a 
school bond election in their home county. 
Headington v. North Winneshiek Community School District — Headington 
challenged the validity and results of a school bond election- Ballots 
were printed on white rather than yellow paper, as required by law, and 
the printing and writing could easily be read on the reverse side. The 
plaintiff also claimed the paper upon which the ballots were printed 
was not opaque and determining the marking thereon was difficult. The 
term "Official Ballot" was not printed at the top of the ballot. 
Headington claimed that the Board of Education was in violation of the 
statute by selecting an excessive number of judges; selecting clerks 
without statutory authority; substituting a judge for one who was ill; 
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reducing the polling places from four to one; and the clerks had not 
initialed the ballots. The issue: Will minor election infractions in­
validate an election when fraud is not evident? A decision was rendered 
for the defendant. The election officials were selected by the Board in 
good faith and properly documented in the minutes of an official board 
meeting. The printing of ballots on white paper did not comply with the 
law. The Court stated that ballots both initialed and not initialed by 
a clerk could be counted. Election results could not be altered and no 
fraud was discovered^(188, p. 430). 
Ballots--paper used not completely opaque—technical defect. 
Ballots used in a school election printed on white paper 
through which printing and writing could be read and it was 
possible but not easy to determine how the ballot was voted 
constituted a technical deviation from the statute and non­
compliance with a directory rather than a mandatory pro­
vision, and the election was not void by virtue thereof. 
Bond election—judges and clerks—substitute judge. In a 
school bond election where the board had selected four 
judges, two substitute judges, three clerks and one sub­
stitute clerk, all of whom were qualified electors, al­
though there is no statutory provision for more than three 
judges or for any clerks, and when one substitute judge 
failed to appear her husband took the oath and served the 
election was not invalidated. Section 277.10, Code of 
1962. 
Bond election—designation of polling place. In a school 
bond election where one of the four voting precincts within 
the school district was designated as the polling place at 
a special meeting of the board, as shown by the minutes of 
the meeting and by a resolution providing for the election 
and for voting at one specified precinct, a legal consol­
idation of the voting precincts was effectuated, in the 
absence of a petition opposing it. Section 277.5, Code of 
1962. 
Bond election--extra help at polls—election valid although 
statute not strictly followed. Extra help at the polls dur­
ing a school bond election by qualified electors duly sworn 
does not vitiate an election, although there was not strict 
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compliance with the statute in selection of the judges and 
clerks, in the absence of showing of fraud or prejudice. 
Section 277.10, Code of 1962. 
Honohan v. United Community School District — A Boone County case in­
volving a $700,000 bond issue for the construction of a school building 
in the United Community School District was decided in 1965. Honohan 
contended that the public measure which appeared on the ballot was not 
the same as that printed on the election petition and election notice. 
The issue: Does the difference in the printing of contents of a public 
measure on the ballot, petition, and election notice invalidate an 
election? All judges concurred in behalf of the plaintiff. The Court 
reasoned that the legislature requires a petition for an election, 
notices of an election, and ballots. No part of a public measure may 
be omitted from a ballot (189, p. 57). 
Election—measure to be voted on set forth in full in 
petition and notice. Requirement that the public meas­
ure voted on be set forth in full on the ballot refers 
to the public measure to be submitted as set forth in 
the petition for and the notice of election, and is 
mandatory. 
Gibson v. Winterset Community School District — The Winterset Board of 
Education was preparing to submit a seventh bond issue to the people for 
the construction of a new building. A total of $890,000 was proposed, 
which was the same as the first issue. Mandamus was sought by Gibson 
to demand that the Board conduct an election for an amount of $500,000. 
The Board of Education believed it had the authority to make a choice. 
The issue: May a bonding proposition which is filed with a board sec­
retary at the time of an unsuccessful election be reason to void a 
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petition submitted at a later date? The Court in 1965 held in favor of 
the plaintiff because of priority in filing. There was no violation of 
the statute in filing a petition with the Board at the time of the 
election (ISO, p. 440). 
Bond issue election—action of school board in refusing to 
submit petitions—arbitrary and capricious—mandamus. Where 
the board of school directors had unsuccessfully submitted 
four bond issues in excess of $800,000 and for more than six 
months plaintiffs had been trying to have one or more of 
their $500,000 bond issue proposals submitted to electorage, 
the board's consistent failure to recognize plaintiffs* 
rights to have an election on their proposals constituted 
arbitrary and capricious action subject to relief by man­
damus . 
Bond issue election—request in petition to delay sub­
mission—validity. Request in a petition for an election 
on a school bond issue that it be filed immediately but not 
acted upon until after the election on another bond issue 
that was to be held three days later did not invalidate the 
petition or make it illegal. 
Kirchoff v. Humboldt Community School District — The Humboldt Community 
Board of Education named and qualified two board members as relief 
judges prior to the opening of the polls for a bond election. They 
also assisted in canvassing the ballots. Kirchoff charged that the 
relief judges could not legally serve and that the election was void. 
The issue: Is an approved bond issue valid when minor irregularities 
occurred prior to or during the election? The Court held for the 
defendant. It reasoned that an election is valid even though technical 
violations are noted when no fraud or prejudice is found (191, p. 756). 
Bond issue—election--relief judges appointed prior to 
election—de facto officers. Relief judges appointed 
prior to an election on a school bond issue were at least 
de facto officers and the election should not be invali­
dated unless prejudice is shown. Section 277.10, Code of 
1958. 
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Election—bond issue—handling of ballots. A school bond 
election by a district having only one voting precinct will 
not be invalidated by failure to comply with Chapter 50, 
C., '58, as to handling the ballots and disposition of those 
not used in the absence of showing of fraud or prejudice. 
Winespear v. District Township of Holman — A case testing the legality 
of the incurrence of a debt which was voted by the people came before 
the Court in 1873. Winespear charged that the Township of Holman could 
not incur a debt. The issue: Did the bonded indebtedness exceed the 
constitutional limitation? A decision was reached in favor of the 
defendant. The Constitution provides for the indebtedness of school 
districts not to exceed five per cent of the actual valuation of a dis­
trict (192, p. 542). 
Limit of indebtedness: Constitutional law. A school dis­
trict township is a political or municipal corporation 
within the meaning of Article 2, Section 3 of the consti­
tution, inhibiting such corporation from incurring indebt­
edness to an amount exceeding five per cent on the taxable 
property of the corporation. 
Chambers v. Knoxville Board of Education — Fifty-one citizens attempted 
to prevent the Knoxville Board of Education from issuing bonds to build 
a schoolhouse. Chambers charged that the rate of interest was not 
published prior to the election. The issue: Must a resolution or 
notice of election stipulate the rate of interest? In 1915 the Court 
affirmed the election as valid because the law provides for the maxi­
mum rate of interest. The rate of interest is not known prior to the 
sale of bonds (193, p. 340). 
Elections--form of notice. Interest rate. In submitting 
to the electors of a school district a proposition, under 
Sections 2820-dl—2820-d4, Sup. Code 1913, to bond the 
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district for schoolhouse purposes, no necessity exists to 
state the rate of interest the bonds will bear. 
Adams v. Fort Madison Community School District — A bond issue for the 
construction of school buildings was defeated in the Fort Madison Com­
munity School District in February 1969. The issue received a 53.1 per 
cent favorable vote. Several voters of the District initiated legal 
proceedings in an attempt to reverse the statute, which requires a 60 
per cent favorable vote. The issue: Is a majority vote sufficient in 
a bond issue? The Court rendered a six to three decision in favor of the 
60 per cent majority vote. It reasoned that the United States Consti­
tution requires an extra-majority or two-thirds vote of both Chambers 
of Congress for impeachment, expulsion of a member, and amendment to 
the Constitution; whereas, in other areas a simple majority is suffi­
cient. The matter of the bond issue falls in the extra-majority cate­
gory. A bonding program is scheduled for a 20 year period. An extra 
majority of votes at the local level protects the purchaser against 
worthless bonds, and the taxpayers against taxes which cannot be paid 
during periods of economic recession. The decision was rendered on 
December 15, 1970. Time has not permitted this case to appear in the 
Iowa Reports. Information was obtained from the news media; conse­
quently, headnotes are not available. 
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CHAPTER XII: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS 
The School Laws of Iowa, a Department of Public Instruction pub­
lication, provides for a system of administrative appeals from local 
to county and state level. The legislature created this system of 
administrative remedy because it is faster and less costly than can 
be obtained in the courts. Some statutes provide for appeals to the 
court when administrative remedy has been exhausted. Other laws man­
date the decision of the administrative tribunal to be final; however, 
given circumstances have permitted some cases to be ruled upon by the 
courts. 
Decisions resulting from administrative appeals have frequently 
been challenged. As early as 1865 the Supreme Court of Iowa cast doubt 
upon an administrative appeal statute which permitted a county super­
intendent to render a decision which was to have been final. 
District Reorganization Appeals 
School district reorganization appeals have frequently been brought 
to the attention of the county and state superintendents. These appeals 
are frequently initiated as a result of dissatisfaction over boundary 
lines. 
Iowa Falls Board of Education v. State Board of Public Instruction — 
In 1959 the Iowa Falls Community School District petitioned for re­
organization of its school district with territory located in Franklin 
and Hardin Counties. The Joint County Board met in session and excluded 
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seven sections of land from the proposal. The dissatisfied Iowa Falls 
Board appealed the decision to the State Board of Public Instruction. 
This appeal resulted in a ruling which excluded territory from the pro­
posal. An aggrieved Iowa Falls Board brought suit to recover the land 
which had been excluded from the proposal. The issue; Can an independ­
ent school district appeal a decision of a joint board to the State 
Board of Public Instruction? A decision was rendered in favor of the 
defendant. The judges found that the State Board had not exceeded its 
authority and school districts may appeal a decision of a joint board to 
the State Board (194, p. 672). 
Appeals to state department of public instruction—not 
limited to county boards. An independent school dis­
trict has the right to appeal to the state superintend­
ent of public instruction from the decision of joint 
county boards fixing the boundaries of a proposed com­
munity school district even though there was no dispute 
between the county boards and no appeal taken by either 
board to the state department. 
Durant District, Montpelier District, and Cedar County Board v. Iowa 
State Board of Public Instruction — Voters of the Durant Community 
School District and other contiguous districts circulated and filed a 
petition for the reorganization of school boundary lines with the pro­
per County Superintendent. The Joint Board of Cedar, Scott, and 
Muscatine Counties met to hear objections and approved the plan with 
only minor modifications. An appeal was brought to the attention of the 
State Superintendent by objectors living in the Montpelier No. 4 and 
Sweetland No. 5 Districts. The State Superintendent and two assistants 
heard the case. The proceedings and decision were reviewed by the State 
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Board and the petition was dismissed. The Durant District, Montpelier 
District, and Cedar County Board brought the case to Court. The plain­
tiffs charged that the State Superintendent and his assistants had no 
right to conduct the hearing and that it should have been heard by the 
nine member State Board. They also charged that the State Superintend­
ent was without jurisdiction to act because the Cedar County Superin­
tendent was not given notice by the Districts of their appeal to the 
State Superintendent. The defendant claimed the plaintiffs did not notify 
the County Superintendent regarding the appeal brought to the State Board 
of Public Instruction. Consequently, this was a violation of the law. 
The issues: Did the State Superintendent and his assistants have au­
thority to conduct the hearing? Must the County Superintendent be 
notified by the parties which file the appeal with the State Superintend­
ent? A decision was reached in 1960 which favored the defendant. The 
State Superintendent and his assistants did legally hold the hearing 
and the findings were reviewed and approved by the State Board of Public 
Instruction. The plaintiffs were under no obligation to notify the 
County Superintendent of the appeal brought before the State Superin­
tendent (195, p. 237). 
Organization—jurisdiction of state board—controversy--
hearing by state superintendent and two assistants. 
State board of public instruction did not lack juris­
diction to hear a controversy concerning formation of a 
community school district because only the state super­
intendent and his two assistants conducted the hearing 
where their findings and conclusions were approved by 
the state board at one of its regular meetings, and the 
board specifically designated the three officials to 
conduct such hearings. 
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Organi2ation--controversy to state board—notice requirement. 
Statutes providing for taking to state board of public in­
struction a controversy concerning approval by joint boards 
of a proposed district do not require service of notice upon 
county superintendent by parties who brought the controversy 
to the state board. Sections 275.18 and 285.12, Code of 1958. 
Springville Community School District v. Iowa State Board of Public 
Instruction — In 1961 the Supreme Court of Iowa ruled on a case involv­
ing two county boards which could not reach an agreement in establishing 
boundary lines. The Joint Board of Jones and Linn Counties did not agree 
to the assignment of the Viola Township District. This area was located 
adjacent to the line dividing the two Counties. Originally the State 
Board of Public Instruction assigned the Viola territory to the Linn 
County plan. Later the Anamosa Community School District presented a 
petition for a change in county plans, which included the Viola District. 
The Joint Board vote ended in a tie. A second appeal was brought to the 
attention of the State Board. This appeal was returned to the Jones and 
Linn County Board for its decision. The Springville Community School 
District brought suit against the State Board of Public Instruction. 
The issue: What jurisdiction does the State Board of Public Instruction 
have in matters resulting in a tie vote of a joint board? A decision was 
rendered in favor of the defendant. The Court reasoned that it was the 
duty of the Joint Board to reach a decision or dismiss the petition and 
the State Board of Public Instruction had ruled correctly. The State 
Board may not rule on matters not covered by statute (196, p. 907). 
Joint boards—controversies to state department—final 
decision. The controversy arising from a meeting of 
joint boards to determine and fix boundaries that may 
be brought to the state department is one that arises 
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from a final decision, either fixing boundaries or dis­
missing the petition, and there is no provision for 
bringing a controversy over an intermediate motion or 
interlocutory order to the department. 
Controversy—jurisdiction of state department—not 
conferred by motion of joint boards. A motion of the 
joint boards that a controversy be presented to the 
state department is not sufficient to confer juris­
diction where none is conferred by statute. 
Essex Independent School District v. Montgomery County Board of Educa­
tion — A petition was filed in 1958 for the formation of the Coburg-
Essex School District. The proposal included 21 existing districts. 
More than 20 per cent of the eligible voters signed the petition. The 
Joint Board, comprised of Page and Montgomery Counties, scheduled a 
hearing and by a vote of seven to three approved the proposal. 
Montgomery County, with three dissenting votes, appealed to the State 
Board of Public Instruction. The School Districts of Red Oak, Clarinda, 
and Shenandoah also appealed to the State Board. Their appeal was dis­
missed because they were not aggrieved parties. The decision of the 
State Board, as a result of the Montgomery County hearing, stated that 
the reorganization planning was inadequate and the petition submitted 
lacked sufficient signatures. The appeal was dismissed. From this deci­
sion a suit was initiated by the Essex Board which ended in the Supreme 
Court. The plaintiff challenged the authority of the State Board in its 
ruling on the appeal. The Montgomery County Board contended that the 
plaintiff could not bring suit because it had not sought administrative 
relief by appealing to the State Board. The issue: Can a district bring 
suit without first seeking proper administrative relief from the State 
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Board? A decision was reached which stated that the State Board has 
authority to dismiss all proceedings, affirm the action of a joint 
board, and make modifications. The case was dismissed because proper 
administrative relief had not been sought. A district must appeal to 
the State Board prior to initiating court proceedings (197, p. 1085). 
Joint boards--appeal must be first taken to state depart­
ment. There is no provision for appeal directly from 
joint boards to the district court, and such appeals must 
be to the state department, which is given extensive 
authority and cannot be by-passed. 
Essex Independent School District v. Montgomery County Board of Educa­
tion — A second petition was circulated and filed for the reorganiza­
tion of the Essex and Coburg Districts which included 33 sections of 
land. This proposal included slightly less land than the original one 
and did not conform to either of the county plans. The plan also dis­
regarded a tentative four-county plan which was approved by the County 
Boards of Adams, Montgomery, Taylor, and Page Counties. The Montgomery 
County Board appealed to the State Board of Public Instruction on the 
grounds that the proposal violated its county plan and that it did not 
meet the prescribed standards relative to sound reorganization. A 
decision of the State Board ruled in favor of the Montgomery County 
Board, which resulted in court action initiated by the Board of Educa­
tion in and for the Essex Independent School. The plaintiff claimed 
that all previous proceedings met the legal requirements and that the 
proposal should have been brought to a vote of the people. The issue: 
Can the Court determine the reasonableness in the formation of district 
boundaries after a proposal has been rejected by the State Board and 
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such decision sustained by district court? A 1963 decision reached by 
the Court ruled in favor of the defendant. The reason was that a Court 
cannot decide the wisdom of a reorganization proposal (198, p- 537). 
Decision of state department—questions determined by court. 
On an appeal by joint boards from a decision of the state 
board the court may consider the judicial question whether 
the joint and state boards exceeded their jurisdiction and 
whether their orders were wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and 
without support in the record. 
Board of Directors of Stanton Independent District v. Montgomery County 
Board of Education — A petition was filed with the Montgomery County 
Superintendent for the formation of the Stanton Community School District. 
A hearing was scheduled by the Joint Board of Montgomery and Page Counties 
and the petition was dismissed. The Board of Directors of the Stanton 
District appealed to the State Board of Public Instruction. The hearing 
resulted in a decision sustaining dismissal of the petition by the Joint 
Board. The plaintiff then brought suit in district court against the 
Montgomery County Board and in so doing joined the State Department of 
Public Instruction, State Board of Public Instruction, and State Super­
intendent with the Montgomery County Board as defendants. A decision 
was reached sustaining the findings of the Joint Board. In 1960 the 
case was appealed to the Supreme Court. The issues; Was it proper to 
join the State Department of Public Instruction, State Board of Public 
Instruction, and State Superintendent as defendants? Was the action of 
the State Department of Public Instruction quasi-judicial? Is the State 
Department of Public Instruction regulatory and supervisory? A deci­
sion was rendered in favor of the defendant. It was not necessary to 
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join the State Superintendent and the two governmental agencies as 
defendants. They were considered supervisory and regulatory relative 
to reorganization of boundary lines; therefore, they should not have 
been joined any more than the presiding judge of the district court. 
All aspects of the case were considered even though the joined defend­
ants were dropped (199, p. 589). 
Appeal from decision of state department—not a necessary 
party defendant. On appeal to the district court from a 
decision of the state department of public instruction dis­
missing a petition for formation of a community school 
district, it was necessary or permissible to join the state 
department of public instruction, state board of public 
instruction and the state superintendent of public instruc­
tion as defendants and trial court's order dropping them 
as such defendants was proper. 
State Department—actions quasi-judicial but not judicial. 
While the action of the state department of public instruc­
tion may be termed quasi-judicial that fact does not remove 
it from the legislative category or make it judicial. 
State Department—legislative functions. The state depart­
ment of public instruction is a supervisory and regulatory 
board as to proper development of school reorganization in 
the state, with functions primarily legislative in nature. 
Stanton Board of Education v. Montgomery County Board of Education --
A second attempt was made to establish a change in the Stanton School 
District boundaries in 1961. A petition was filed with the Montgomery 
County Superintendent for reorganization of lands in Page and Montgomery 
Counties. The area was comprised of 78 square miles, and a total of 
334 students. A hearing was scheduled by the Joint Board and many 
written and oral objections were considered. The proposal was approved 
by a vote of seven to three. Three members of the Montgomery County 
Board disapproved the proposition, and that Board appealed the decision 
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to the State Board of Public Instruction. Following a hearing, it was 
decided to dismiss the reorganization proposal. The Stanton Board ap­
pealed the decision of the State Board to the lower court, which affirmed 
the decision. The plaintiff claimed that the Montgomery Board had failed 
to comply with the law in changing the county plan and that the Board's 
appeal to the State Board changed the county plan. The issue: Did the 
State Board of Public Instruction comply with the statutes in reviewing 
the appeal? A decision was rendered sustaining the decision of the State 
Board of Public Instruction to dismiss the proposal (200, p. 1285). 
Reorganization—appeal to state department—legislative 
functions. On appeal of a controversy from a meeting of 
county boards to the state department the proceedings be­
fore the department involve legislative functions,' 
Section 275-16, Code of 1958. 
Grimes Board of Directors v. Polk County Board of Education — A peti­
tion to reorganize the Dallas Center, Grimes Independent District, and 
other territory was filed with the Polk County Superintendent. A 
Joint Board, representing Dallas and Polk Counties, scheduled a hearing 
and thereafter approved the proposal. The Webster District, which was 
included in the plan, opposed the reorganization and appealed its 
objection to the State Board of Public Instruction. Following a hear­
ing the State Board of Public Instruction dismissed the petition. The 
Grimes Board of Directors then filed an appeal in the lower court, which 
was opposed primarily by the Polk County Board of Education. A decision 
of the lower court ruled that the Polk County Board was not a proper 
party to the appeal. It further ruled that the State Board acted without 
jurisdiction upon the appeal of the Webster District and ordered the State 
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Board to approve the petition. Upon this decision the Polk County Board 
appealed the case to the Supreme Court of Iowa. The defendant contended 
that the trial court erred when it ruled that the Polk County Board was 
not a proper party to resist the appeal. The plaintiff claimed the 
State Board of Public Instruction was arbitrary and unreasonable. The 
issue: Did the State Board exceed its authority in this case? A 1964 
decision was awarded to the defendant because the records did not sup­
port the plaintiff's charge that the State Board was unreasonable and 
arbitrary. The Polk County Board did properly resist the appeal (201, 
p. 106). 
Formation of district—wisdom for state board—limita­
tion on court's function. The court may not substitute 
its judgment for that of the state board as to the wis­
dom of a plan for formation of a school district, and 
may consider only the judicial question whether the state 
department exceeded its jurisdiction and whether its 
orders are arbitrary, unreasonable' and without support 
in the record. 
Transportation Appeals 
Transportation controversies were brought in the form of appeals 
to various county superintendents and the state superintendents. Some 
of these decisions were brought to Court by dissatisfied plaintiffs. 
County Board of Bremer County v. Parker — The records indicated in a 
transportation appeal case that Sub-District No. 6 designated its ele­
mentary and secondary students to the Waverly Independent School. This 
designation was disapproved by the Bremer County Board. Following the 
decision, the Waverly District and portions of Districts Nos. 2 and 3 
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of LaFayette Township appealed to the County Board. Again the request 
was disapproved. The Waverly District and the same rural Districts ap­
pealed to the State Superintendent and the decision of the Bremer County 
Board was reversed. Certain bus routes were to be revised so as to 
transport the designated children. The Bremer County Board filed a peti­
tion for writ of certiorari because the State Superintendent had required 
changes in the Waverly bus routes and this created a duplication of 
travel with the Denver District on some boundary roads. Jessie Parker, 
state superintendent, filed a motion to quash the writ and dismiss the 
petition. The Bremer County Board brought the case to Court and charged 
that Parker exceeded her authority and acted contrary to the law. The 
issue: Is the decision of the State Superintendent subject to review? 
A 1951 decision was rendered in favor of the defendant. According to 
statute, the ruling of the State Superintendent is final and not sub­
ject to review (202, p. 1). 
Appeal to superintendent of public instruction if dispute 
concerning bus route—decision final if official has 
jurisdiction of parties and subject matter. Under the 
provisions of Section 285.12, C., '46, *50, the decision 
of the state superintendent of public instruction in a 
disagreement as to the establishment of a bus route is 
final and is not subject to review if that official has 
jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter. 
Queeny v. Higgins — In a 1907 case relating to administrative relief, 
Queeny brought mandamus to require Higgins to enter into a transportation 
contract with him, or anyone else, to transport his daughter. Queeny 
lived beyond the statutory walking distance. The defendant, a member of 
the Board, refused to enter into a contract for transportation. Queeny 
191 
brought the case to Court, seeking the service for his daughter. The 
issue: Is a transportation appeal a matter of decision for the Court 
or for the County and State Superintendents? The decision stated that 
an appeal of this type shall not go to the Court but to the County 
Superintendent, and then if not resolved, to the State Superintendent 
(203, p. 573). 
Transportation of children—mandamus. The question of 
transportation of pupils to and from public schools in­
volves an exercise of judgment and discretion by the 
school board, and the remedy for one aggrieved by its 
action is appeal to the superintendent and not mandamus. 
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CHAPTER XIII: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Need for the Study 
This study was designed to assist board members, superintendents, 
principals, teachers, noncertified employees, students, and any other 
interested persons in gaining a better knowledge of school law. These 
people are not expected to have a technical knowledge of school law; 
however, they should possess a general knowledge of the subject. 
The Problem 
School laws are a product of the legislature. The statutes them­
selves possess some ambiguities which must be cleared to have a viable 
function. The problem is, therefore, to obtain a clear concept of school 
law, not only the words and phrases as enacted by the legislature, but 
their true meaning as declared by the Court. 
Procedures 
The 261 copies of the Iowa Reports, published by the State of Iowa, 
were the primary source of information. Supreme Court cases were briefed 
by securing the following predetermined, primary data: (1) facts, (2) 
issues, (3) decisions, and (4) reasons. The findings were organized 
into chapters which included school districts, boards, buildings and 
grounds, teachers, students, transportation, reorganization, elections, 
appeals, and summaries, conclusions, and recommendations. All chapters 
were divided into sub-topics. Each case was summarized, followed by 
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one or more headnotes which appeared in the Iowa Reports. This chapter 
contains the summary, conclusions, and recommendations. 
A cross-reference index has been placed in the appendix for the 
convenience of the reader. The topics and issues are listed in alpha­
betical order, followed by the case titles and page numbers. 
Limitations 
The Supreme Court of Iowa has rendered many decisions relative to 
educational statutory problems. It was beyond the scope of this study 
for the author to analyze the many technical aspects of law in each case, 
or to give consideration to the holdings in cases decided by the United 
States Supreme Court, Federal District and Appellate Courts, and District 
Courts of the State of Iowa. Neither has it been feasible to give men­
tion to the departmental decisions or opinions of the Attorney Generals 
of Iowa on questions of school law. Therefore, the study is not as com­
prehensive as may be desired. 
In the past decade a great number of landmark precedents have been 
altered. Emphasis has been placed upon controversies which involve the 
constitutional rights of individuals. If this change represents a trend 
in judicial framework, it is somewhat questionable as to the length of 
time which one may rely upon the decisions presented in this study. 
Summary 
A brief summary of case findings assigned to each category is 
presented. This will follow the same sequence of chapter arrangement. 
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School districts 
Three cases were briefed which related to quasi-corporations. The 
forefathers designed school districts as corporations, with authority 
to carry out the educational functions in the State of Iowa. 
Each district is financially responsible for educating the children 
residing within its boundaries. A tax must be levied to meet regular 
operational costs, and also when voted by the people. 
Generally speaking, school districts were found to be immune from 
tort liability. They were, however, responsible for damages in nuisance 
cases. 
The separation of church and state was reviewed in two instances. 
Public funds cannot be used to pay the salary of sectarian teachers. 
This ruling has held throughout the educational history of Iowa. 
The authority to make rules under which public schools must qualify 
for state aid is a legislative function. 
Boards of education 
Boards have the statutory authority to adopt reasonable rules and 
regulations to conduct the business affairs of their respective corpora­
tions. Routine business is not to be curtailed by injunctions. 
Boards of education may use tax money to employ legal counsel. 
Authority rests with the board pertaining to financial expenditures, 
except when the statutes require authority from the electorate. 
Two cases were presented in this study which relate to fraud and 
embezzlement. Counsel procured with district funds for involved board 
members is not permissible. 
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Buildings and grounds 
School districts hold title to property as quasi-corporations of 
the state, with legal ownership in the name of the state. 
A board of education is not obligated to award a contract to the 
lowest bidder. Competence of the bidder is difficult to evaluate in the 
courts. Once a contract is awarded, it must be reduced to writing. 
Site acquisition in this study was limited to voluntary purchase, 
and condemnation proceedings. A district need not own a site at the 
time of a bond election for the construction of a building. 
Boards of education are obligated to revert abandoned land to ad­
jacent landowners at an appraised or actual value, unless terms are 
stipulated in the deed. 
Boards may expend money for the building of roads to connect school 
sites with public roads. 
One case was reviewed pertaining to the abandonment of schoolhouse 
construction. In school construction disputes, an architect's certifi­
cate of cost is official in settling financial accounts. 
The fraction of land occupied by roads is not included in site 
size, as provided by law. 
Board-selected committees serve in an advisory capacity only; how­
ever, boards of education are responsible for any debt which may be 
incurred by them. 
Before a school district can legally enter into a lease-purchase 
agreement, a 60 per cent majority vote of the people is required. 
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Teachers 
Teachers are not public officers of the state even though they per­
form a governmental function. Certification was designed to indicate 
their qualifications and preparation. 
Seven Court decisions were reviewed in the area of teacher dis­
missal. This process is a legislative function established by law. 
Boards may act as judge and accuser in dismissal cases, and teachers 
must be granted a hearing. 
The place of teacher employment is considered legal residence for 
voting purposes. 
Students 
A décision of the Court in a slave case set the statutory frame­
work which permitted black students to enroll in white schools. Two 
additional school cases left no doubt as to the intent of the Iowa 
Constitution. 
On two separate occasions teachers were criminally charged for 
the administration of corporal punishment. Both were convicted of 
assault and battery. One civil case was not retried after it had been 
returned to district court. Courts have always considered the matter 
of reasonableness in corporal punishment cases. 
Two special education cases were reviewed for this study. It was 
found that parents may not always determine the place of a child's 
education when special training is needed. 
Boards of education have the authority to establish reasonable 
rules governing the behavior of their students. 
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The responsibility for educating children rests with the school dis­
tricts. This is a legislative matter due to the enactment of statutes. 
One case was brought to the attention of the Court to force the 
issuance of a diploma. Diplomas must be awarded to students who have 
satisfactorily completed academic requirements. 
Transportation 
School districts were mandated to furnish bus transportation for 
the children living beyond statutory walking distances. The Court 
reasoned that transportation was one of the factors by which educational 
opportunities were equalized. 
The Court has enforced the requirement of school districts to fur­
nish bus transportation to eligible students. Districts must reimburse 
parents for transportation services. Bus contracting is not necessary 
in order for parents to procure payment. 
Tax money for bus transportation can only be used to haul children 
to and from school. 
Approval of the voters is not necessary for bus purchases by boards 
of education. 
One bus driver's contract controversy was brought to the attention 
of the Court. Termination is an option available to either party if 
stipulated in the contract. 
School district reorganization 
The legislature provided for the enlargement of school districts to 
meet the ever-changing needs of the state. Boundaries of cities and 
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towns have had no bearing on school district boundaries. 
County boards of education are mandated to administer necessary 
reorganization proceedings. They are required to make reorganization 
studies of their respective counties and may disapprove reorganization 
proposals. 
Areas of less than four sections have to be assigned to one or more 
adjacent districts. The removal of land from a school district by the 
Federal government does not invalidate a district which is reduced to 
less than the statutory requirement size. 
Contiguous territory has been required in school district re­
organizations to provide efficient bus routes. 
Increased taxation following school district reorganization does 
not violate a citizen's constitutional rights. 
A parcel of land cannot be included in two school district re­
organization proposals at the same time. 
Newspaper publications during school district reorganization pro­
ceedings are mandated to fully inform and protect the citizens of the 
proposal. 
The division of assets and liabilities is a provision for school 
district reorganization. It provides for equitable distribution of 
assets and liabilities. 
Elections 
School district reorganization elections are a function of the 
legislature. Laws designed to provide understanding and protection 
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for the citizens of the proposal have been enacted to govern an orderly 
process of reorganization. 
Bond elections are also controlled in detail by statute. School 
districts may not indebt themselves in excess of five per cent of their 
actual valuation. The Court reversed an election when ballots, peti­
tions, and election notices were stated differently. This was due to 
the fact that an issue of this kind obligates district citizens for 
long periods of time, or not to exceed 20 years. 
Appeals 
A system of appeals was legislated to provide a more rapid and less 
costly means of administrative remedy, in contrast to court proceedings. 
School districts and county boards may appeal reorganization disputes 
to the State Board of Public Instruction. Citizens may appeal to the 
State Board by certiorari when lack of jurisdiction or illegal practice 
is evident. 
A transportation appeal to the State Superintendent is final and 
not subject to review. An appeal of this nature is not usually a court 
matter. 
Conclusions 
This study resulted in several conclusions relative to present 
educational practices. It should be remembered that issues settled by 
Supreme Court action are generally considered final in legal practice. 
They should be made known to those administering the educational program 
in Iowa. 
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Legislative enactment of a tort liability law in 1967, which 
included school districts, will probably create an increased 
number of tort court cases. 
A two and one-half mill levy may be scheduled for such dura­
tion of time as authorized by the electorate. A ten year 
period is considered reasonable because the Court approved 
that duration of time in the case of Chappell v. Board of 
Directors of the Independent School District of Keokuk. 
Statutory provision requires unused school sites to revert 
to the owners of land from which they were taken. The pur­
chaser must pay the school corporation the true value of the 
land. An appraisal must be conducted if agreement is not 
reached. 
It is believed that teacher retirement programs, sponsored 
by the school, are declining in number due to the initiation 
of social security and the Iowa Public Employees Retirement 
System programs. 
The sale of almost all property is specified by statute and 
is determined on the basis of property value and student en­
rollment. An Attorney General's opinion states that the 
sale of property for a fee of one dollar is not legal. Bids 
should be taken when property is sold. Failure to make an 
appraisal results in the board's inability to reject bids. 
The two and one-half mill levy is an additional means of 
opening roads to schools. 
Formerly, local school districts were responsible for educa­
ting children from charitable institutions located within 
their districts. Statutory provision has relieved them of 
this responsibility in that the State assumes tuition and 
transportation costs. 
Private or parochial school children have been prohibited 
from riding public school busses; however, the shared-time 
statute has modified this ruling. They may ride a public 
school bus if they are delivered to the public school just 
prior to or at the conclusion of a shared-time class. This 
ruling was initiated by an Attorney General's opinion, 
dated July 14, 1965. 
Bus transportation is provided by law to carry school children 
to and from school. Exceptions to the rule include student, 
extra-curricular activities and emergency operations for all 
citizens when time is of the essence. The exceptions have 
been legalized through the process of Departmental Rules. 
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10. Statutory requirement for all non-high school districts to 
be attached to 12 grade districts resulted in the attachment 
of many remnant parcels of land. County boards have made all 
assignments; however, two attachments are still in Court. 
11. A controversy exists relative to voting residence of college 
students. The Court ruled that it was permissible for them 
to establish residence in their home communities. A bill 
has been proposed by the Iowa Legislature in 1971 to have the 
residence established where the family pays taxes. 
12. Failure of joint county boards to establish boundary lines 
for school district reorganization due to deadlocked votes 
created considerable difficulty in the past. The legis­
lature corrected the problem by enacting a law which, upon 
a second tie vote, automatically results in positive action. 
Recommendations 
Future recommendations are presented even though the decisions of 
the Supreme Court have been rather constant in the various educational 
areas throughout the history of Iowa. If implemented, those who possess 
an interest in education will become more knowledgeable and effective. 
The following recommendations should be carefully considered: 
1. An updating of Supreme Court decisions should be made every 
five years. 
2. A statute should be enacted which would require the Depart­
ment of Public Instruction to forward a summary of Supreme 
Court decisions to all county, city and area superintendents. 
3. This same service should be provided for the various county 
attorneys, who are designated by law to avail their services 
to school districts. 
4. Those who teach school law at the Iowa college level should 
also be supplied by the service mentioned in recommendation 
No. 2. 
5. The proposed service of the Department of Public Instruction 
should also be provided to the legislators to acquaint them 
with Court decisions relative to the interpretation of the 
laws which they had enacted. 
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On the basis of the decided cases and recurring problems, it is 
recommended that the General Assembly of the State of Iowa enact 
statutes specifically providing: 
1. The ten year limitation on the two and one-half mill levy 
that has been followed by custom since the Chappell v. Keokuk 
Board of Directors case should be enacted into the statutes 
for ready reference. School administrators have access to 
copies of the school laws but few school offices are equipped 
with the Iowa Reports. 
2. Legislation should be passed, in the interest of equal treat­
ment of teachers, to phase out local retirement plans and 
place all public school teachers under the state plan. 
3. Arbitrary and outdated limitations on the amount of school 
property a board may sell without an election should be 
repealed. 
4. The matter of parochial school children riding school busses 
on the theory that they are part-time public school students 
should be clarified by express provision of statute to end 
perennial argument on the subject. 
5. Transportation of school children to extra-curricular events, 
and the source of payment of the cost, should be clarified 
by amendment to the statutes. The question of activity 
busses for the exclusive purpose of transportation of ath­
letes should be clarified by statute. 
6. School district reorganization attachment statutes should be 
clarified by amendment. No provision has been made for the 
authority of county boards to attach districts which have 
designated their high school students to another district on 
a tuition basis and continue to operate their elementary 
school. 
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APPENDIX 
A cross-reference of topics, issues, case titles, and page numbers 
is presented for the convenience of the reader. 
Bids 
Awarding - Hanlin v. Independent District of Charles City, p. 61. 
Oral Contract - Weitz v. Independent District of Des Moines, p. 61. 
Board Authority 
Board member and district employment - Moore v. Independent District 
of Toledo City, p. 48. 
Board member and sale of books to students - State of Iowa v. Wiek, 
p. 49. 
Board member resignation - Menlo Board of Directors v. Blakesley, 
p. 46. 
Boards prescribe curriculum - Neilan v. Sioux City Board of Directors, 
p. 47. 
De facto officer - Herbst v. Held, p. 45. 
Delegation of ministerial power - Looney v. Consolidated Independent 
School District of Cromwell, p. 42. 
Injunction and routine business - Kesselring v. Mooreland, p. 45. 
Legal counsel secured by board action - Independent School District 
of Cedar Township v. Wirtner, p. 43. 
Official board action - Herrington v. District Township of Liston, 
p. 42. 
Oral notice of board meeting - Gallagher v. Holley Springs School 
Township, p. 44. 
President and secretary and official business - Johnson v. School 
Corporation of Cedar, p. 48. 
Rules for married students - Waterloo Board of Directors v. Green, 
p. 41. 
School business and absence of board member - Consolidated School 
District of Glidden v. Griffin, p. 51. 
Transaction of business - Furnace Company v. District of Seymour, 
p. 42. 
Treasurer, school officer - Kennedy v. Independent School District of 
Derby Granger, p. 50. 
Board Committees 
Authority to pay expenses - Driscoll v. Independent School District of 
Council Bluffs, p. 76. 
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Bond Election 
College student's residence for voting - Frakes v. Farragut, p. 173. 
Ineligible college student - Strawn v. Independent School District 
of Indianola, p. 173. 
Minor election infractions - Headington v. North Winneshiek Community 
School District, p. 174. 
Printing differences of ballot, petition and election notice - Honohan 
V. United Community School District, p. 176. 
Rate of interest not stipulated on notice of election - Chambers v. 
Knoxville Board of Education, p. 178. 
Relief judges - Kirchoff v. Humboldt Community School District, p. 177. 
Simple majority vote - Adams v. Fort Madison Community School District, 
p. 179. 
Site not in possession - Seaman v. Baughman, p. 63. 
Statutory limitation - Winespear v. District Township of Holman, p. 178. 
Use of existing buildings when voters fail to approve construction 
project - Manders v. Consolidated Independent School District of 
Community Center, p. 156. 
Validity of bonding proposition at time of unsuccessful election -
Gibson v. Winterset Community School District, p. 176. 
Condemnation 
Affect on adjoining property - Haggard v. Independent School District 
of Algona, p. 63. 
Construction 
Abandoned construction - Green Bay Lumber Company v. Odeboldt School 
District, p. 72. 
Statutory noncompliance and tax levy - Casey v. Independent School 
District of Nutt, p. 73. 
Contiguous Territory 
Isolated district surrounded by districts favoring reorganization -
Brown v. Community School District of St. Ansgar, p. 144. 
Noncontiguous districts are de facto districts - DeBerg v. Butler 
County Board of Education, p. 143. 
Corporal Punishment 
Permanent injury (civil action) - Tinkham v. Kole, p. 103. 
Reasonable and for what parent asked his child to do (criminal 
action) - State v. Mizner, p. 101. 
What a parent asked his child to do (criminal action) - State v. 
Davis, p. 102. 
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County Boards 
Alteration of proposed school district reorganization proposal -
Community School District of Malvern v. Mills County Board of 
Education, p. 135. 
Authority to amend county plan - Hubka v. Mitchell County Board 
of Education, p. 134. 
County reorganization planning - Archer v. Fremont County Board of 
Education, p. 136. 
District reorganization resulting in increased taxes - Davies v. 
Monona County Board, p. 133. 
Reorganization appeal by a citizen to the state superintendent -
Everding v. Floyd County Board of Education, p. 135. 
Diploma 
Demanded upon successful completion of course of study - Valentine 
V. Independent School District of Casey, pp. 115-116. 
Discipline 
Authority to expel - Burdick v. Babcock, p. 106. 
Conduct outside school - Murhpy v. Board of Directors of the Independ­
ent School District of Marengo, p. 107. 
Expulsion for damage to property - Perkins v. Board of Directors of 
West Des Moines, p. 108. 
Division of Assets and Liabilities 
Settlement required - District Township of Franklin v. Wiggins, p. 148. 
Easement 
Requirements for school site - Ionia Independent School District v. 
DeWilde, p. 74. 
Finance 
Boards exceeding purchasing authority - American Insurance Company 
V. Stratton, p. 53. 
Competence in finance management - Hansen v. Independent School District 
of Holstein, p. 56. 
Excessive interest rates - Austin v. District Township of Colony, p. 54. 
Expenditures as voted by the electorate - Drew v. School Township of 
Madison, p. 55. 
Legal counsel - Rural Independent School District of Eagle v. 
Independent School District of Bankston, p. 52. 
Responsibility for stolen funds - District Township of Taylor v. 
Morton, p. 57. 
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Tax levy required - Boynton v. District Township of Newton, p. 55. 
Teacher retirement - Nelson v. Sioux City Board of Directors, p. 51. 
Treasurer liable for funds - District Township of Buffalo Creek v. 
Hardinbrook, p. 58. 
Fraud 
Bank liability for misappropriated funds - Independent Consolidated 
School District of Dow City v. Crawford County Trust and Savings 
Bank of Denison, p. 59. 
Legal counsel - Scott v. Independent School District of Harding, p. 58. 
State fund guarantee - Runyan v. Farmers Bank of Liberty Center, p. 59. 
Jurisdiction of Land 
Single area in two school district reorganization proposals simul­
taneously - Harberts v. Klemme Community School District, p. 146. 
Lease-Purchase Agreement 
Vote of people - Porter v. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction, 
p. 77. 
Property Tax 
Agricultural land tax - Keefner v. Porter, p. 33. 
District obligation to levy - Stevenson and Rice v. The District Town­
ship of Summit, pp. 29, 57. 
District owned property - Fort Dodge Independent School District v. 
The District Township of Summit, p. 30. 
Duration of two and one-half mill - Chappell v. Keokuk Board of 
Directors, p. 32. 
Improper payment by treasurer - District Township of Honey Creek 
V. Floete, p. 31. 
Property purchased after bond election - Grout v. Illingworth, p. 31. 
Property used by a college - ReDille v. Polk County, p. 34. 
Secretary instructed not to certify - Smith v. Powell, p. 32. 
Publication 
Necessary to school district reorganization - Cox v. Consolidated 
District of Readlyn, p. 147. 
Quasi-Corporations 
Closing school facility - Dean v. Armstrong, p. 26. 
Installment on property - Bloomfield v. Davis County Community School 
District, p. 25. 
Tort liability - Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Association, 
pp. 27, 34. 
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Racial Discrimination 
Equal educational opportunities - Clarke v. Muscatine, p. 99. 
Separate but equal provisions - Smith v. School District of Keokuk, 
p. 100. 
Remnant Districts 
Assignment of territory after removal from reorganization proposal -
Robrock v. Chickasaw County Board, p. 137. 
Assigned to one or more 12 grade districts - Osprey Rural Independent 
School District v. Monroe County Board of Education, p. 142. 
Court declines to evaluate educational opportunities - Greene v. 
Webster County Board of Education, p. 141. 
Federal government removes land - Hufford v. Herrold, p. 139. 
Inundated land not a portion of district - Rural Independent School 
District of Eden v. Ventura Consolidated Independent School District 
p. 138. 
School boundary adjustment a legislative function - Monroe Community 
School District v. Marion County Board, p. 140. 
Religion 
Building rental to Jewish federation - McLang v. Harper, p. 37. 
Public funds and secretarian teachers - Knowlton v. Baumhover, p. 37. 
Reorganization 
Absence of county board members at hearing and failure to stipulate 
method of board selection in notice of hearing - Rollins v. 
Halverson, p. 164. 
Authority of county board over land assigned to prior proposal -
Sheridan Rural School District v. Gurnsey Consolidated School Dis­
trict, p. 167. 
Authority of county board to set reorganization boundaries - Alley v. 
Mills County Board of Education, p. 166. 
Ballot boxes for towns which grew in population after petition was 
filed - Pleasant Hill Independent School District v. Norris, p. 162. 
Change of polling place - Warrington v. St. Ansgar Community School 
District, p. 152. 
Chapter 275 and further reorganization elections -ACL Community 
School District v. Wayne County Board, p. 156. 
City boundaries and reorganization of school boundaries - Independent 
School District No. 10 v. District of Kelley, p. 155. 
Concurrent action - Independent District of Lynnville v. District 
Township of Lynn Grove, p. 131. 
Consolidated districts - Kirchgatter v. Thompson, p. 132. 
County superintendent and addition of land to proposal - Brooker v. 
Ludlow, p. 160. 
220 
Elections on different days; validity of contesting reorganization 
after voting - Molyneaux v. Molyneaux, p. 161. 
Failure to approve petition dismissal status - Brighton Independent 
School District v. Joint County Board of Keokuk, Jefferson, and 
Washington Counties, p. 169. 
Filing of petition for election - Ha ins v. Consolidated Independent 
School District of Wright, p. 154. 
Number of land sections in existing districts - Liberty Consolidated 
School District, demons Consolidated School District, and Drew v. 
Schindler, p. 158. 
Petition signed by voters at large or by sections of land - Altman v. 
Independent School District of Gilmore City, p. 159. 
Polling place outside proposed boundary - Turnis Vc Monticello Board 
of Education, p. 163. 
Posting of election notice - Crawford v. School Township of Beaver, 
p. 152. 
Separate ballot boxes in unincorporated villages - State v. Booth, 
p. 154. 
Successive reorganizations and 12 grade system - Peterson v. Joint 
County Boards of Boone and Hamilton Counties, p. 168. 
Time priority in filing petition - Shilling v. Jefferson Community 
School District, p. 170. 
Validity of contesting reorganization after voting - Grant v. Norris, 
p. 171. ' ' • 
Voter qualifications - Taylor v. Independent School District of 
Earlham, p. 151. 
Withdrawal of names from petition - Zilske v. Albers, p. 157. 
Reorganization Appeal 
Appeal proceedings are a legislative function - Stanton Board of 
Education v. Montgomery Board of Education, p. 187-
Court will not decide reasonableness in formation of district - Essex 
Independent School District v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 
p. 185. 
Courts reasoned whether or not state board exceeded authority - Grimes 
Board of Directors v. Polk County Board of Education, p. 188. 
Enjoin state board, department of public instruction, and state super­
intendent improper - Board of Directors of Stanton Independent Dis­
trict V. Montgomery County Board of Education, p. 186. 
Notification to county superintendent upon appeal to state superintend­
ent - Durant District, Montpelier District, and Cedar County Board 
V. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction, p. 181. 
Tie vote of joint board in establishing boundary lines - Springville 
Community School District v. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction, 
p. 183. 
Validity of independent district appeal to State Board - Iowa Falls 
Board of Education v. State Board of Public Instruction^ p. 180. 
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Reorganization Petition 
District must seek administrative relief - Essex Independent School 
District v. Montgomery County Board of Education, p. 184. 
Reversion and Sale 
Option to purchase - Waddell v. Aurelia Board of Directors, p. 67. 
Payment requirement - Consolidated School District v. Thompson, p. 68. 
Quit claim deed and reversion - Suck v. Benton Township School Dis­
trict, p. 69. 
Reversion for one dollar fee - Johnston v. District Township of 
Ellsworth, p. 66. 
Roads 
Authority to open road - Bogaard v. Independent District of Plainview, 
p. 70. 
Authority to open road - Independent District of Flint River v. Kelley, 
p. 70. 
Extended roads - Locker v. Keller, p. 71. 
Site 
Board authority to determine - James v. Gettinger, p. 66. 
Site Location 
Geographical center of district - Van Es v. Independent Consolidated 
School District of Newkirk, p. 65. 
Site Measurement 
Area utilized by road - Salisbury v. Highland Township, p. 74. 
Site Size 
Statutory limitations - Smith v. Maresh, p. 64. 
Special Education 
Forced enrollment - The State Board of Education v. Petty, p. 104. 
Required attendance - State of Iowa v. Christ, p. 105. 
State Aid 
Rules for qualification - Lewis Consolidated School District v. 
Johnston, p. 38. 
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Tax Increase 
Not a violation of a citizen's constitutional rights - Wall v. 
Johnson County Board of Education, p. 145. 
Teacher Contract 
Board approval - Mulhall v. Pfankuck, p. 92. 
Change in assignment - Miner v. Lovilia Independent School District, 
p. 91. 
Different assignment - Jackson v. Independent School District of 
Steamboat Rock, p. 89. 
Legal contract - Smith v. District Township of Knox, p. 84. 
Obligation to pay salary - Smith v. Rural School District of Adair 
County, p. 92. 
President fails to sign - Independent School District of Eden No. 2 
v. Rhodes, p. 94. 
Proper administrative remedy - McGuffin v. Willow Community School 
District, p. 95, 
Recovery of wages - Smith v. School District of Grove, p. 89. 
Shared-time agreements - Clay v. Independent School District of 
Cedar Falls, p. 93. 
Signature of president - Place v. District Township of Colfax, p. 86. 
Specified calendar - Burkhead v. Independent School District of 
Independence, p. 90. 
Validity when school closed for lack of enrollment - James v. School 
Township of Troy, p. 88. 
Validity when signed by all parties - Shill v. School Township of 
Rock Creek, p. 87. 
Teacher Dismissal 
Board as judge and accuser - White v. Holstein Board of Education 
(Wahlenberg, board member), p. 84. 
Hearing required - Schrader v. Rural School District of Audubon 
County, p. 82. 
Hearing required - VanPeursem v. Consolidated Independent School 
District of Laurens, p. 81. 
Incompetence - Courtright v. Consolidated School District of Mapleton, 
p. 85. 
President selection - Benson v. Township School District of Silver 
Lake, p. 82. 
Right of recovery for wages - Hull v. Independent School District 
of Aplington, p. 80. 
Tort Liability 
Athletic field and injunction - Casteel v. Town of Afton, p. 35. 
County employee - Montanick v. McMillin, p. 35. 
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Governmental immunity - Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Association, 
p. 34. 
Nuisance - Ness v. Independent School District of Sioux City, p. 36. 
Transportation 
Door-to-door - Flowers v. Independent School District of Tama, p. 121. 
Driver's contract - Black v. Thayer Consolidated Independent School 
District, p. 129. 
For adults - Schmidt v. Blair, p. 127. 
For tuition students - Mumm v. Troy Township School District, p. 119. 
Private school children - Silver Lake Consolidated School District 
V. Parker, p. 126. 
Purchase of vehicles - Hare v. Boyer Township, p. 128. 
Requirement of parent - Lampshire v. Tracy Consolidated School, p. 120. 
Transportation Appeal 
Administrative relief - Queeny v. Higgins, p. 190. 
State superintendent ruling final - County Board of Bremer County v. 
Parker, p. 189. 
Transportation Reimbursement 
For children eligible for transportation - Bruggeman v. Independent 
District No. 4 Union Township, p. 125. 
Initial payment binds board - Woods v. Independent School District 
of Oto, p. 123. 
Outside of state - Dermit v. Sergeant Bluffs School District, p. 124. 
When district schoolhouse is closed - Riecks v. Danbury Public School, 
p. 124. 
When not agreed upon by a contract - Harwood v. Dysart Consolidated 
School District, p. 122. 
Tuition 
Administrative remedy is appeal - Preston v. School District of Marion, 
p. 110. 
Calculation - Nishna Valley Community School District v. Malvern 
Community School District, p. 28. 
Charitable institution - Salem Independent School District v. Kiel, 
p. 112. 
Designations and payment - School District of Soldier Township v. 
Moeller, p. 109. 
Improper calculation of rates - Center Township School District v. 
Oakland Independent School District, pp. 113-114. 
Liability of district - District Township of Horton v. District Town­
ship of Ocheydan, p. 27. 
Residence at county home - Carbon School District v. Adams County, 
p. 110. 
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Residence determination - Mt. Hope School District v. Hendrickson, 
p. 111. 
Voting Residence 
Place of employment - Dodd v. Lorenz, p. 96. 
